





KOVÁCS László (Managing Editor)
GAZDAG Ferenc (Editor)
HALÁSZ László (Editor)
BALÁZS Erika (Editorial Assistant)
  
Typeset and printed by NKE Szolgáltató Kft.
ISSN 1588 8789 (print)




















An International Journal of Security, Strategy, Defense Studies, 
Military Technology and Public Management
Published by the National University of Public Service
Editorial Board:
PADÁNYI József (Chair of Editorial Board)





AARMS Vol. 13, No. 1 (2014)
Contents
BALAJTI István: Short Study on Performance of Air Surveillance Augmented  
by Twin Radars  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
BALÁZS Róbert, KOPCSÓ István: Evidence Based Military Medicine –  
The NATO Trauma Registry Initiative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
MUNK Sándor: Component based IT interoperability solutions, a novel approach . . . . . . . . . . 31
FEJES Zsolt, KORODI Gyula: Analysis of upper respiratory tract infections  
in mission circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Petr MUSIL: Implementation of Goal–Oriented Budgeting in the Defence Sector . . . . . . . . . . . 53
FARKAS Tibor, HRONYECZ Erika: The infocommunication system requirements  
of the deployable rapid diagnostic laboratory support “sampling group” I. . . . . . . . . . . . 59
TÓTH Zsolt: War Grave Excavation Methods: Survey, Results and Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
FURJÁN Attila: Capabilities and application possibilities of the intelligence functional  
sub–system of “HUTOPCCIS” computer–aided command system operating  
on a geospatial information systems basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
RITTER Noémi: Mali: a new challenge for peacekeeping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
SZTANKAI Krisztián: Place and role of cultural anthropology in the Military  . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
FURJÁN Attila: Analysis and assessment of targets on a digital map and Computer  
processing of Intelligence data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Luboš ŠTANCL, Vendula HYNKOVÁ: Origin and development of the thoughts on military 
keynesianism during 1936–2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
KÁTAI-URBÁN Irina, VASS Gyula: Hazardous Activities in Hungary —  
in terms of Industrial Safety  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Holger SCHEPPELMANN: International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS)  
12–Inventories: Determining exemplary requirements for military logistics systems . . 155
HORNYACSEK Júlia, ANTAL Örs: (Specialized) Technical and medical reconnaissance  
of disaster–affected areas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Vlasta ZEKULIĆ, Ana ŽUŽIĆ , Adam PIŠKULIĆ: Support to insurgency  
and counter insurgency operations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Marek PANÁK, Jiří ČERNÝ: Military symbology and schemes of battalion task force  
in selected tactical activities (Learning tool) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Jiří SZTUKA, Ladislav HAGARA: Military Captcha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
SZABÓ Albert: The Analysis of the U.S. Financial Year (FY) 2014 Defense Budget. . . . . . . . 221
CSURGAI József, SOLYMOSI Máté: Thoughts on the Book Nuclear Reactor Safety . . . . . . . 229

AARMS Vol. 13, No. 1 (2014) 1–16.
1
Short Study on Performance of Air Surveillance 
Augmented by Twin Radars
BALAJTI István1
Detection of targets at low altitudes with a low Radar Cross Section (RCS) such as 
drones and stealth could challenge Air Surveillance systems and this situation must 
be addressed in a cost–effective way. This paper summarizes the newly emerged 
technical challenges of the Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) and gives solu-
tions on how to overcome recognized shortcomings. In addition it highlights prob-
lems and requirements related to drone maneuvering capabilities and their very 
low RCS. This article summarizes challenges and gives a synthesized solution to 
the network centric approach based on the short distance Gaussian bi–static radar 
concept called twin radar coherent signal fusion. The idea is to explore advantages 
of the twin radar concept such as doubled detection range, increased, superior 
angular resolution of the system and increased plot update frequency. Examples 
for the twin radar performance demonstration are based on VHF radar, which has 
unique capabilities such as exploitation of multipath and resonance frequency for 
drones. A few peculiarities of the new signal processing are introduced with the 
extended air traffic control and monitoring network structure. 
Introduction–motivation 
New challenges for air surveillance of CRC (and Civilian Air Traffic Control — CATC) have 
emerged in the last decade. The main outcomes of the air target detection, tracking, and rec-
ognition problems can be characterized as follows: 
• Risk of accidents in the low altitude of long range air surveillance radar networks shall 
be reduced.
• Natural disaster monitoring and rescue support in case of earthquakes, flood and 
forest fire.
• Increased interest for control and monitoring drones with less than 20 cm2 (8 inch2) 
Radar Cross Section.
Populations of the homemade drones or civil and commercial UAVs are rapidly growing. 
Several features such as flexible route planning, adaptive communications and control mech-
anism are built in the system. These functions have been designed to allow easy installation 
and operation keeping the operational cost down. The danger for drone’s illegal application 
such as traditional smuggling, terror threats or more sophisticated airborne cyber–attacks, 
hijacking mobile phone calls are increasing. Most of the drones are lightweight with very low 
RCS, due to latest fiber composite technology and the typical size, which is less than 2x4 m 
in length and wing span consequently. e.g. in case of the drone shown in Fig. 1 the length is 
1.7 m and the wing span is 3.7 m. 
1 balajti.istvan@uni-nke.hu, Hungary, Budapest, National University of Public Services, Military Science Faculty 
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Figure 1. Commercial UAV2 
Maneuvering capabilities of the drones are increasing beyond man piloted aircraft per-
formance, which redefines the plot update time requirements required for track initiation and 
maintenance. One of the simplest ways to characterize the required data update time of the 
highly maneuverable targets is if one determines its plot correlation time, which could be 
expressed in a simple way as “cos” curve fitting. Details on the target characteristics such as 
kinematic properties of its maneuvering capabilities and tracking could be found in [1]. Usu-
ally the Civilian Air Traffic Centre takes care of the airplanes having acceleration maximum 
3G and are well equipped by IFF/SSR systems. Fig. 2 shows that a target with low speed e. 
g. 500 km/h, has no correlation among updated plots at a 2G maneuver if the radar network 
plot update is 12 sec. The reliability of track initiation and maintenance is critical in case of 
intensive false plot production even with a well–designed Kalman Filter in the region of NO 
CORRELATION among updated plots. Consequently, Air Traffic Safety needs an air surveil-
lance radar network augmented by a new type of radar such as twin systems to detect, track 
and recognize all types of flying objects. [2]
Figure 2. Plot update requirement for reliable tracking [16: 20, updated – upd.]
2 http://www.bhe-mw.eu/bxuav.pdf  (downloaded: 19 10 2012)
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Characterization of traditional and twin radar performances
The traditional way to solve newly emerged detection, tracking and non–cooperative target 
recognition problems is to increase the required Signal–to Interference–Noise power Ratio 
(SINR), while the radar concept designer’s task is to maximize available technical solutions 
and advantages at the lowest cost and development risk. The receiver noise is determined as:
   
Where: 
kB – Boltzmann–constant,
Ts  – System noise temperature, 
Bn  – The effective noise bandwidth of the receiver, 
w(n)  – Receiver noise after ADC (Analogue Digital Converter) by  “n”–sample,
 – Auto–covariance of the receiver noise as the complex 
conjugate representation of the samples.
A simplified situation of the twin radar concept is plotted in Fig. 3. Two identical radars (e. 
g. Air Traffic Control radar or mobile VHF) are interconnected and are working in coherent 
signal processing mode for transmit and receive. Antenna beam pointing, surveillance meth-
ods and the triggers of transmit and receive signals are synchronized. The two radars have 
common exciters and signal processors next to the mono radar equipment, with maximum 
similarity in order to obtain maximum cross–correlation between the dedicated channels.
Figure 3.  
Short baseline (Gaussian) bi–static topology of twin VHF radar system [16: 73]
4 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
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Where:
Θ –  aspect angle <0.3o, because Leff<<r1  r2 This parameter separates the bi–static 
concept from twin radar concept.  
R1 – Radar 1, R2 – Radar 2,
SR(t) – signal power received by radar antenna:   
STr(t) – signal power transmitted to the antenna: 
 
ρT[1ρ] – Correlation coefficient between R1 and R2,
ρ(t1–t2) –  Correlation transfer function of the envelope detector signal between time in-
terval t1 and t2, 
A11 A12 A21 A22 –  Correlation coefficients in loops: exciter-R1-Coh.Sync; exciter-R1-R2- Coh.
Sync; exciter-R2-R1- Coh.Sync and exciter-R2- Coh.Sync consequently,
r1 – Distance between Radar 1 and Targets,
r2 – Distance between Targets and Radar 2,
Leff – effective base length, the projection length of baseline onto the plane of antennas,
σ – Radar Cross Section, RCS,
vr – Radial velocity of the target related to radar antennas.
The determining key parameters of the concept are the Coherent Parameter Estimation 
and the “effective base length” -Leff, which is perpendicular to the bisector of the angle be-
tween directions from the target to diverse radars. The modulated signal is generated in the 
exciter (Coh.Sync./Exciter block), amplified and radiated with the R1 and R2 antennas in the 
direction of the targets. The electro–magnetic energy is scattered in all directions from the 
surface of the target, with the energy level determined by the RCS and the Doppler shift pro-
portional to the radial velocity of the target to the directions of separated antennas. 
A portion of energy is collected by the R1 and R2 antennas and the received signal’s SINR 
is increased by amplification, filtering and signal processing gain. After detection, the target’s 
parameter estimation by the system allows target tracking. The realization of this technology 
is required to manage parameters of the radar equation while keeping the related correlation 
coefficient high >0.95. 
Challenges of the concept realization
It requires centralized control of spatially separated radars with spatially coherent signal 
processing fully or instantaneously in the case of degraded correlation coefficients. It is nec-
essary for:
• synchronization, phasing and control on mutual coupling/reflection of separated an-
tennas, transmission of reference frequencies and signals that depend on the type of 
operational mode;
• additional phase shift control of radar subsystems, such as short distance bi–static 
Doppler and Range peculiarities in ambiguities over relatively long time intervals re-
quires phase adjustment between adjacent systems in order to keep the system correla-
tion coefficient high;  
• cooperative beamforming, e.g. VHF multipath condition, signal reception frequency 
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and signal waveform emitted by the transmitting radars must be known at the receiving 
counterpart;
• increased requirements for signal–, data processors, computer systems and data trans-
mission from radars to the common signal processing centre, and for control command 
distribution;
• coordinate conversion of radar data from local coordinate systems into the common 
coordinate system, because errors in the determination of antenna positions and the 
orientation of local coordinate axes influence directly the accuracy of output informa-
tion traditional phased–array technology which is maximizing the coherent processing 
gain at the transmitter, beamforming and the receiver side [3].
Symulation results of the realization
The realization biggest uncertainties are related to the RCS of the target for related correla-
tion coefficients. In narrow–band radar (Bn/fo <<1  at frequency “i”) applications, contribu-
tions from all scattering centers combine coherently to produce a single value for the target 
RCS at every aspect angle. In the proposed multi–band application, a target has target motion 
and can straddle many range bins, therefore maintaining the coherence of the received signals 
could be complicated, and may also be limited. Equation (2) depicts that RCS fluctuates as 
a function of RCS of the mth scattering centre, radar aspect angle on frequency “i” (or in 
frequency diversity mode of narrow–band radar operation). The individual amplitudes of the 
electro–magnetic field corresponding to √σm i at the envelope detector output are added vec-
torized, taking into account their phases. The complex RCS of the target could be rewritten 












σm i  –  RCS of the mth scattering centre for the polarization of the radar on ith narrow–band 
radar frequency,
φm i  –  Initial phase shift introduced by mth scattering centre into reflected field on ith 
narrow–band radar frequency,
“m” –  Refer to scatters 1, 2, … and subscript “i” to narrow–band radar operating fre-
quency,
dm = |(r1+r2)m–1 - (r1+r2)m |– distances among scattering centers,
 – unit vector directed to the radar (does not change in Gaussian bi–static situation,
ko – Wave number, 2π/λo,,
λo – Transmitted wavelength of Radar 1, or carrier frequency (fo), λo = c/fo
 – Complex representation of the Phase. 
Please note: the bi–static RCS of a target, σi(Θ), at the frequency “i” is equal to its mono–
static RCS for a radar located at the bisector of the angle Θ and working at the wavelength 
λi/cos(Θ/2), when “the mono–static – bi–static equivalence principle” is valid.
6 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
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Findings related to the radar cross section
The amplitude at the output of the i–th narrow–band radar receiver will be proportional 
to   and depending also on other parameters of the radar equation marked by Ki. It is 
known by basic radar theory that the SINR is the Key Measure of the Radar Performance and 
defined as ratio of signal power to noise power at the receiver output and the total energy ratio 
for coherent signals can be calculated. Fig. 4 shows the genetic receive and signal detection 
structure of the twin radar. The system has up to XI(t) simultaneous channels and MF — 
Matched Filters, where X1(t) and related transmit part is the reference. Compared to reference 
the time delays and the phase shifts are measured, adjusted to improve the signal coherency 
in transmit, beamforming and receive for maximal SINR. The envelope detector “Σ” sum the 
signals in phase and comparison with the threshold detects the targets in the traditional way.
 
Figure 4.  
Receive and signal detection structure of the twin radar [3: 123, upd.] 
In case of coherent signal processing an envelope–detector receiver output amplitude 
from the narrow–band such as “VHF’, “L”and “S”band  radar receivers are added. It would 
be possible to define a composite RCS as:
Where the term  represents the summed noise powers of the three (“i” – in 
general case) narrow–band radar receiver outputs. Let’s assume that the two sets of radar 
parameters are equivalent with K/kBTsBn. In case of noncoherent signal integration a square–
detector receiver output amplitude from the radar receivers is added. The total RCS can be 
expressed as:  
BALAJTI István: Short Study on Performance of Air Surveillance Augmented by Twin Radars
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Putting the total RCS value into the radar equation the system output signal amplitude 
can be normalized to “r. m. s” noise amplitude. Equations (3) and (4) show that the temporal 
correlation is determined by the target rotation angle during time on target interval and by 
the target dimensions to the wavelength ratio.
A first–order approximation of RCS for a complex object can be obtained by summing 
the major specular RCS components. This is shown in Fig. 5 with a simulation performed 
on spheres in the VHF frequency band, showing RCS changes relative to the angle of radar 
pulses. The 3 small spheres are 9.84 inches (25 cm) and the two big spheres are 13.8 inches 
(35 cm) with the positions and parameters of Fig. 5. 
The random aspect of the target RCS is the result of a rotation from the mean position of 
the target through a small random angle. Averaging should be made over the random target 
aspects, which are small in our cases, relative to spatially diverse antennas. The spatial cor-
relation function of signal fluctuations for 3D moving targets of an arbitrary shape proves 
that a target RCS containing many scatterers is not random.
The target’s RCS dependency on the frequency band, shows advantages if the target size 
determined by the resonance region of the allocated frequency. The key performance is that 
the RCS signal fluctuation is relatively steady for a large aspect angle relative to the radar. 
Consequently random and fluctuating signals at the receiver input are a result of summing 
many partial signals from small non–random scatterers with sharply changing phases.
 
Figure 5. Drone RCS models based on 5 spheres  
in 3 VHF frequency (no source – n s.)
Further investigation is required with the comparison of advantages and disadvantages to 
find the proper frequency for the required radar system for dedicated targets recognition. Fig. 
6 shows plots of the composite RCS of the modeled spheres. Table 1. summarizes findings 
of the analyzed scatterers signal processing statistics related to situation displaced at Fig. 6.
8 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
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Figure 6. Composite RCS statistics for twin VHF radar signal processing (n s.)
RCS statistics: f=144 MHz f=180 MHz f=240 MHz “Composite”
MEAN -12.36 -8.899 -9.425 -1.513
median -12.19 -8.819 -7.376 -1.637
mode -28.54 -11.85 -67.67 -5.02
STD 6.483 5.75 8.695 2.099
Table 1. Twin VHF radar signal processing statistics
The main advantages of the twin VHF radar composite signal processing are the in-
creased RCS and the moderated signal fluctuation, which increases the achievable SINR of 
twin radars.
 Further information on the bi–static and multi–static radar could be obtained from [5, 6]. 
Note: applicability of the concept on the VHF radar has some peculiarities “well known” 
by radar experts that require attention and detailed clarification such as the multipath effect, 
mutual coupling, reflections and environmental interferences that frequently block the new 
VHF radar developments. 
IV./b. Findings related to the twin antenna patterns
Fig. 7 shows two conventional phased–array radar which are connected to twin radar phased 
arrays. The whole transmitting array is considered as one array (Resultant Directivity Pat-
tern), which has an overall illumination function containing two identical illumination func-
tions related to R1, R2 and a few hundred “m” isolated gaps between. The receive patterns 
contain sum and simultaneous different channels. Frequency diversity modes are foreseen 
with 3 waveforms emitted at ± 3 dB beamwidth shift to the center beam. The uplink and 
downlink channels are to be separated by traditional beamformer networks. The two radars, 
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introduced above are interconnected and working in coherent signal processing mode as sim-
plified situation is plotted in Fig. 3. The phased array antenna patterns have been analyzed 
in the literature so far [6] and do not needed deep explanation. Consider a phased array with 
M transmit and receive elements, where the beamformer produces its output by forming a 
weighted combination of signals: 
        (5)
In case of twin phased array, such as Fig.7:    
− the antenna gain is doubled compared to a mono–radar case because 
the beam forming networks of the joint phased array complex conjugate pattern productions 
are common. 
Where: c=[ ]T – column vector of beamforming weights, xm(n) – signal on 
the phased array element m and D*(n) – is the complex mutual coupling/reflection coefficient 
of two phased arrays.
Figure 7. Phased array of twin radar (unpublished – up.) 
To demonstrate the peculiarities a simplified simulation was carried out where the phased 
array of R1 and R2 radar contain 32 elements with the same illumination functions of R1 and 
R2. The distance between the phased array antennas is 500 m, where the real part of the com-
plex mutual coupling/reflection coefficient is 0.3, 0.1 and 0.05 respectively. The beams are 
calculated using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The calculated far field antenna pattern of the 
two closely located VHF radar antennas is displayed at Fig 8.  The receive pattern situation 
has been simulated and the results analyzed also. The receive SUM channel is identical to the 
transmit array tapering, while the DEL channel`s array tapering phase of R1 radar which has 
been shifted by 180 degrees produces the complementary antenna far field pattern.
As predicted by phased array antenna theory the “grating lobes” of the far field patterns are 
increased. Details of the effect can be seen in Fig. 9. The main beam pattern has deep notches 
with a magnitude of 20–30 dB which can be observed. These notches cause additional signal 
fluctuations regarding the complementary channel delta, in case of operational frequency 
change. The effect of mutual coupling/reflection between two phased arrays is changing by 
antenna positions, which has significant effect on the antenna patterns as Fig. 8 shows. Con-
sequently, the notches in the twin VHF radar main beam one shall be precisely calculated and 
measured during the calibration of the system and adjusted continuously during operation.
10 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
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Figure 8. Twin VHF radar far field diagrams with the transmit illumination functions (up.)
The notches in the main beam comparison caused by frequency differences and/or an-
tenna rotation show a similarity to the monopulse angular measurement techniques, where 
simultaneous offset beams are compared. This effect has to be exploited for improvement of 
angular accuracy as we see in the case of mono–pulse or multi–beam systems. (In the case 
of different carrier frequencies the notch positions move with the frequency change giving 
possibilities for further increase of the angular resolution measurement accuracy of the twin 
radar system.) See Fig. 9.
Figure 9. Magnified view of the twin VHF radar far field patterns (up.)
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IV./c. Findings related to Range and Doppler Ambiguities’ 
Fig. 10 shows geometry and kinematics of the target motion in a twin radar system as char-
acterized in Fig. 3. As target position relative to the receive site is required to be known in 
twin radar implementation the Gaussian bi–static Range (Ru) and Doppler (vu) ambiguity 
peculiarities at the receivers can be calculated. Both of them depend on the Pulse Repetition 
Frequency (PRF) of the twin radar system. The ambiguous range in each PRF is followed by 
an unfolding and correlation process. [7] The unfolding creates a vector of possible ranges 
for valid detections by adding a set of integers [0…K] times the unambiguous range interval:
          (6)
     (7) 
Where: 
c – speed of light, fr=PRF, The set of integers [0...K] are referred to as the range ambigu-
ity number, with K determined by the maximum range of interest, λ – operational wavelength 
of the radar, frλ/2 – is the first blind speed (PRF velocity), δ, Θ – related to the target move-
ment in Fig. 10, and [-J…0...K] represents the set of Doppler ambiguity numbers covering 
the maximum negative and positive Doppler–velocities for the targets of interest.
Figure 10. Twin VHF radar and target movement geometry (up.)
As the example assumes: the VHF radar antenna rotation is 6 APM (Antenna rotations Per 
Minute, operational frequency =160 MHz, Target radial speed = 0.1–1000 m/s, its amplitude 
= 100 mV and the target radial speed fluctuate due to change of heading and/or acceleration. 
Fig. 11 draws the attention to the proper Pulse Repetition Frequency selection complexity 
while remaining unambiguous of Range and Doppler velocity in the required margin. First 
of all, the Doppler unambiguous margin is critical up to 100 Hz PRF for low speed targets 
and reduces in higher PRF.
12 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
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Secondly, the range unambiguous margin has opposite behavior, but both cases are very 
sensitive for targets at low speed with high acceleration capabilities as speed vector change 
indicates. (Such targets can be drones and other types of small airplanes that could be prob-
lematic from tracking points of view.) This situation could be resolved by increased resolu-
tion of the twin radar system.
Increase of resolution performance of the twin radar is convenient to calculate with ap-
proximate expression (Resultant Directivity Pattern) based on Rayleigh criterion to echo 
from point target. [3] The thermal noise error of monopulse estimate, for high SINR can be 
expressed [8]:
Where the 
σ(α) – denotes the r.m.s. error of the resolution estimation in the bi–static plane, 
Θ3 – Resultant Directivity Pattern beamwidth at 3 dB; 
km –  denotes the r.m.s. error of the monopulse slope can be determined directly from 
measured Σ and ∆ patterns, 
n – denotes the number of the received pulses. 
Figure 11. Twin VHF radar unambiguous Range and Doppler velocity vs.  
Pulse Repetition Frequency (up.)
Detection capabilities of a twin system could be proven by Barton’s MRSAS 3.3.2 Pro-
gram calculations. [9] This method allows easy comparison of the radar system performance 
changes, while it looks “not important” enough to be implemented for comprehensive stud-
ies. The author’s experience of this article shows that the “apples and oranges” type of com-
parison’s confusion can be reduced significantly if researchers more frequently use the “old 
fashioned Blake charts” for showing the Row Order of Magnitude of the applicability of the 
idea. Related to the subject twin radar performance calculations have been introduced in [10]. 
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The summary of the calculations show that the detection range of the target is doubled 
for default circumstances. The reason is that the new system itself shall have advanced ca-
pabilities such as 6 dB Power–Aperture search advantage in simplified operational mode 
and 9 dB Power–Aperture–Gain. Additionally 7–10 dB increase of RCS for same types of 
targets and 2–2.7 dB multipath effect can be explored in the case of VHF radar band offered 
circumstances [11].
 Additional 3 dB advantages in the twin radar signal processing can be exploited as 
pointed out in Fig. 12. This Fig. has been produced applying findings [12] to the MATLAB 
Phased Array Toolbox.
The Pd increases from 0.1 dB to 0.5 dB at fixed Pfa=4·10
–6 in twin radar signal process-
ing or the Pfa reduces from 8·10
-4 to 4·10-6 at fixed Pd=0.5 dB. A compromise has to be found 
among the reduced probability of detection, probability of false alarm and the required SINR 
for a good quality of target detection. One of our future tasks is to characterize the centralized 
signal fusion with a correlation gate feedback control function applied to three different Pd 
(0.9; 0.3; 0.1) related to “optimal” Pfa of the radars as is it looks to be one of the most prom-
ising solutions for twin radar applications.
Figure12. Pd vs. Pfa in case of mono and twin VHF radar cases [16: 80]
Fig.13 depicts the generic structure of the extended military–civilian air traffic control 
and monitoring network. Different types of narrow–band radar such as short, long range, 
“VHF”, “L” and “S” band radars are connected.  The bone radar network contains military 
and civilian radars that are installed under RADOME and all of them connect to the air traffic 
control centers for centralized plot fusion. There is no plot exchange among radars in the 
traditional structure at all. The plot based radar networks performances and capabilities have 
been analyzed in the literature so far and do not require further explanation.
The extended detection range requires increased performance of the radar which could 
be enriched by added mobile or fixed counterparts for realization of twin radar offered per-
formance, where the twin passive systems are an essential part of the structure. The method 
based on twin radar concept offers a sort of coherent video integration in the Sensor Fusion 
14 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
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Post (SFP) at the signal fusion level, which could be allocated inside, or close to the radars. 
The twin radar concept advance performances, increase of target detection and angular reso-
lution, could be extended further as is shown in the middle of the figure. The signal level data 
exchange among radars such as “VHF”, “S” and passive (“P”) systems are required because 
hits of the radars are collected from all radar correlation gates, in three different threshold 
levels, commutatively. This information is then compared, merged, filtered and the targets 
are extracted with standard target detection requirements. Advance passive radars can be 
installed on board of drones too. This solution offers extended air surveillance performances 
from the air for “S”, “L” and “VHF” radars applying so called sparse phased array technolo-
gy on the board of mutually cooperating drones.  
The low frequency band such as HF and VHF radars importance are increasing recently 
in modern air surveillance systems because their RF pulse propagation peculiarities can be 
exploited for target detection even in extreme weather conditions. Hungary has large flat 
surfaces that are very suitable for exploitation of the multipath effect of the VHF band radars. 
Consequently they are very cheap from operational and maintenance points of view and VHF 
radar type shall be kept in the radar fleet and should be modernized time to time. Nowadays 
the twin radar concept solves the biggest shortcoming of low frequency band radar because 
their angular resolution can be increased as equation (8) points out.  
Figure 13. Extended air traffic control and monitoring network structure [16: 84]
This system concept supports the track initiation and maintenance of the highly maneu-
verable targets too. It solves uncertainties introduced in Fig. 2 because the radars marked 
under RADOME are synchronized in antenna rotation in such a way that the “L” band radar 
follows the “VHF” band radar surveillance sector with a 120 degree delay. If both radars 
independent plot update time is 10 sec, the target position and speed vector update sequence 
is 0 sec -3 sec -10 sec -17 sec -20 sec etc. This feature increases the target initialization prob-
ability up to 12 G. 
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Two, Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) were an integral part of the Hungarian Air 
Defense system in the past. The ISAR is a known technique to generate a two–dimensional 
high resolution image of a target. The image of ISAR radar has had sufficient quality to allow 
it to be used for target recognition purposes. In situations where other radars display only 
a single unidentifiable bright moving pixel or scope of the target, the ISAR image is often 
adequate to discriminate between various drones, missiles, military and civilian aircraft. The 
difficulty in utilizing this capability is the object motion and its periodicity, which is mea-
sured in 2–dimensional Fourier transform of the received signal as a function of frequency 
and target aspect angle. The twin concept could be extended to the Inverse Synthetic Aper-
ture Radar when two ISAR coherently connected and formulate an Interferometric Inverse 
Synthetic Aperture Radar with 3–dimensional FFT applications. The twin ISAR shown in the 
Fig. 13 should be an essential part of drone recognition and increased safety measure support 
of the airplanes in the near future.
The twin radar can also be subject to intentional interference initiated by hostile trans-
missions. Thus it is essential to examine how the performance will be affected under such an 
environment. A few aspects of the investigation and related simulations have been already 
carried out in open literature. [13]
Summary
General overview on the air surveillance system augmented by twin radar is introduced. The 
system elements connections and main performances highlight the fact that management of 
the extended volume of the air surveillance space is required in detection range of the low 
RCS signature targets, such as drones, Stealth with high maneuvering capabilities and in the 
very low altitude down to the highway level at low cost. It was pointed out by this article also 
that the twin radars, which are based on very high correlation coefficients of the transmitter, 
antenna and receiver sub–systems have unique performances. Most important among these 
are: the capability of the double detection range of the Stealth, drones constructed with low 
or very low RCS technologies. 
Main challenges of the twin radar concept realization are reviewed and analyzed. Behav-
iors of the target RCS in case of coherent and non-coherent signal integration is demonstrat-
ed, the antenna pattern peculiarities, the Range and Doppler ambiguities are analyzed, and 
the angular resolution increase is introduced briefly. The results show that newly proposed 
system itself shall have advanced capabilities such as 9 dB Power–Aperture–Gain sensitivity 
advantage and more than 3 dB signal processing gain. Additionally 7–10 dB increase of RCS 
for some types of targets and 2–2.7 dB multipath effect can be explored in the case of VHF 
radar band offered circumstances. The author’s field experiences show that the target signa-
tures RCS in the VHF band usually give 5–10 dB stronger reflections than in the “S” band. 
The twin radar signal processing offers a significant increase in probability of detection, and 
false alarm reduction. The main drawback of the VHF radar was in the past the angle mea-
surement accuracy and resolution capability which could be eliminated too. 
Additional benefits can be obtained at a relatively low–cost, under the assumption that 
the system is set up by integrating operational radar, or by adding remote Passive Location 
Capabilities applying the findings of advanced MIMO technologies to the twin radar concept. 
From a logistic support point of view the performance of the radar systems shall be foreseen 
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guaranteed and checked regularly for 20 years. Cost efficient realization of it requires well 
developed and maintained “in situ” performance measurement technologies, which are re-
quired for tests above the Built In TEst (BITE) capabilities of the radar. It is important to note 
that the twin radar concept gives improved reliability and operational availability of the air 
surveillance radar systems.
These benefits are among others focused on the possibility to implement fully coherent 
transmit, antenna, receive and signal processing methods into the wide area distributed radar 
systems. The topic has got more attention and importance recently as patent [14] and article 
[15] highlights this fact.
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Evidence Based Military Medicine –  
The NATO Trauma Registry Initiative
BALÁZS Róbert1, KOPCSÓ István2 
For thousands of years Medicine was practiced in empiric and authoritarian ways. 
Physicians and other medical personnel always treated sick people with the prin-
ciple of “nil nocere”, meaning “do no harm”, but the procedures sometimes either 
were not effective or did cause harm. Modern scientific methods in medicine en-
abled the scientists to provide firm results and evidence of a particular treatment 
or procedure in health care provisions.
In a controlled clinical environment the prospective, double blinded, multi–centric, 
randomized trial became the golden standard of research, because this method 
provided the most solid basis of testing a hypothesis.
In Military Medicine the operational environment and battle rhythm define the 
framework for the practice. It is impossible to design a trial with all the afore-
mentioned requirements in battlefield settings, however small scope prospective 
trauma care studies are now getting approval and some of them have been already 
published. The tools for this research are the national Military Trauma Registry 
Systems, which are available now in a few countries. The NATO Trauma Registry 
Initiative is a multinational effort for the exchange of operational trauma care data 
among the NATO Military Medical Services, to foster the improvement of Military 
Medicine and to provide more solid evidence for treatment.
Foreword
The chronology of the NATO Trauma Registry (NTR) takes one back in time to 2008. The 
successes of the few national military trauma registries became apparent and the Chiefs of 
Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS) requested a study from the NATO Research 
and Technology Organization3 (RTO). The RTO described the national trauma registries and 
released a firm recommendation and the summary of the benefits of a common database. This 
technical report was published in March 2008. [1] The report provided the reference point for 
the development of the NTR.
Executive Summary
“One of the precepts of military medical support is to constantly maintain and improve the 
quality of healthcare which is available to our deployed personnel. When there is a political 
1 NATO Support Agency Capellen, Luxembourg, e-mail: robert.balazs@nspa.nato.int
2 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Mons, Belgium
3 New name is NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)
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decision to put troops in harm’s way, there is a concomitant duty to implement processes that 
will improve quality of care in an institutionalised way. One tool which has been found useful 
in this context by several nations is that of a trauma registry.” [1]
Continuous improvement of health care in operations needs to be supported by various 
analyses of injuries sustained in combat situations. The underlying data should be captured, 
stored and utilised for comprehensive research and performance improvement.
Although the imperative of such a tool is admitted, there are only few nations employing 
trauma registries on a national level. There is a particular limitation for nations whose casu-
alty numbers and case loads are not sufficiently large to allow scientifically and statistically 
robust analysis. Moreover, there is no standardized means of communication or exchange of 
information. This factor limits the systematic exploitation of lessons learned.
The NATO Trauma Registry Task Force (NTR TF) was established in late 2010 to accel-
erate the process of the implementation of a common Trauma Registry in NATO. COMEDS 
endorsed the initiative and mandated the Task Force to validate the progress by using a pilot 
study [2].
Methodology
The pilot study assessed the feasibility of the NTR. It is a descriptive study. Besides the 
analysis of virtual patient data MILMED COE performed field health data collection in the 
Area of Responsibility of the International Stabilisation and Assistance Forces (ISAF). The 
field deployment included one week data collection in Kabul FRA Role3 hospital and one 
week in Mazar–e–Sharif DEU Role3 hospital. From 15–30 JAN 2012 two MILMED COE 
medical staff officers, who have been previously trained in US trauma system, were deployed 
to execute the task.
During the pilot study the NTR Core Data Elements (defined by different COMEDS 
Working Groups and Expert Panels), US JTTR v3.2 Data Collection Form and UK Trauma 
Audit Form v5.1 were utilized.4 The team collected anonymous patient data according to the 
data handling policy. The collected data is classified as UNCLASSIFIED.
The team mission was affected by one major limiting factor:
• The theatre weather conditions limited the data collection in FRA Role3 hospital to 
three days.
Parallel with the planning and performance of the field data collection, the TF member 
NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) constructed the experimen-
tal NTR import interface. NC3A tested the NTR–US–UK exchange capabilities using the 
NATO Trauma Registry Core Data Elements. The technical report from the Agency will be 
discussed in this report concisely.
Major conclusions
Having proven the technical feasibility of communication and data exchange between differ-
ent registries further standardization of data elements and development of related processes 
are needed.
4 All three data collection forms are available from the authors.
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Key recommendations
• Development of a standardized data dictionary (in accordance with STANAG 2231)
• Engagement of the TF in further development from “Registry” to “System” during the 
initiated commercial development phase of the NTR
Introduction
The NATO Trauma Registry (NTR) is a military medical tool that will link participating 
nations to improve operational medical awareness, monitor casualty care, share experience 
and analysis of trauma management among nations and so ensure that state–of–the art trauma 
care is provided. The principle purpose of a NTR is to act as a quality assurance system for 
the management of military medical trauma from point of injury to rehabilitation. It is a tool 
to support continuous detailed clinical audit and research and improve the provision of care 
for frontline personnel.
The NTR project was initially outlined by the NATO Research and Technology Organi-
sation (RTO). Human Factors & Medicine (HFM) was tasked to analyse the current national 
trauma registries and make proposals to implement such a tool NATO–wide. RTO predicted 
the following potential benefits:
• Aid in the classification of injuries sustained in military operations
• Track casualty outcomes and impairment
• Develop standardized clinical treatment guidelines
• Ensure effective process monitoring
• Improve the development and use of protective equipment and vehicle protection
• Inform and focus medical research
• Assess and improve treatment quality[1] 
It is crucial that the final RTO report recommended establishing a common NATO trauma 
registry.
The Committee of the Chiefs of the Military Medical Services (COMEDS) endorsed the 
project, tasking the Military Health Care WG (MHC WG) and the Medical Command Infor-
mation Systems Expert Panel (MedCIS EP) to work on its development. Later MHC WG 
involved the Emergency Medical Expert Panel (EM EP) to provide its expertise and help to 
define the NTR core data elements. The Medical Communication and Information Systems 
Expert Panel (MedCIS EP) contributed STANAG 2543 promulgated in 2009 and STANAG 
study draft 2231, but this was later withdrawn from the ratification process.
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Figure 1. NATO Trauma Registry timeline5
In 2010, acknowledging the comprehensive work done by the custodian, the NATO Trau-
ma Registry project was reaffirmed. A NTR Task Force (TF) – upon receiving mandate from 
COMEDS – was established under the umbrella of MHC WG, with MILMED COE as co-
ordinating secretary supported by volunteer participating nations (BEL, CZE, DEU, FRA, 
GBR, NLD, USA) and Allied Command Operations (ACO). NC3A was tasked by Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT) to support the project and facilitate the project develop-
ment [3]. The TF got the mandate to accelerate the process and validate the progress using a 
pilot study. The timeline of the TF activities are shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2. NATO Trauma Registry Task Force Timeline6
Problem Statement
A number of nations are employing trauma registries but they are doing it on a limited na-
tional level. There are no standardized means of communication or exchange of information 
amongst the involved nations and this fact limits the opportunities to learn quickly from the 
experience of others and prohibit a broader analysis of trauma to support best medical prac-
tise in military deployments. This is a particular limitation for nations whose casualty num-
bers and case loads are not sufficiently large to allow scientifically and statistically robust 
analysis. The result is that only anecdotal information is available about the current combat 
trauma care of the casualties.
In order to facilitate and structure the further development of a common NTR, with the 
benefits for all contributing nations, the TF has designed this pilot study.[2]
5 Author’s own figure created in 2012, presented in Trauma Innovation Conference in London UK
6 Author’s own figure created in 2013, presented in Trauma Innovation Conference in London UK
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Pilot objectives
Goals/Overall Objectives:
1. To assess the feasibility of the NTR.
2. To assess that the validity / significance of military medical research is higher in mul-
tinational than in national approaches.
3. To determine that evidence in military medical research can be achieved when it is 
based on a qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient set of standardized data.7
Purpose:
1. To develop a working model of NTR; to merge the numbers of national cases into a 
single database and henceforth provide a scientifically robust pool of information for 
studies and analysis.
2. To encourage nations to exchange and share anonymous data.
Output
1. Established functional interface among national trauma registries 
2. Communication strategy among NATO TF Nations.
Activities
1. To identify a limited number of parameters for a descriptive study design based on 
NATO TRAUMA REGISTRY CORE DATA ELEMENTS [10]
2. To identify participating nations and their current systems (internal system model com-
pared to NTR model)
3. To utilize the UK/US JTTR as a template of national trauma registries
4. To develop a Trauma Registry System Data Model in order to exploit the trauma reg-
istry data
5. To develop an NTR Data Exchange Model to enable exchange of core data elements 
6. To utilize algorithm for Global NTR ID in order to avoid data redundancy
7. To design the preliminary rules and procedures to support the NTR model
8. To do a test run of import / export based on available systems




This pilot study is designed to assess the feasibility of the NTR. It’s a descriptive study.
Inclusion / exclusion criteria:
NTR inclusion criteria are defined in Annex B of RTO TR–HFM–131: all patients (military 
and civilian) with physical trauma seen at Role 2 or above requiring one of the following [1]:
• Surgical procedure/treatment
• Activation of the trauma team, partial or full.
• Admittance in MTF
7 Goal 2 and 3 require further research and will be discussed elsewhere.
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• Transport to a higher level
• All deaths
Data collection
Data collection and “Minimum Data Set” are defined in Annex C of RTO TR–HFM–131.
After the data collection phase, national data (AFG, DEU, FRA, GBR and USA) were 
imported into the NTR Database.
Evaluation Criteria8
• Quantity of anonymous trauma data
• Functionality of communication among systems
 - Timeliness
 - Centralised control and handling
 - Accessibility
• Collection method
 - Effectiveness and efficiency
 - Quality and standards
• Usability of collected data for lessons identified
• Further need of data standardization (e.g. ICD–10) or any interoperable standardized 
nomenclature according to STANAG 2231.
• User–friendliness of the manual and the requirement for specific training for data col-
lection and registering.
Study Results / Observations
Results of the field experiment
The field data collection aimed to populate trauma patient data available in theatre military 
treatment facilities (MTF). The two weeks period of deployment was split into two parts. In 
the first week the team visited the FRA Role3 hospital in Kabul International Airport (KAIA), 
the second week was spent in the DEU Role3 hospital in Mazar–e–Sharif (MeS), ISAF Re-
gional Command North [5].
Description of activities
The COE team met the MEDAD of RC North that included discussion of current epidemio-
logical trends and preventive medical trends.
The team received a hospital familiarization brief and situational awareness presentation 
in the facilities. The multinational medical team in both facilities were aware of the NTR 
project. Trauma patients were selected with the active assistance of the hospital leadership 
according the NTR inclusion criteria.
8 Summary of Evaluation criteria results in Annex A
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In Kabul the FRA hospital included BGR, CZE, HUN and USA personnel. The patient 
documentation was mainly in English; FRA military casualties sometimes were documented 
only in French. Our team was affected by the French hospital rotation and transfer of com-
mand in the particular week. The number of days spent in Kabul was reduced due to the 
weather and the consequent flight restrictions.
In Mazar–e–Sharif the hospital consisted of DEU, HUN and USA medical personnel. The 
patient documentation was in English and German, for non–DEU patients the medical record 
was always in English. The DEU hospital provided office space and a standalone laptop with 
fixed IP (internet protocol) address.
The team tested data availability in coherence with the NATO Trauma Registry Core Data 
Elements, and the UK Trauma Audit Form v5.1, US JTTR v3.2 Data Collection Form. These 
forms were available electronically as MS Word documents except the US form, which was 
in Adobe Portable Document Form (PDF). The US dataset was employed on printed paper 
forms.
NTR Core data elements
NTR Core Data Elements are based on NATO RTO HFM–131 report recommendations. 
COMEDS tasked the Military Health Care Working Group (MHC WG) to provide minimum 
requirements for collectible trauma data. In the MILMED COE field data experiment the data 
set was utilized and recommendations are the following:
1. Some of the fields are not collectible from current medical documentation.
2. Some data fields affect national sensitivity e.g. weather conditions, vehicle and per-
sonal protection classification, definite geographic location of the incident/accident.
UK Trauma Audit Form v5.1
The UK employs a comprehensive joint trauma theatre system. The trauma registry is the 
backbone of the system providing a significant pool of data for patient care and also for 
personal protection improvements. UK JTTR is managed and maintained by the Defence 
Analytical Services and Advice (DASA), this organization supports scientific research and 
provides advice to different military levels.
In the operations the registrar is embedded in the clinical staff, those patients who meet 
the inclusion criteria are registered in the Trauma Audit Form (TAF). This is an MS Word 
document template where the entry fields are only open for editing and formatting. Drop 
down menus are provided in most of the entry fields.[7]
The TAF form is emailed when completed, and the data import to the registry is performed 
by the Academic Department of Military Emergency Medicine (ADMEM), in Birmingham.
GBR kindly distributed the latest version of the JTTR to MILMED COE and other na-
tions on a bilateral basis. COE is entitled to install and experiment with the application. The 
team did not get training on the system, however the user manual provided with the UK JTTR 
application was sufficient.
In the MILMED COE field data experiment the data set was utilized and observations are 
the following:
1. All data entry fields have instructions/dictionary
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2. The TAF represents the UK national perception of casualty care flow. There are limited 
options for deviation if the patient care is performed by other national standards (e.g. 
not merging of Role1 and Pre–hospital).
3. Performance indicators are embedded in the form and reflect the most important qual-
ity control elements.
4. Coding and classification is done by the registrar, wounds are classified according the 
Red Cross standards. Trauma scoring codes (AIS, ISS, NISS, RTS, TRISS, and AS-
COT) are calculated also by the registrar. In the form the diagnosis is narrative and not 
coded to WHO ICD or SNOMED.
5. DASA are coding the diagnosis to ICD 10 and OPCS 4 during the data procession.
US JTTR v3.2 Data collection form
The Joint Trauma System (JTS) is the Department of Defense global trauma system. The 
Joint Theatre Trauma System (JTTS) is the deployed team into the operational Area of Re-
sponsibility (AOR).
The Department of Defense Trauma Registry (DoDTR), is the combination of the Store–
and–Forward and web–based Joint Theater Trauma Registry (JTTR) and they are the back-
bone of JTS [6]. Main objectives of the Trauma Registry (JTTR) are to support trauma care 
development and to facilitate performance improvement.
US DoDTR is maintained to provide accurate data for clinical practical guidelines, for 
prospective and retrospective studies and it provides important input for medical planning.
The MILMED COE team was trained on US DoDTR in a three weeks programme, to-
gether with other Trauma Nurse Coordinators (TNC) as part of the regular pre–deployment 
training of the JTTS. The TNCs are dedicated to take care of the DoDTR and rotated on a 
six months basis.
The US kindly distributed a limited version of Store and Forward JTTR application for 
MILMED COE experimentation. A user manual was also provided.
In the MILMED COE field data experiment the US DoDTR data set was utilized and ob-
servations are the following (data collection form was printed out and used for data capture):
1. Records are facility orientated and focusing on Role3 hospital level. Optional Role2 /
Forward Surgical Team data collection is under development.
2. US DoDTR has a strong coding capability; the application has embedded calculators 
transforming narrative text to different diagnosis codes and trauma scoring codes. The 
current disease classification is ICD–9. The US most likely skip the ICD–10 and will 
adopt ICD–11. The coding, diagnosis, procedures and severity of trauma allow statis-
tical analysis and also association of different cases.
Result of the NC3A data exchange experience
NC3A9 created a schema in Extensible Mark–up Language (XML) to enable the data 
exchange between the NTR prototype and the national registries. This schema was created in 
a specific type of XML called XSD.
9 NCIA is the new name of the agency
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This XSD schema is functioning as an interface ahead of the NTR database layer and 
controlling the data messages before integrating data into the NTR.
The NTR XSD schema was created according the Core Data Elements and was modified 
after the NTR TF Budapest meeting (mid–October 2011). Currently version 1.0 is published 
on the MILMED COE NTR portal.
Summary of results of data exchange episodes:
• US DoDTR
 - NC3A received the same message (containing one trauma record) a number of 
times, and at the beginning of Feb 2012 we were able to successfully import this 
record into NTR. It helped prove the concept of the pilot study.
• UK JTTR
 - At the end of January 2012 NC3A received a CD with data files, but this data is 
NOT compliant to the NTR schema, therefore we could not import it. Due to re-
source constraints, the UK could only have sent compliant data later.
• NC3A has been working on the NTR User’s Operational Requirements (UOR) / SRS rath-
er than on developing the NTR capability further; this is in line with ACT requirements.
• To develop the NTR capability further test imports and exports are essential to carry out.
• UOR work revealed that changes should be made to the schema.
Discussion and Recommendations
Discussion of IT interoperability
Data export and data message construction is a national task. The current and future NTR 
contributing nations have to adjust their data set in line with the minimum core data elements. 
Data export tools should be capable of extracting the minimum core data elements and send-
ing them in a defined and standardized XML language.
The UK and US DoDTR were amended to include the minimum core data elements; 
nations are free not to share elements they find sensitive or classified by a national decision.
NTR Prototype I. needs further adjustments to enable more effective data exchange. Con-
straints of the XSD schema need to be opened, the current model data fields are restrictive 
and refuse non- fully compliant data transmission.
1. Example 1. If One element is sensitive for sharing and one nation sends no–data the 
system rejects all the message, there is no option to integrate partially
2. Example 2. XSD schema was able to receive only the literal text for the particular data 
field, if the text was altered by the sender the schema rejected the whole message and 
lost the other data field elements
The recommendation is to further develop the schema, “open the gates” and eliminate 
constrains. The NTR model/prototype II will enable the test patient data exchange while the 
received data will provide a pattern for data standardization and data dictionary development.
Upon refinement of the NTR model/prototype II the final model will enable the Task 
Force to perform real patient data exchange.
Fig. 3 and 4 depicts the proposed data flow and data management from point of data col-
lection to final analysis.
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Figure 3. Data flow [11]
Figure 4. Proposed data management [11]
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Discussion of data elements collection
As a result of the individual data entries and the discussions with medical planners there 
were strong links identified where quality improvement in trauma care and epidemiological 
surveillance conjugate, and Force Health Protection approaches apply.
Due to the low sample size statistical analysis was not carried out on captured data. Ef-
forts were focused on practical observations regarding data collection in a clinical environ-
ment where trauma registry is a novel tool. Additional findings were made from the parallel 
utilization of the three datasets.
Entering the same cases there was different achievable compatibility with the UK and US 
data form. As far as all three forms are concerned there are major variances in inclusion criteria, 
data sets and data dictionaries as well. The current main deficiency of the NATO Trauma Regis-
try Data Elements is the lacking data dictionary and missing specifications of numerous entries.
The available registries focus on hospital care and do not fully capture pre–hospital data.
Conclusion
Medical solutions in extensive kinetic military operations in austere environments have been 
under continuous evolution. The evolving changes in casualty management policies require 
continuous adaptation of the injury surveillance techniques. It is important to ad flexibility 
to the different national and NATO injury surveillance systems, but in the meanwhile a core 
common standardization is necessary to ensure Completeness and Data Quality.
Further research recommended:
1. Data dictionary for all entry fields needs to be elaborated. It is advised to take over data 
definitions from the UK/USA trauma registry if available and feasible.
2. Explore NTR related Quality Improvement and Epidemiological Surveillance aspects 
and assess the links between Clinical Governance in Trauma Care and Force Health 
Protection.
3. Survey the NTR tactical level users’ operational requirements and support the develop-
ment of the System part. (collecting, analysis, reporting and dissemination)
4. Evaluate the deliverable products in terms of simplicity, flexibility, data quality, ac-
ceptability, representativeness, and timeliness.
If the quantity of data is sufficient, and further data standardization is performed statisti-
cal analysis (case control studies for example) should be realized in a second time approach 
to evaluate the impact of different factors on survival and general outcome.
Description of the establishment of a new trauma system
NTR development is in the phase when the major difficulties could be examined and dis-
solved through various trials and experiments in multinational environment. The NTR Pilot 
Study is now concluding the phase 1 (feasibility), but the Task Force has already proposed to 
maintain their future presence in order to continue the work in coordination, harmonization 
of the NTR, providing expertise for the nations, and providing assistance for standardization 
in the further (planning) process. (Fig. 5). 
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Figure 5. Proposed cycle of trauma system development10 [11]
The cycle depicts the continuous process and drive of the different elements in the trauma 
system development. Any of the five steps can be an entry point; a nation perhaps already has 
operational medical guidelines available, another nation only has some collected data, but 
has no analysis capability in place. Perhaps the simplest way is to start collecting available 
data, and later refine the clinical documentation and broaden the data collection matching the 
findings. When enough clinical data are available than clinical guidelines can be developed.
 
10 Figure was created by the author, published in 2011
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Annex A
Evaluation Criteria results
• Quantity of anonymous trauma data
 - According to data availability, in Multinational Medical Units there are a sufficient 
number of multinational casualties
• Functionality of communication among systems
 - Available with the NTR interface
• Timeliness
 - Can be evaluated after enabling smooth communication between individual regis-
tries not forgetting that NTR is not a “near real time tool”
• Centralised control and handling
 - Depending on future set up and structure of a NTR
• Accessibility
 - Requires standardization between individual registries and data sharing agreements
• Collecting method
 - Dedicated personnel for collection is recommended
• Effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. integrated function or extra posts in theatre)
 - To be evaluated (“system”) later when the system is operational
• Quality and standards
 - To be evaluated (“system”) later when the system is operational
• Usability of collected data for lessons identified
 - To be evaluated (“system”) later when the system is operational
• Further need of data standardization (e.g. ICD–10) or any interoperable standardized 
nomenclature according STANAG 2231.
 - To be initiated asap (next step)
• User–friendliness of the manual and the need for specific training for data collection 
and registering
 - To be evaluated after the finalization of the data dictionary
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Component based IT interoperability solutions, 
a novel approach
MUNK Sándor1
In our days the range of information activities supported by IT equipment, and 
the volume of information stored in IT systems is continually growing. So coop-
eration among different organizations is practically impossible without extensive, 
meaning preserving information exchange between their IT systems. Practically 
all today’s interoperability solutions are based on a previously agreed intermedi-
ary representation (formatted message standard, or standard data elements), but 
these solutions have a number of limitations. This paper outlines the foundations 
of a novel, component based realization of IT interoperability solutions. For this 
reason it summarizes the foundations of IT interoperability, analyses the goals, and 
possibilities of component based solutions outlines an architecture of component 
based interoperability solutions, and finally determines basics of its components.
Introduction
Due to the evolution of information technology it is continually expanding the range of infor-
mation activities; processes supported by IT equipment, as well as the volume of information 
stored in IT systems. Consequently cooperation among different organizations is already 
practically impossible, or at least not sufficiently effective without extensive information 
exchange (specifically data exchange) between the IT systems of these organizations. This 
necessitates that IT systems be able to exchange information without human intervention, 
preserving the meaning, that is to say be interoperable. The significance of IT systems’ in-
teroperability is particularly great in such complex systems of organisations as the defence 
sector (military forces, law enforcement, disaster management, etc.), public administration, 
as well as alliances and regional integrations of such spheres.
Interoperability between IT systems can be assured by dissolving the differences between 
the systems, and by meaning preserving transformations between data with different formats, 
contents, and interpretations. Practically all interoperability solutions of our days are based on 
previously agreed intermediary representations, formatted message standards, or standard data 
elements. Traditional IT interoperability solutions typically devolve the tasks of transformation 
between different information representations to the relevant IT systems, so the interoperabili-
ty capabilities, functions embodied in these solutions do not become “public property”. Anoth-
er significant problem is, that the adaptation to emerging, and changing information exchange 
needs, the improvement of interoperability capabilities are limited, and time–consuming. 
Dominant components of IT interoperability solutions are software applications, applica-
tion components that implement meaning preserving transformations. The effective develop-
1 National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training, Budapest, Hungary, 
munk.sandor@uni-nke.hu
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ment and maintenance of capabilities flexibly adapting to dynamically changing interopera-
bility needs requires application of state–of–the–art IT development methods, and solutions. 
These include, among others, component based, service oriented, or middleware solutions. 
From an interoperability point of view the most important properties are: the utilization of 
available capabilities, the dynamic expandability, so it seems appropriate to research the ap-
plication of component–based solutions.
The purpose of this paper is to outline a novel, component based realization of IT interop-
erability solutions. For this reason it:
• summarizes the foundations of interoperability, and IT interoperability, the types, lim-
itations, and problems of IT interoperability solutions;
• presents the essence of component based software development, analyses its goals, 
and possibilities in IT interoperability solutions;
• finally outlines an architecture of component based interoperability solutions, and de-
termines concepts, types and main attributes of its basic components.
IT interoperability solutions
Interoperability between IT systems is not an end in itself; its objective is to ensure the con-
ditions of operational interoperability, and as a part of this, information interoperability of 
organizations, necessary for their effective cooperation. In practice today’s solutions based 
on standardization increasingly face implementation barriers and problems. In the following 
(based fundamentally on [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]) we summarize the conceptual basics of IT 
interoperability, then we introduce the concept, and types of IT interoperability solutions, 
finally we analyse the limitations, and problems of these solutions related to characteristics 
of interoperability environments of our days.
Basics of interoperability
Different interpretations of interoperability, a concept first appearing in the military sphere, 
agree that it is a relation, a mutual capability between or among two or more objects to sup-
port cooperation and interoperation. A fundamental type of interoperability is operational 
interoperability between active actors (organisations, forces, etc.), a relation between/among 
actors cooperating to achieve a common goal and the overall mutual capability necessary to 
ensure successful and efficient cooperation. The preconditions of cooperation and operational 
interoperability are different part–capabilities, such as interoperabilities on functional areas 
(command, and control, logistics, etc.), as well as information interoperability, and technical 
interoperability, which are the basis of any kind of interoperabilities. (see details in [1])
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Figure 1. System of interoperability types [1: 129.]
Information interoperability is a key prerequisite for cooperation, for operational in-
teroperability. A fundamental condition of successful and efficient operation of complex 
organisations, organisational systems, and groupings is the sufficient level of information 
exchange between the components, the sharing and coordinated exploitation of information 
necessary for cooperation. According to our interpretation, information interoperability is a 
mutual capability of different actors necessary to ensure exchange and common understand-
ing of information needed for their successful cooperation. [1: 128.] This is made up of two 
basic components: the ability to exchange information, and the ability of the common under-
standing of information.
During information exchange one party (the sender) converts a portion of its knowledge 
into a form suitable for transfer; this representation will be transferred to the other party (the 
receiver), who interprets it, and builds into its knowledge. So in fact not the information itself is 
transmitted, but a representation, and an “other” information is created based on this represen-
tation. Common interpretation means that the intended meaning of the representation owned by 
the source — to the extent necessary for cooperation — equals the interpretation of the receiver.
Information interoperability requires different components, and capabilities. According 
to the levels of abstraction of information representations these components can be classified 
into three (technical, syntactic, semantic) levels. The technical level is related to the handling 
— creation, transmission, delivery — of material (physical) representations carrying infor-
mation. The syntactic level is the level of the intermediary — perceptual or symbolic; tradi-
tional, or technical — representation, handling what is related to the languages, and formats 
used during information exchange. Finally the semantic level is the level of meaning carried 
by syntactic representations, the systems of concepts, and the knowledge representations 
used. To implement information interoperability it is necessary to ensure the conditions of 
meaning preserving information exchange on all the three levels.
IT interoperability has become an increasingly important, essential condition of informa-
tion interoperability. Information exchange between cooperating actors increasingly happens 
without human assistance (machine to machine = M2M), by direct data exchange between 
the actors’ IT systems. During exchange, and if necessary, transformation of data stored, 
handled in IT systems, it is necessary to ensure, that source and target data carry the same 
meaning, or to be more precise similar enough meaning for cooperation, for all the concerned 
actors. So IT interoperability is a mutual capability of IT systems, devices, applications to 
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send, receive, exchange data — with possible transformations — preserving the meaning 
assigned by the primary user community. [2: 105.]
Basics of IT interoperability solutions
In case of IT systems (devices, applications, application components, hereinafter briefly IT 
systems) exchanging information with each other, an interoperability problem occurs, when 
at some level, there are differences, disagreement in the representations used, or in their 
interpretations. If the representations and their interpretations are the same, then nothing is 
to be done. However if there are differences, either the capability to use a shared, uniformly 
interpreted intermediary representation should be created, or the meaning preserving trans-
formation between different representations should be realized during the process of infor-
mation exchange (communications).
An IT interoperability solution is an IT system, device, application, or application compo-
nent that’s purpose is to resolve heterogeneity between disparate, heterogeneous IT systems, 
to ensure conditions of meaning preserving information exchange. Information exchange 
between two IT systems is always implemented with the help of a certain intermediary rep-
resentation, which is carried by the communication network used. Meaning preserving trans-
formation, the essential component of the IT interoperability solution, or parts of it can be 
implemented in relation to, as a part of the related systems, or independently from them.
The purpose if interoperability solutions, forming part of the systems, interoperability 
interfaces, connectors, wrappers is to implement the meaning preserving transformation be-
tween the system’s internal, native representation, and the intermediary representation used. 
A given system may be connected to a more collaborative environment, so it can have more 
interoperability interfaces to different intermediary representations.
Interoperability solutions that are independent from the related systems — analogously to 
appropriate network devices — can be interoperability gateways performing transformations 
between intermediary representations used by the different collaborative environments. In 
addition to the centralized solution, the necessary transformations can be implemented in a 
distributed manner, in the form of an interoperability infrastructure based on the services of 
multiple components. Interoperability infrastructure can be a value–added service layer of 
the IT network, or an independent middleware layer. The advantage of the system indepen-
dent solutions is that each system may use their own intermediary representation, and do not 
have to conform to other systems, to the changes in their range.
Today’s IT interoperability solutions in practice are primarily standardization solutions. 
They are based on standards widely accepted, or agreed on by a community of interest for 
the different forms, components, and levels of information exchange that in the following 
we summarize based on [3]. The essential characteristic of interoperability solutions is based 
on global, or community of interest specific standards, established by formal agreements, or 
developed from practical experience, and the ability to exchange information by standardized 
solutions is the responsibility and task of the cooperating IT systems. Standardization of IT 
interoperability affects the three levels of interoperability to varying degrees. The technical 
level is characterized by general, widely used solutions, and this gradually covers the syn-
tactic level. At the same time a semantic level dealing with content oriented questions is 
basically characterized by community of interest specific solutions.
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Today the standardization solutions can be classified into three major groups, including 
document format standards, message format standards, and data element standards. Interop-
erability solutions based on document format standards standardize the formats of different 
(textual, spreadsheet, drawing, image, audio, and other multimedia) documents exchanged 
between IT systems. They do not address the issues of production, processing, transmission, 
and reception of these documents.
The basis of interoperability solutions based on message format standards is formatted 
messages belonging to semi–structured information. To meet the specific information ex-
change needs of a community of interest, standard messages are defined, which are based on 
standardized data elements, message fields, and standardized message structure processable 
by IT equipment. Message fields are standardized for each message, but can be re–used in 
more messages. Bit–oriented message formats are intended to support time–critical (real–
time and near–real time) information exchange, while character–oriented message formats 
support the less or non–time critical information exchange.
Interoperability solutions are based on information exchange data models, which are 
based on the set of standardized data elements satisfying all the relevant information ex-
change needs of a community of interest. Data elements describing the characteristics and 
relationships of objects, which are subjects of information, are arranged into a single data 
model, where each data item can have only one version, specifying the content, format and 
possible values. These standardized data elements then can be used both in formatted mes-
sages and during database replication. Meaning preserving transformations between data 
models of the different IT systems and the common information exchange data model are the 
responsibility of the respective systems. Nowadays different communities of interest have 
designed and develop continuously a number of information exchange data models.2
Limitations and problems of IT interoperability solutions
During the examination of specialities of IT interoperability solutions, including their lim-
itations and problems, one cannot abstract from the scope of interoperability to be ensured. 
Interoperability problems and the range of applicable solutions of a given IT system are 
determined by the characteristics of its interoperability environment. IT interoperability envi-
ronment of a given IT system can be interpreted as all those IT systems (devices), that are in 
direct information exchange relation with the given system (without human interaction). IT 
interoperability environment includes information (or rather data carrying this information), 
handled, or exchanged by the given systems (see details in [4] and [5]).
Today’s existing, as well as planned IT interoperability solutions mostly related to the so–
called elementary interoperability environment, that is characterized by a well defined, per-
manent, close, functional area cooperation, and functional similarity of cooperating partners. 
These solutions are based on the same conceptual and methodological basis, the application 
of a single common intermediary representation (standardized messages, standardized data 
elements). Their implementation requires the following tasks:
• definition of information exchange needs of the given cooperation group;
2 Joint C3 Information Exchange Data Model (JC3IEDM), National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), 
Justice Information Exchange Model (JIEM), European Information Exchange Model (EIEM), Aeronautical 
Information Exchange Model (AIEM), etc.
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• comparison, and reconciliation of the content (interpretation) and format of informa-
tion by different actors, involved in information exchange;
• creation of the intermediary representation used in information exchange, and its 
agreed interpretation;
• finally the implementation of the necessary transformations between the internal repre-
sentations of the different actors and the intermediary representation.
Functional similarity implies the identity or similarity of the scope, and content of infor-
mation handled, which facilitates the establishment of the common intermediary representa-
tion, and the implementation of meaning preserving transformation between the internal and 
intermediary representations.
In order to maintain interoperability satisfying the requirements, in case of new, emerg-
ing information exchange needs, or changes in existing needs the above tasks should be 
cyclically repeated. The main characteristic of interoperability solutions based on common 
intermediary representations is the significant turnaround time (measured in half years, or 
years), which follows from the time required to reconcile changes, and on the other hand the 
implementation of appropriate modifications.
With the expansion of the scope of cooperating partners and the content of coopera-
tion (the range of information exchanged) the implementation opportunities of elementary 
interopera bility solutions are gradually narrowing. In case of a so–called complex interopera-
bility environment, that is an extensive cooperation group and widespread information ex-
change with differentiated content, on most communities of interest the possibility to coordi-
nate application domain specific versions of information decreases. Due to specific needs of 
different functional, application areas, standardization, and realization of uniform solutions 
is limited, particularly on a semantic level. This is because each community of interest has its 
own terminologies, which have concepts identical, or partly different to those used by others, 
as well as concepts unique to them. Consequently instead of a single intermediary represen-
tation more, complementary, existing parallel to each other intermediary representations are 
needed.
In a complex interoperability environment a given IT system is in connection with more 
IT systems that are members of more previously known communities of interest, and these 
communities develop their interoperability solutions independently of each other, or only a 
partially coordinated way. The number of these communities is usually few, rarely greater 
than 2–5. IT systems know, and use intermediary representations of more communities of 
interest (“they speak several languages”). Conditions of interoperability in this case can also 
be created in advance; the appropriate interoperability solution for the given system can be 
previously developed, and continuously maintained.
In a complex interoperability environment different intermediary representations in many 
cases form a multilevel, hierarchical system. The core of the system is a representation, 
which is shared by the whole cooperation (application) area, and ensures the exchange of 
information relevant for all, or the majority of cooperating actors. Some parts of intermediate 
representations related to specific communities of interest are common with the central rep-
resentation (overlapping it, or are mapped to it), other parts are area–specific.
In case of dynamic interoperability environment a given IT system is also in connection 
with IT systems of more communities of interest, but their number is far higher than in the 
complex environment of interoperability, their range is dynamically changing, some of them 
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appear only in relation to a specific task, operation. Consequently, unlike in the case of the two 
types mentioned before, conditions of interoperability previously can be ensured only par-
tially, or only in the previously known areas of cooperation. In case of dynamically occurring 
cooperation areas of interoperability solutions should only be (fully) implemented and adapted 
to the given situation during the phase of the preparation, and/or the execution of the operation.
In dynamic interoperability environments implementation of interoperability requires 
other then pre–planned and prebuilt ways, and methods. To describe an adequate capabil-
ity of an IT system in such an environment, a new concept should be introduced. Adaptive 
interoperability is a capability of an IT system to ensure the necessary conditions of the 
meaning preserving information exchange in a dynamically changing cooperation (interop-
erability) environment with other — previously known or unknown — IT systems, without 
IT development efforts, within user defined time limits. [4: 71.]
The overall conclusion is that currently used IT interoperability solutions based on inter-
mediary representation provide an efficient solution only in case of well–defined, long–term 
and close cooperation. In addition their development and maintenance requires considerable 
coordination and time, they reaction to new information exchange requirements is difficult 
and slow. Finally the implementation of the necessary transformations between the internal 
and intermediary representations is fully passed on to affected systems.
Component–based approaches and interoperability solutions
In case of some level of heterogeneity of cooperating systems the conditions of interoperable 
(meaning preserving) information exchange between IT systems is implemented by IT appli-
cations realizing the transformation of the information flow. These applications, apart from 
simple cases, are complex software systems which realize a number of different — syntactic, 
semantic, and procedural — transformation functions. For effective and efficient software 
development different development approaches, methodologies have emerged, one of which 
is component–based software development. In the following (based essentially on [6], [7], 
[8] and [9]) we summarize the fundamentals of component–based software development, and 
then examine how this approach can be utilized, realized in case of interoperability solutions.
Basics of component–based software development
Component–Based Software Development (CBSD), or Component–Based Software Engi-
neering (CBSE) is a software development methodology, based on the idea of an engineering 
approach, which states:
• do not invent, and do not fabricate everything again;
• build on reusable components;
• take, and adapt existing parts, components;
• standardize. [8]
This approach is based on the separation of software system development, and software 
components development. Accordingly, software systems should be built up (as far as possi-
ble) from prefabricated, existing components, and software components should be developed 
so that they can be used in different systems. This approach occupies an intermediate position 
between a completely individual development and the use of ready–made solutions.
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The basic objective of component–based software development, fitting the line of former 
modular programming, structured programming, object–oriented programming, distribut-
ed software development, and other similar methodologies, is faster, more scalable product 
manufacturing, matching user needs; ease of modification and expandability; as well as reus-
ability of partial results of development. Component–based software development difficul-
ties include those not easy to find, learn or adapt to the appropriate components, and those 
where it is more difficult to make reusable components, then unique ones.
According to a widely accepted definition a software component “is a unit of composition 
with contractually specified interfaces and explicit context dependencies only. A software 
component can be deployed independently and is subject to composition by third parties.” [7: 
41.] Software components are cohesive units (from some, usually functional, point of view), 
implementing specified functionality, loosely coupled with their environment.
The concept of components are strongly connected to such general design, and develop-
ment principles as decomposition, modularity, abstraction, and encapsulation. Effectively 
usable components can be developed by decomposition — that is division into more manage-
able parts — of complex systems (functions). During decomposition the intent is to increase 
the strength of internal relationships, and reduce external dependencies. For their users the 
components are abstractions of a particular function, or group of functions, whose quality 
significantly determines the usability of the component. Finally the components, by encap-
sulation, include data and procedures necessary to accomplish the functions provided, at the 
same time hiding the details from their users.
Software component interfaces are those means between the users and the component 
that enable the interconnection. Technically an interface is a set of operations that can be 
invoked by clients. Each operation’s semantics is specified and this “contract” is normative 
for the users and for the developer of the component too. Specification of an interface is 
an abstract description of functionality; services provided by the component can be infor-
mal, formal, and mixed. A specification always contains functional aspects, usually includes 
pre– and postconditions of operations and possibly extra–functional elements (performance, 
capacity, availability, security information, and environmental requirements) too. [7: 50–57.]
Software component models and infrastructures (frameworks) are fundamental con-
ditions of component–based software development. Component–based systems rely upon 
well–defined standards and conventions (component model) and a support infrastructure. A 
component model is a set of rules that determines the framework of a component’s develop-
ment (forms of communication, data representation, conditions of deployment, etc.), while 
a component infrastructure is a platform, on which the components ‘work’ and which pro-
vides different (e.g. communication, or resource management) services to the components. 
[9: 23–25.] In practice many different software component models and related infrastructures 
have evolved.3
In addition to dissimilarities, there are many similarities among component–based ap-
proaches and service–oriented approaches so popular nowadays. Both approaches are based 
on loosely coupled, interoperable, reusable components. However, compared with existing 
component–based solutions, service–oriented approaches took a step forward, because in 
fact they regulate only communication between components and do not contain provisions 
3 Microsoft Component Object Model (COM), Microsoft .NET Framework, Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) and 
Java Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE), Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA).
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for their language, and platforms. There are also differences in performance and security 
between components deployed in their environment and web services available through In-
ternet protocols. Of course, in changing the interfaces, it is possible to implement the func-
tionality of a software component as a web service, or provide a web service in the form of 
software component.
Basics of component based interoperability solutions
For the analysis of the application of the component based approach in interoperability 
solutions:
• first we overview the arguments for and against this approach and what opportunities 
exist;
• then we outline a basic framework of a component based interoperability solution.
The use of component based software solutions are justified, if on the given application 
area there exists widely used functions, in many IT systems, products, implementation of 
which, in the form of software components can be economical. This is obvious in the case of 
interoperability solutions, since most of the systems involved in information exchange use 
the same or similar information representations4, and several types of data elements (tempo-
ral characteristics, spatial characteristics, names, etc.) used in many systems.
However this ‘simple’ condition in practice often does not appear to be sufficient. Ac-
cording to experience, the application of the theoretically suitable methodology is mostly 
bogged down in the business interests of software product manufacturers and in the diversity 
of component architectures. Software solutions implementing the same and similar functions 
are typically used only in various products of one manufacturer (and not necessarily in the 
form of software components), and not in products of different manufacturers (see e.g. dif-
ferent image and video format converters). The same is the case of existing interoperability 
solutions.
Another aspect of the use of component based solutions can be the contribution to specific 
capabilities, properties of the software product. The literature formulates a number of system 
properties (so called “ilities”), that can be easier, and reliably achieved with component–
based solutions. These include among others extensibility, tailorability, and through these 
adaptability (to changes, changing needs).
In case of an appropriate support architecture, by replacing software components, or add-
ing new components, capabilities, services of a component–based system — in a plug–and–
play manner, similar to technical solutions used as examples — can be extended, enhanced 
without software development. In the world of interoperability solutions, due to dynamic 
changes in cooperating partners and their information exchange requirements, the new and 
changing message formats, and data elements, the significance of this option is invaluable. 
Limitations of the implementation are first of all the variety of component models and infra-
structures, and the lack of a unified interoperability architecture.
Finally the reason for the component–based solutions can be the special expertise needed 
to implement some functions. In case of interoperability, in a lot of application areas there are 
(domain specific) knowledge intensive functions, where implementation of software requires 
4 EDI, military message formats (Message Text Format, MTF), XML, etc.
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not primarily IT, but domain specific expertise. Technical and syntactic level transformations 
usually require minimal knowledge of speciality. However semantic level transformations are 
basically based on speciality based knowledge, after that their IT implementation — a bit of 
exaggeration — is simple, almost mechanical. For example it is the domain experts’ responsi-
bility and capability to determine the order, and rules of transformations between different, but 
similar classification attributes, or between dates in different calendar systems. These domain 
area expertise functions should be implemented in the form of widely usable components.
The conclusion is that in case of interoperability solutions there exist a number of sub 
functions, which play an important role in many, or almost every system, so their implemen-
tation in form of reusable components could provide significant benefits. Without a detailed 
analysis these include for example the decomposition of structured information represen-
tations (e.g. formatted messages, tabular data, etc.) into elements and their relations, or the 
meaning preserving transformation between different formats of data elements. In case of in-
teroperability solutions, due to dynamic changes in information exchange requirements and 
limitations of solutions based on preliminary coordination, standardization is of the utmost 
importance for the role of component–based solutions supporting extensibility, adaptability. 
Finally the independent implementation of interoperability components can be justified by 
the need of specialized domain knowledge.
The basics of a framework for component–based interoperability solutions can be built 
on functional decomposition, partition into functional components of a meaning preserving 
information exchange between IT systems. In our opinion two basic dimensions of decompo-
sition are the abstraction levels, and the structural architecture of information representations.
It is easy to see how transformations between technical (physical), syntactic and semantic 
representations can lead to different functions, independent in nature, and may form individ-
ual components. In the following — although their role in specific interoperability solutions 
(e.g. tactical data links) is significant — we do not deal in detail with components handling 
physical representations. This is common in the interoperability literature: in case of analysis 
of interoperability solutions the lower levels of information exchange are usually considered 
solved, and a communication infrastructure is assumed, that provides an existing bit– or char-
acter–oriented channel for information exchange between cooperating systems.
It is also fairly clear that a meaning preserving transformation of a complete information 
exchange unit (document, message, query, response, data stream, etc.) can be decomposed 
into transformations of composite and elementary information units. Software structure de-
termined by data structure, object–structure has long been used and is a still prevailing ap-
proach of software development. From our point of view it is important to emphasize that 
individual information exchange units typically are made up of parts used more than once, 
and these parts are built from often used elementary units. Thus software components imple-
menting transformations of intermediate and elementary level representational units may be 
ideal for multi–use (reusable) building blocks. Hereinafter — due to reasons of brevity and 
differences in characteristics — we do not deal in detail with the issues of interoperable trans-
formations of natural language texts and multimedia representations, our discussions will be 
narrowed to structured and semi–structured data, information representations.
In the following we outline a comprehensive model of interoperability solutions that 
could form the framework for the analysis of the structure and components of component–
based solutions.
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Figure 2. Overall model of interoperability solutions 
(Created by the author)
The fundamental input of the interoperability solution — whether it is centralized or 
distributed, or part of the system(s) involved, or independent from them — is a given type of 
information representation (belonging to source side), and its fundamental output is another 
type of information representation (belonging to received side). For processing, and the cre-
ation of particular representations, syntactic and semantic descriptions are needed that can 
be provided, published by the involved parties, or may be generated by the interoperability 
solution providers.
In many cases permanent specifications are not sufficient for meaning preserving trans-
formation; information from previous process of information exchange may also be needed. 
For the period of the information exchange, this information should be temporarily kept by 
the interoperability solution.
Architecture of component based interoperability solutions,  
interoperability functional units
As outlined in the previous section the basic function of an interoperability solution is to 
transform a given type of information representation to another type of information represen-
tation. In case of a component–based implementation to achieve this goal a comprehensive 
architecture and its constituent component types must be defined, which form the basis of the 
development of components fitting into this framework, and usable in several solutions. In 
the following we first outline an interoperability solution architecture, and then determine the 
essential features of its functional units.
Architecture of component based interoperability solutions
The functional architecture of interoperability solutions can be determined according to the 
three phases of transfer–based solution of computer (machine) translation. Its essence is that:
• with morphological, syntactic and semantic analysis the source text is transformed into 
a language–specific intermediate representation;
• source language intermediate representation is transformed into a target language in-
termediate representation;
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• finally target language text is generated based on the target language intermediate rep-
resentation.
Since our study is focused on the meaning preserving transformation of structured and 
semi–structured data (information representation) and the goal (requirement) is a ‘perfect’ 
solution, without the loss of information due to application circumstances, statistical transla-
tion techniques – considered nowadays the most popular – based on substantial preliminary 
data collection are not feasible. It can be easily stated that analysis (decomposition into com-
ponent parts) and generation (building from component parts) of structured and semi–struc-
tured information representations, in relation to the processing of natural language texts, are 
practically not a problem. Based on the foregoing a proposed overall architecture of compo-
nent–based interoperability solutions is shown in the following figure:
Figure 3. Overall architecture of an interoperability solution 
(Created by the author)
Key components of the architecture are the two intermediate representations that form a 
connecting link between three functional units. The required degree standardization of these 
representations is the basic prerequisite of the component–based solution. To facilitate fur-
ther transformations intermediate representations carry the information content of source and 
target representations divided into elementary components, in form of elementary statements 
related to individuals (objects), their characteristics (properties), and relationships. In case 
of structured and semi–structured data any knowledge representation language5 suitable for 
description of propositional (statement oriented) information is appropriate for intermedi-
ate representation. According to the literature these knowledge representation types can be 
mapped to each other [e.g. 10, 11], however in this paper we are not dealing with this in de-
tail, conversions between different types we consider solved by general purpose components.
Subtasks of an interoperability solution are implemented by three broad functional units. 
Two of these, decomposition of the source representation into elementary components and 
composition of target representation from elementary components are related to the system 
of interpretation (conceptual system) and format rules of a given side; they are independent 
of the features, characteristics of the other side. In case of structured (tabular) and semi–
structured data (e.g. formatted messages) realization of the two transformations, based on 
5 Resource Description Format ~ W3C Recommendation, Topic Maps ~ ISO 13250, Conceptual Graphs ~ ISO 
24707.
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database schemas, and message formats, is not a significant problem, it largely encompasses 
commonly used sub functions.
The third functional unit, transformation between intermediate representations of the 
source and target contexts is the essential component of the meaning preserving transforma-
tion. This functional unit resolves the differences in concepts, interpretations, and formats 
of the two contexts. Based on the needs of the application area, the transformation can be 
achieved in two ways:
• complete (as possible) transformation of source information into target information;
• production of required target information from the source information available.
Of the two, the second approach is more difficult, because its implementation — in case 
of source information is not sufficient — may require additional information. These may 
be available in the source environment (but outside of the source representation), or can be 
acquired from a general knowledge base, or a knowledge base established specifically for 
interoperable transformations.
Transformation between intermediate representations can be divided at syntactic and se-
mantic levels and corresponding functional units. In practice syntactic transformations are 
conversions between data values appearing in elementary information, representing the val-
ue of a given characteristic of a given object. In this paper we consider a transformation as 
syntactic level transformation when it takes place between two different representations of 
the same data element concept6. They also include conversions between composite represen-
tations (e.g. dates, quantities). However we do not consider as syntactic the transformations 
between classification characteristics represented by different codes, since actually they are 
transformations between class concepts.
Semantic transformations are necessary when there are conceptual differences between 
the two parties, such as case transformations between the concepts – including object, charac-
teristic, and relationship concepts – of the two interpretation environment required. Transfor-
mations between concepts and between data values sometimes are connected: to determine 
object concept data values (classification, or other characteristics) may be necessary, and 
data values (e.g. classification characteristics) may be determined based on object concepts.
Component based interoperability functional units
Basic components of interoperability solutions’ functional architecture outlined on the pre-
vious section are interoperability functional units. A functional unit is a basic concept of IT: 
an entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose. 
[13: 11.] Accordingly an interoperability functional unit is a hardware and/or software entity 
whose purpose is to accomplish meaning preserving transformations between different infor-
mation representations.
Interoperability functional units may be IT application/device components, standalone IT 
applications/devices, and complex IT systems built on each other and other type functional 
units. For extensive usability, the interface of the interoperability functional units can be gen-
eralized in such a way that their input and output consist of bit sequence format information 
6 Concept that can be represented in the form of a data element, described independently of any particular 
representation. A data element concept is composed of an object class [concept] and a property [concept]. [12: 
5., 10.]
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representation(s), and globally unique identifiers defining their type. Specifications, knowl-
edge components of this representations (defined by the unique identifiers) may appear, may 
be available ‘built in’ to functional units, or independently, in some form of knowledge rep-
resentation.
The following provides a broad, one by one overview of the basic characteristics, features 
of functional units implementing decomposition, composition, and transformation, and pos-
sibilities of their implementation in the form of reusable components.
The basic purpose of decomposition and composition functional units is to create elemen-
tary information representations from a composite information representation, and to build 
a desired (composite) information representation from elementary representations. During 
decomposition data values appearing in representations are extended with data type identi-
fier, and object–, property–, and relationship–type concepts (more accurately with their type 
identifiers). In case of structured and semi–structured information representations in practice 
we encounter only a few structure types. These include tabular (matrix), and graph (basically 
tree) data structures.
In case of decomposition and composition functional units, the most appropriate sub func-
tions to implement as widely reusable components are sub functions that implement syntactic 
analysis of the given representation7 (analysing a sequence of symbols according to the rules 
of a formal grammar, and building a language data structure), and sub functions of syntactic 
generation (building sequences of symbols from a language data structure).8 In case of general 
purpose components, for implementation, it is necessary to provide a standardized formal spec-
ification (database schema, or message format specification) of the representation structure.
In case of formatted messages another obvious possibility for component–based imple-
mentation is the decomposition of messages into message parts, and composition of messag-
es from message parts. One of the basic objectives of major message format standards is the 
individual standardization of reusable message parts, and data elements. So in case of a new 
message, to create an interoperable transformation it is just enough to implement the decom-
position, and composition functional units for the new message parts.
The purpose of syntactic transformation units accomplishing transformations between 
source and target intermediate representations is the meaning preserving conversion between 
different representations of the same data element concepts. This includes transformations 
between different formats of numbers, dates, times, and spatial characteristics, or character 
set conversions between textual characteristics. These are already available in the form of 
general purpose programs and subroutines. In fact their component–based implementation 
is only a question of implementing a suitable interface; it is not a major technical problem.
Transformations between textual (character string) data having internal structure, e.g. 
person names9, and organization, organizational unit names, including their different lan-
guage versions form a more interesting, and more significant task. To solve these tasks by 
component–based functional units, deeper level knowledge components are needed. Due to 
the need of the identification of objects that are of interest, meaning preserving exchange 
of name features (appropriate for identification) between different interpretation contexts is 
crucial. (in detail see [14]).
7 Parsing.
8 We can meet such solutions (XML parser, MTF parser, etc.) in the practice.
9 Surname (family name), given name, titles, other name parts, etc.
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Purpose of semantic transformation units accomplishing transformations between source 
and target intermediate representations is the meaning preserving transformation between the 
conceptual systems (object, property, and relationship concepts). The background of this task 
is provided by the alignment, matching, and mapping of ontologies explicating these concep-
tual systems. This is obviously easier in case of interpretational contexts closer to each other, 
and much more difficult in case of more different ones.
Semantic transformation units, by concept categories, may be classified into object con-
cept, property concept, and relationship concept transformation units. These include: organi-
zation concept, activity concept, part–whole concept, etc. transformation units. For transfor-
mation of a given concept, in addition to source and target ontologies, and the concept itself, 
additional information is available in the intermediate representation may be needed.
Transformations between source and target concepts are not always feasible clearly, with 
complete accuracy, e.g. in case when there are differences between levels of detail of the two 
conceptual systems. Moreover conceptual differences between application requirements or 
different points of view may also make it difficult, or prevent the ‘transmission’ of meaning. 
As a consequence semantic transformations are the most difficult parts of meaning preserv-
ing transformations.
Conclusion
As a conclusion it can be stated that information interoperability is a key prerequisite for 
cooperation, for operational interoperability. Moreover IT interoperability is an increasingly 
important, essential condition of information interoperability, a mutual capability of meaning 
preserving information exchange between IT systems of cooperating actors without human 
assistance.
Existing IT interoperability solutions are primarily standardization solutions that can be 
classified into three major groups, including document format standards, message format 
standards, and data element standards. Currently used IT interoperability solutions based 
on previously agreed intermediary representations provide an efficient solution only in case 
of well–defined, long–term and close cooperation. In addition their development and main-
tenance requires considerable coordination and time, their reaction to new information ex-
change requirements is difficult and slow.
Component–based software development is an up–to–date approach of software develop-
ment that is based on the separation of software system development, and software compo-
nents development. Its principle is that software systems should be built up (as far as possi-
ble) from prefabricated, existing components, and software components should be developed 
so that they can be used in different systems.
The application of component–based software solutions is justified first of all when on the 
given application area there exists widely used functions, in many IT systems and products. 
Another aspect of the use of component–based solutions can be the contribution to specific 
capabilities, properties of the software product (e.g. extensibility, tailorability, and through 
these adaptability). Finally the reason for the component–based solutions can be the special 
expertise needed to implement some functions.
The basics of a framework for component–based interoperability solutions can be built on 
functional decomposition, partition into functional components of a meaning preserving in-
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formation exchange between IT systems. In our opinion two basic dimensions of decomposi-
tion are the abstraction levels, and the structural architecture of information representations. 
The functional architecture of interoperability solutions can be determined according to the 
three phases of transfer–based solution of computer (machine) translation.
Basic components of interoperability solutions’ functional architecture are interopera-
bility functional units, hardware and/or software entities whose purpose is to accomplish 
meaning preserving transformations between different information representations. These 
have more widely used sub functions which may be effectively and efficiently implemented 
in form of reusable components.
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Analysis of upper respiratory tract infections in 
mission circumstances
FEJES Zsolt1, KORODI Gyula2 
During this research a specific partial data set of the UN database was analyzed 
from different aspects and evaluated in order to create an image about the prev-
alence and probable reasons of upper respiratory tract infections among soldiers 
serving in the operation area. 
The research indicates that the prevalence of upper respiratory tract infections 
(URTIs), and the previously performed tonsillectomies, was the highest in one con-
tingent. The statistical data demonstrates that the tonsillectomies may influence the 
frequency of upper respiratory infections within the contingent.
Introduction
The objective of the study was to process the accumulated medical database of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and make an analysis of URTIs among 
military troops. 
Discussion
Analysis of the UN medical database has demonstrated that the prevalence of different ill-
nesses varies between nationalities. [1] Dental and stomatological problems are most com-
mon within the Argentinean contingent (ARG), whereas the most dominant problems among 
the British contingent (BRIT) are musculoskeletal and sports injuries. Within the Hungarian 
contingent (HUN), the most common medical problems are URTIs. [1]
In order to explain why the highest rate of URT was among the Hungarian soldiers in the 
mission, we looked for medical and microbiological connections.
Research methods
During the research a specific partial data set of the local, UNFICYP database was analyzed 
from different aspects. The analysis was made with the co-operation of soldiers in the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), from four nations — Argentina, the 
United Kingdom, Hungary and Slovakia — using data between 2009 and 2012.
Considering that the countries select the participants of the mission based on standard meth-
ods and requirements we examined a homogenous, healthy population looking at age, work, 
working conditions, and general physical conditions. The standard system that created the sta-
1 Military Hospital, Medical Centre, Hungarian Defence Forces, Budapest, Hungary
2 National University of Public Service, Institute of Disaster Management, Budapest, Hungary
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tistical basis of the research is provided by the UN standardized data processing and reporting 
system. [2] The research was made with three different methods and the following phases:
Retrospective data acquisition, statistical analysis
Medical records from 1st January, 2009 to 31st December, 2012 have been analyzed. This con-
sists of data from troops from four contingents: Argentina (ARG), United Kingdom (BRIT), 
Slovakia (SLOV), and Hungary (HUN). After the primary analysis of 15,749 diagnosed cas-
es, 2,521 URTIs were identified and highlighted for further process and study.
Survey
Surveying was also completed with the participation of all four contingents. This survey 
aimed to determine the proportion of patients with and without tonsillectomies within each 
national contingent. Almost 600 questionnaires were evaluated and ear, nose and throat phys-
ical examinations were carried out. 
Microbiological laboratory examination
Microbiological laboratorial examinations — throat swabs [3] — were performed in 200 
cases in order to detect the differences in quality and quantity of the oral bacterial flora.
Results in connection with URTIs
We found out that, among all the registered diagnostic groups of diseases in mission level, the 
rate of URT–infections was between 17% and 21% annually. The numbers of the URTIs over 
the 4 years are without any peak. We found out that the rate of URTIs was highest among the 
Hungarian contingent. This observation is true for each of the 4 years. (Table 1.)
Year ARG BRIT SLOV HUN
2009 15% 26% 13% 30%
2010 14% 16% 11% 26%
2011 17% 17% 11% 28%
2012 14% 11% 11% 32%
Table 1. Rate of upper respiratory affections in the mission between 2009–2012
Results in connection with group of diagnosis
The URTI group was separated into two further diagnostic sub–groups: 
Group 1– Infections with cold–like symptoms: 
acute rhinitis, allergic rhinitis, rhino–sinusitis
Group 2 – Infections with throat pain symptoms:
pharyngitis, tonsillitis
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We further examined how URTIs were spread across the two diagnostic groups. Consid-
ering both the data of the whole mission, and the reduced data of each contingent, Group 1 
was affected, as a proportion, more than Group 2.  (Table 2.)
Diagnostic–groups 2009 2010 2011 2012
No.1 group 70% 68% 77% 68%
No.2 group 30% 32% 23% 32%
Table 2. Prevalence of URTIs within the diagnostic–groups between 2009–2012
Results in connection with number of cases per 100 capita
We specified the number of cases and diagnoses per capita using an Upper Respiratory Tract 
Score.
Statistical analysis highlighted that, comparing different medical indexes and diagno-
sis–frequency, both subgroups of URT–infections were in the highest proportion among the 
Hungarian soldiers during the surveyed four years. (Table 3.)
ARG BRIT SLOV HUN
Mean of the URT Score 0,6 0,8 0,5 1,3
Rate of number of cases per 100 capita 60 80 50 130
Table 3. Mean of the URT Score of four contingents
Results in connection with tonsillectomy
We could not disregard the fact that certain previous surgical interventions, like adenotomies 
or tonsillectomies, may affect the current medical status, and thus may influence the preva-
lence of URT–infections among solders. Because of this possible connection, we extended 
our research to the qualitative and quantitative processing of the previously performed oper-
ations whereby we analyzed the operations in relation to two main groups:
• Throat–related interventions (adenotomy and tonsillectomy)
• Other operations (all operations except the above mentioned two)
According to the results of the survey 47% of the Argentine contingent, 55% of the Brit 
contingent and 53% of the Slovakian contingent mentioned some kind of previous surgical 
intervention, while 57% of the Hungarian contingent mentioned the same.
According to the processed data of the previously performed surgeries, 20% of the Argen-
tinean contingent had undergone a tonsillectomy, 64% among the British soldiers, and 24% 
among the Slovakian soldiers. The rate among the Hungarian soldiers was 65%.
Next we analyzed the operations according to their dates and types (performed operations 
in childhood or in adulthood; adenotomy or tonsillectomy, or combined tonsillo– adenoto-
my). We stated that the typical intervention among Hungarian soldiers was the tonsillectomy 
in adulthood while interventions in childhood dominated among the other three contingents. 
(Table 4.)
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ARG 53 % 47 % 80 % 20 % 87 % 13 %
BRIT 45 % 55 % 36 % 64 % 91 % 9 %
SLOV 47 % 53 % 76 % 24 % 89 % 11 %
HUN 43 % 57 % 35 % 65 % 71 % 29 %
Table 4. Rate of operations among contingents
According to the hypothesis based on the present results, termination of the protective 
role of pharyngeal tonsils — which is an intervention altering the protective system, micro-
biological integrity, anatomical and functional status of the organism — could influence the 
number of acute URT–infections. [4]
As a consequence of the results of the data in our research material we found out that 
after the termination of pharyngeal tonsils the number of URT–infections in adulthood in-
creases without any known reason. This assumption was proved indirectly by the fact that 
in our research the URT–infections have less prevalence among those people who still have 
their tonsils. We assumed that there was a traceable relation between tonsillectomies and the 
frequency of URT–infections in adulthood. We thought that in those cases where pharyngeal 
tonsillectomies had been performed oro–pharyngeal bacterial flora were changed without 
any known reason and the protective function without the functions of the tonsils was de-
creased assisting the colonization of certain pathogens along with increasing the frequency 
of URT–infections. [5]
Microbiological results
Towards proving the theory, confirming its microbiological reasons and showing the direct 
relations we took throat swab samples from 200 patients and performed microbiological 
analyses. The examinations were performed on an equal number of soldiers with tonsillec-
tomies and without tonsillectomies. From the 500 pathogens, which create the oral bacterial 
flora, we were focused on 15–20 bacteria. [6]
From the 200 samples, which were sent for microbiological analyses 68 samples had 
positive results (10 phyla, 5 subtypes, 1 fungus were detected), which means 34% positive 
samples all in all. In the group with a tonsillectomy the number of human pathogens was 
double (+28) than in the control group under the same number of cases. Among the detected 
pathogens all have major roles in causing those disease–groups of URT–infections, which 
we examined.
Among those 100 patients with a tonsillectomy and among the 100 patients of the control 
group the following pathogens were detected. (Table 5.) 
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1 Staphylococcus aureus 13 4 +9
2 MRSA 2 0 +2
3 Streptococcus 9 3 +6
4 Pseudomonas aeruginosa 2 0 +2
5 Acinetobacter 2 2   0
6 E.coli 5 2 +3
7 Enterobacter cloacae 4 4   0
8 Lactobacillus 0 3 -3
9 Klebsiella pneumonia 4 3 +1
10 Serratia 1 0 +1
11 Pantoea agglomerans 0 1 -1
12 ESBL 0 0  0
13 Candida albicans 4 0 +4
Total 46 22 +28
Table 5. Detected pathogens in throat swabs
Discrepancy of the detected pathogens among soldiers with a tonsillectomy was more 
significant than in the control group. Especially if we take into consideration that, under the 
same number of cases, the numbers of the detected human pathogens [7] was double among 
soldiers with a tonsillectomy compared to soldiers in the control group without tonsillectomy.
Summary
The rate of the URT–infections and tonsillectomy was the highest among the Hungarian 
contingent. According to the processed statistical data, it is proven that the examined factor 
has a dominant role in the frequently occurred URT–infections among Hungarian soldiers.
Termination of the protective function of pharyngeal tonsils could cause the presence and 
colonization of certain pathogens in pharyngeal area. In our research the pathogens detected 
from microbiological samples exceeded in numbers more significantly among soldiers with 
a tonsillectomy than among the solders without a tonsillectomy. As a direct correlation it is 
verifiable that the presence of the pathogens in greater numbers in the pharyngeal area could 
cause the frequent URT–infections. Through the results of our research it is detectable that 
certain bacteria, which are basically part of the normal and healthy throat–microflora, appear 
more often among patients without tonsils, while others typically colonize in patients’ pha-
ryngeal area that still have their tonsils. All this could mean a microbiological correlation 
between the different aptness for URT–infections among patients with a tonsillectomy and 
patients without a tonsillectomy.
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Implementation of Goal–Oriented Budgeting  
in the Defence Sector
Petr MUSIL1
This article describes the starting points for implementing goal–oriented budget-
ing (management by objectives) into the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Repub-
lic. It also focuses on the principles and factors that affect implementation.
Keywords: planning, budgeting, goal–oriented budgeting (MBO), goal.
Introduction
On the 1st of January 2009, Decree No. 415/2008 Coll. establishing the scope and structure 
of documentation for the development of the medium–term national budget outlook became 
effective. On the basis of this Decree, the budgeting was initiated in compliance with the 
methodology for goal–oriented budgeting (MBO) not only at the Ministry of Defence of the 
Czech Republic (MoD, CR), but also in other budget chapters in the Czech Republic. The 
implementation of the new system which has an impact on the finance management began in 
2009. Under the new rules, the budget was compiled for 2010 for the first time. [1] 
Goal–oriented budgeting
The concept of goal–oriented budgeting is used in two basic meanings. The first concept is 
broader and represents the resource management system. The second concept is narrower and 
it is the budget method. Thus, the nature of goal–oriented budgeting is rationalizing resource 
allocation.
Goal–oriented budgeting is such a resource management system that enables the transfor-
mation of identified public needs into the form of a particular ministry goals and the cover of 
these goals with regard to their priorities and limited resources. [2]
Goal–oriented budgeting is a new allocation system that is to make it possible to answer 
the question: “What is to be achieved, how and with what amount of money?” To find the 
answer to this question means the following: [3]
• To realize the mission of a given institution and the benefits of its activities for the 
public and the state (general goal setting including the time horizon),
• To analyse activities, to determine their purpose and how they contribute to the set 
goals, and thus to create their homogeneous units (the definition of expenditure block 
structure and a more detailed division),
• To assign expenditure to these activities (expenditure assignment to expenditure blocks 
and a more detailed division).
1 Lieutenant–Colonel, MSc, University of Defence Brno. He heads Financial Management Section, Department 
of Economy, Faculty of Economics and Management. He deals with issues of planning, programming and 
budgeting financial resources in public sector and sector Ministry of Defence. petr.musil2@unob.cz
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To implement a new approach to be successful, it is necessary:
• To know the source and target state of goal–oriented budgeting (Table 1.),
• To adapt the program structure of the Ministry of Defence, the thinking of responsible 
workers as well as the software support of the entire system. 
The successful implementation is further subject to the adequate regulation of the exter-
nal and internal legislative documents. Goal–oriented budgeting should allow the workers of 
the Ministry of Defence to fulfil the obligations resulting from Act No. 320/2001 Coll., on 
financial control, i.e. the efficient, economical and sensible use of financial resources. Cur-
rently, we are able to identify inputs (we have information on expenditure), but we are not 
able to identify our outputs in relation to the fulfilment of economic evaluation of financial 
resources. This new system should enable these deficiencies to be removed.
Field of state budget 
creation in the Czech 
Republic
Initial state Target state
Methodological approach to 
budgeting Supply Demand
Final recipient of financial 
flows Institution Targeted activities (goals)
Budget method used Index or incremental lean-ing against a historical basis Goal–oriented budgeting
Method of budgetary treat-
ment  of incomes Gross–budgeting Net–budgeting
Method of budgetary treat-
ment of expenditure
“Consumer” system of 
expenditure treatment
Production system of ex-
penditure treatment
Method for monitoring 
public expenditure
Formal control (accounting 
and documentation)
Factual and content control 
(control of purpose, effect 
and impact of realized 
expenditure)
Public inspection
Performed by external audit 
as audit of compliance with 
the accounting and legal 
documentation
Factual control of public 
policies through the moni-
toring of expenditure goals 
of the state budget  
individual chapters
Accounting Single–entry bookkeeping, accounting for expenditure
Double–entry bookkeeping, 








Table 1. Initial and target state in the creation of the state budget of the Czech Republic [4: 18]
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This is a completely new system for preparing and implementing the budget through the 
Management by Objectives (MBO) method which will be introduced in phases in the course 
of several years. In this context, a set of objectives has been created at the Ministry of De-
fence, which is expressed in Figure 1. The budget structure is represented by homogenous 
units of activities which constitute expenditure blocks (EB) – the first level objectives. These 
are further divided into expenditure areas (EA) – the objectives of the second level and the 
lower level division (the similar method of specification applies to objectives as well), while 
a higher level is a complete sum of the directly subordinate levels. The determination of EB 
and EH is mandatory, other lower–level divisions are voluntary.
Implementation principles
The implementation principles of goal–oriented budgeting at the Ministry of Defence — 
Article 6.4 — regulate the area of “creating objectives and working with objectives in the 
budget preparation” which define the objectives as projects / sub–projects. The “target man-
ager” is responsible for the content and development of various kinds of objectives. He/she 
is an “official of the Ministry of Defence selected by the top management and is responsible 
for the development and management of objective (project) implementation and provided 
with adequate authority”[5]. Within the process of developing objectives in each level, tar-
get managers should use the “SMART” method in compliance with the principles of goal–
oriented budgeting. “The requirement for setting measurable parameters to evaluate the 
accomplishment of goals must always be taken into account when the content of the goal is 
defined”[6]. The goals are determined according to particular levels from the highest one, 
usually called the zero level (goal “0” order) up to the n–th level which is necessary for the 
management of the organization. The goals of the lower level are not set forth unless the 
higher level goal divide at least into two sub–goals. The goals of the zero level are based on 
§ 16 of Act No. 2/1969 Coll. of the Czech National Council on the establishment of minis-
tries and other central bodies of state administration of the Czech Socialist Republic (the 
so–called Jurisdictional Act) and are the basic mission of the organization. These goals are 
elaborated and clarified in lower levels as strategic, tactical and operational ones. Within the 
Ministry of Defence, the first level of goals is determined by long–term strategic goals of the 
Ministry of Defence which result from the Long–Term Development Perspective of the Min-
istry of Defence and are regulated by the Directive. The second level goals are medium–term 
goals and are laid down by the Directive. The third level goals are determined by managerial 
personnel  directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence in relation to the higher level 
goals and are approved by the Planning Conference. The length of experience will show how 
the given method will be applied in creating particular goals. Subsequently, these goals are 
divided into the lower levels of goals which we call measures and tasks.
The goals are elaborated in a hierarchical structure – the goal tree:
• The first level goal – the expenditure block (the first level goals are shown in Table 2.)
• The second level goal – the expenditure area,
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Number of the 
first level goal Name of the goal
1. Provision of the Czech Republic defence by the armed forces.
2. Creation and development of the national defence system.
3. Provision of the Public Administration operation at the Ministry  of Defence.
4. Provision of strategic intelligence.
5. Providing support for the President of the Republic as  the Commander in Chief.
6. Provision of pension insurance benefits.
7. Provision of other social benefits.
8. Support of national sports teams.
Table 2. The MoD system of goals for the planning cycle for 2013–2017 (the first level goals) [7]
Factors affecting the implementation
Currently, the planning and budgeting area occurs in the so–called transition period. There 
is a continuous reduction of expenditure (allocated financial resources) at the Ministry of 
Defence. This entails undesirable consequences. Then there are problems with the implemen-
tation of goal–oriented budgeting. The Ministry of Defence elaborates analyses in the area 
of planning and budgeting which highlight the problems concerning the implementation of 
goal–oriented budgeting. These are mainly:
• The used concepts have not been clarified within the implementation,
• Provision of internal standards has been implemented only partially,
• The workers involved have not been trained adequately,
• Inability / unwillingness of the workers concerned to learn new things,
• The issue of management by objectives is considered to be an “economic” discipline, 
the personnel of planning components take part very unwillingly,
• Lack of cohesion of the factual and financial planning,
• The planning is not able to respond to changes in the source frame,
• Etc. 
The issue of the new budgeting system is characterized by the following advantages and 
disadvantages.
The new budgeting system – advantages:
• The tool coordinating the efforts of employees to achieve organizational goals,
• Allows objective evaluation of the effectiveness,
• Supports motivation to improve the individual performance,
• Allows identifying problem areas in relation to achieving goals.
• The new system of budgeting – disadvantages:
• Time–consuming,
• A lot of “paperwork”,
• Problems in goal–setting,
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• Risk of inflexibility,
• Emphasis on short–term goals,
• Inadequate or irrelevant information provided by the authors of goals.
Conclusion
Based on the abovementioned fact, it is clear that the issues of the new system–of–budgeting 
implementation are very difficult. The changes that have occurred in the process of budgeting 
and planning should lead to a more rational management of budgetary resources within the 
Ministry of Defence. When assessing the current state of the examined questions, I must state 
that the options offered for the accomplishment of goals and the mission of military units 
have not been utilized efficiently, so that they could lead to a more rational management of 
resources (factual, financial, human).
At the present, when the Czech economy is facing the economic crisis, the basic task of 
the management will be to support effective, efficient and economical use of resources. The 
resource management should include the entire cycle of planning, budgeting (programming) 
and resource utilization for individual goals from accounting up to their analysis.
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The infocommunication system requirements of 
the deployable rapid diagnostic laboratory support 
“sampling group” I. 
FARKAS Tibor1, HRONYECZ Erika2
The purpose of the authors of this article is to present the abilities and the require-
ments of the infocommunication sub–system of a sampling group which supports 
the professional activity of a deployable rapid diagnostic laboratory. In addtion, 
the article determines the infocommunication demands and the contact system of 
the group. Considering the above, the authors of the article investigate the appli-
cable technologies, the possible technical devices and give suggestions for their 
implementation. 
This article is made possible with the support of the project TGYDGL09 “Deploy-
able Rapid Diagnostic Laboratory”.
Introduction
The rapid diagnostic laboratory, implementable in a standard 22–foot container, is a tool sys-
tem which is capable of eliminating the consequences of bio–terrorism and answering issues 
of health and food, and increasing the efficiency of biological risk management. 
In the case of an occurred biological risk or infection it may be necessary to deploy a 
mobile biological analysis laboratory which would be installed near the location of the in-
fection to process the samples from the pathogens and detect the presence of the pathogens 
in order to enforce the management decisions in relation to the risk management procedures 
and protocols.
In order to support all of these, a mobile sampling group strengthens the bio–laboratory. 
Its task is sampling from a specified area. The purchase  taking of the samples from the pos-
sibly contaminated area forms the basis of the laboratory work, as the main task and basic 
purpose of the bio–laboratory is to process and analyse them.
It is necessary to establish a communication link between the sampling group and the 
bio–laboratory in order to facilitate the appropriate amount and quality of information ex-
change. One of the subfields of the communication sector of the bio–laboratory is keeping 
contact with the sampling group which helps the professional management. Providing all 
kinds of information exchange promotes exact task–execution. 
Another element of the communication system of the bio–laboratory is an internal com-
munication system and a network which ensures the contact development with the lead and 
command management. All of these should be established taking into account the above 
mentioned requirements. 
1 farkas.tibor@uni-nke.hu, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
2 hronyecz.erika@gmail.com, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
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The sampling unit is a group equipped with special sampling devices and other additional 
components (see on Figure 1.). It moves via motor vehicles, possibly by aircraft (helicop-
ter). Its members carry out various sub–tasks during the sampling which are an important 
influence factor in the planning of the establishment of the communication system. Beyond 
the sampling they perform the appropriate (temporary and safe) storage of samples and the 
reliable delivery of them to the deployable laboratory. 
Figure 1. Sampling Group [1]
The communication link between the sampling group and the bio–
laboratory 
The factors which affect the establishment of the infocommunication system of the sampling 
group are greatly narrowed by the usable systems and devices. Accordingly, we need to 
examine the communication basics and the physical location of the group and its members 
during the performance of the tasks. 
To properly ensure the system of communication services it is necessary to specify the 
communication needs before we determine the system requirements. Considering the links 
and connections of the sampling group, it has to serve two directions according to the deter-
mined requirements: 
• the relation between the sampling group and the bio–laboratory (external communi-
cation); 
• the internal communication of the sampling group. 
There is a significant difference between the two directions in terms of the distance and 
the service requirements. According to the previous examinations and the communication 
needs it is necessary to ensure a long distance connection between the group and the bio–lab-
oratory as the distance between the location of the sampling and the place of the processing 
of the sample can be tens of kilometres. The communication tools and systems need to be 
chosen correspondingly. 
The essential criterion of rapid and precise task execution is a quick and simple con-
nection because the installation and operation of complicated communication tools is not 
practical as the bio–laboratory is not reinforced by infocommunication professionals. The 
large space requirement of a big and complex communication system is a negative factor as 
well, since the size of the bio–laboratory is limited and the placement of a large number of 
laboratory and mechanical equipment is a priority. 
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In accordance with all of these, a communication tool should be provided — for the 
sampling group — which is easy to use, small sized and offers a proper connection with the 
bio–laboratory and with the sampling group as well. The communication channel between 
the sapling group and the bio–laboratory should provide a voice based communication. Voice 
connection is an important element of the communication between the two parties because 
professional governance and support can be done through it. Besides the transmission of 
issued orders for the sampling group, it is important that the group leader report and send 
information to management for defining further tasks. 
Another important possibility is the realization of data communication. Besides the oral 
tasking and reporting, the transformation of certain data may be necessary to help to process 
the samples in the future. A datasheet — filled out by the leader of the sampling group — 
concerning the sample and sampling can be an example of data recording. After acquisition 
the determined samples must be examined for data for the easier start-up of a later investiga-
tion. It can be recorded in a pre–defined datasheet. (see on Figure 2.) One of these datum can 
be the amount of samples, the sampling location, the sampling date, the type of samples etc. 
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Figure 2. Sampling data sheet [2]
In addtion, pictures or videos can be taken of the samples or of the location, this helps the 
preparation of the processing of samples, the action of processing, archiving, or makes pos-
sible inspections, investigations. The personal equipment of the members of sampling unit 
should be installed with a camera which is able to take photos or record moving pictures of 
the process (see on Figures 3.). Naturally it helps the professional ordinance of the sampling 
group if the group leader is able to control the workflow from the background.
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Figure 3. Sampling method [3]
It is a significant factor that it has to be able to communicate in an area without commu-
nication infrastructure. The satellite link is one of the most suitable solutions for establishing 
a connection. Its advantage is that it is less sensitive to the terrain conditions and it has a 
high capacity of availability, but its major disadvantage is the huge traffic charge. Satellite 
communication has a great importance both in civilian and in military (defence) signal areas. 
The currently applicable satellite phones can provide all requirements which are necessary 
nowadays in a modern infocommunication society and also suitable for serving the bio–lab-
oratory. Therefore the satellite data transfer allows continuous, highly reliable voice and data 
traffic between the users and the remote endpoints. 
Over all, in terms of the communication among the bio–laboratory and the sampling unit, 
based on the existing needs and expectations, an integrated voice and data connection pro-
viding technology should be selected from among wireless connection types. As described 
above, microwave connection provides opportunities beyond the satellite connection forms. 
Microwave connection can be workable on Ethernet interface so the long distance micro-
wave connection can be established between information technology (communication) de-
vices which are used in civilian life. “Ethernet is the most widely used local area network 
protocol (LAN). Its defined standard is 802.3. Ethernet was originally developed by Xerox, its 
initial form called Aloha net […] Nowadays the most commonly used Ethernet protocols are 
the 10 Mbps and 100 Mbps versions. […] Recently the 1000 Mbps, gigabit versions are wide-
ly spread.” [4] It always provides the connection between the endpoints, allowing a fast and 
secure voice, data and image transmission. With the VPN3 service which is based on MPLS4 
protocol the secure connection form is available which is allowed by developed virtual cir-
cuits which exclude unauthorized access to data and information. In our view, the secure ex-
change of data and the exclusion of unauthorized persons are highly important requirements 
at all levels and in all directions of connection. Secure and protected communication is the 
basic condition of the successful operation, even if the laboratory carries out non-military 
but civilian tasks. A good example of a leak is when a civilian “captures” a message which 
contains information about the samples, it can create a panic among the public, forwarding 
3 Virtual Private Network
4 Multiprotocol Label Switching
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misunderstood information. In our opinion, its use in this project is not the most appropriate 
way because a direct line of sight (LOS) is necessary between the microwave antennas and 
it needs complex visibility testing and an antenna (mast) kit and it significantly affects the 
place of the operation. Therefore a professional specialist with complex knowledge is neces-
sary during the planning, installation and operation, something not available in the capapcity 
of the bio–laboratory. In our view, the high–speed, high–throughput microwave link can be 
definitely useful as a second connection.
The wireless connection form with radios can also be achieved between the two parties. 
In this case, considering the large distance, the short–wave (HF) radio connection can be 
implemented. The radio equipment is excellent for voice communication, but only slightly 
suitable for data transmission because the transfer speed is not sufficient to transfer images 
and moving pictures. The modern, currently applied antenna types can easily be used be-
cause of their small size but the bridging of the large distances mostly can be achieved only 
with complex antennas. It is important that these radios generally should be easy to handle 
(user level), with highly efficient and fast tuning. During the application of radio links the 
frequencies to be used should be taken into account in every case as their use requires autho-
rization. (“Appointing frequency is possible according to the government regulation about 
the national allocation of frequency bands within the using rules established in a regulation 
by the Minister. The allocation of frequency bands is determined by government regulation 
in accordance with international agreements and EU sources of law.” [5]). Accordingly, the 
radio signal is very well applicable during military use of the bio–laboratory, when the nation 
uses its own operational radio devices and the corresponding antenna kit. We need the safety 
factors to take into account the case of radio connections (applying all wireless connections),-
to insure that the information will be only accessed by the specified persons. The security is-
sue is naturally a particular field in the world of infocommunication but a kind of information 
defence base can be realized with the decrease of spreading radio waves. The spread of radio 
waves can be limited by using controlled antennas. The radiation area is decreased with the 
right force and control, and therefore the covered area can be optimized.  
Those devices which work on unlicensed frequency5 ranges are easily accessed by civil-
ians. This may be appropriate but there is a risk of mutual interference with other devices but 
it can be minimalized with careful planning thereby making it very applicable. 
It is important to highlight — from the other forms of connection — the use of a GSM 
network which is one of the most widely used communication ways nowadays. The mo-
bile network is a continuous developing area of modern telecommunication which provides 
various services after classic phone calls. Besides voice calling, advanced devices are ca-
pable of data transforming, video calls and establishing Wi–Fi contact. Its big advantage is 
that the mobile network is available almost everywhere (because of high national coverage). 
Nowadays, the devices can establish a high–speed data connection (3G; 4G) which provides 
smooth data transfer. The new technology supports mainly data contact and data communi-
cation because it requires a higher speed and higher throughput. 
The 3G (4G) cellular systems can complement each other well with the local networks 
(for example: LAN). The 3G can allow services and applications such as playing high–defini-
5 ISM: Industrial — Science — Medical band: The 2,4 GHz band usable for establishing radio frequency 
connections without any official permit. Several common devices radiate in this band, so we must account for 
the interference.
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tion videos, video conferencing, or fast internet access. The 4G services provide a 326 Mbit/s 
theoretical maximum transfer rate — with high mobility — for the users. It supports the 
internet connection and online television, in addtion to the “classic” phone calls. According 
to these, we have to analyze the modern GSM services as a corresponding communication 
solution. The usability across national borders is guaranteed as the roaming service insures 
passing across the mobile networks of several nations. However, the channel is opened, the 
encryption and the covering of the transmission of the data is not appropriate. Apart from 
this, it can be an excellent duplication of a given communication channel, of a satellite con-
tact for example. 
In summary, satellite communication which is capable of large distances, is mainly used 
for voice but also data connection, it is usable in every circumstance and its geographical 
capability is the best choice with reserved radio or GSM connection. In case of military ap-
plications using their own tactical radios is expedient.  
The external satellite communication of the sampling group 
As previously mentioned, it is necessary to establish voice communication between the mo-
bile sampling group and the deployable rapid diagnostic laboratory. Therefore, the bio–labo-
ratory should have satellite communication, so it is best to realize the connection between the 
group and the laboratory by using this method. 
The satellite systems provide two–way communication data transfer between the satellite 
and the terrestrial user. We need a system formed with telecommunication satellites for estab-
lish the satellite communication. Their aim is to ensure telecommunication. The majority of 
telecommunication satellites are in geosynchronous orbit6 which has the big advantage that it 
is orbiting with the same orbital speed of the Earth and it seems always to be at the same point 
from the Earth. It greatly facilitates the establishment of a satellite connection. It is enough to 
set the terrestrial antenna to the satellite and the established connection remains constant. The 
GEO orbit means an approximately 35 800 km altitude above sea level. The other satellites 
which are orbiting in the same altitude are the geostationary satellites7  but the difference is 
that those move at the level of the Equator. For the implementation of satellite communica-
tion, transmitter and receiver stations and terrestrial observation stations are necessary which 
carry out the monitoring of the system and the satellites. A relatively large area of the territory 
of the Earth (approximately 40–45 %) can be covered by the satellites which operate at this 
altitude. This allows the communication system to operate with a small number of satellites. 
The satellites installed by the company Thuraya operate at this altitude and are capable 
of establishing contact between the sampling group and the bio–laboratory. “The Thuraya -3 
satellite was built by the company Boeing Satellite System and began a geosynchronous orbit 
on 15 January 2008 at 154° west longitude. The Thuraya mobile satellite system was built by 
the Boeing Satellite System (formerly: Hughes Space and Communication International, Inc, 
or HSCI) for about 1 billion USD worth. Its planned life is 12–15 years. The Thuraya–1 and 
2 satellites are at 44° to the east in geostationary orbit.” [6] The hand–held satellite phones 
are ideal for information exchange based on our recommendation and taking the primary 
voice communication needs into account.
6 GEO: Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
7 GSO: Geostationary Earth Orbit
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Figure 4. Thuraya coverage map [7]
It is necessary to provide a kit of Thuraya XT–Dual phone for the mobile sampling 
group  which is water–, shock– and dust resistant and suitable for application at a GSM band 
(900/1800/1900 MHz) besides satellite connection. This is an excellent option in the case of 
the mobile network coverage appropriate in the region. In this case the satellite communica-
tion can be omitted which carries out a cost–effective connectivity. Naturally, in those areas 
where the terrestrial infrastructure is not available, the satellite connection is realizable. The 
Thuraya XT–dual device is usable for communication while moving without significant loss 
of satellite signal, thanks to the advanced technology, its special antenna and the extremely 
strong system. It is also possible to use in-vehicle by a connect to the car kit. It has high talk 
and stand–by time and is suitable for data transfer along with voice communication. It has 
Bluetooth and message sending functions (SMS, MMS, e–mail, Fax), and emergency SMS 
function. The great advantage of the device is that it can receive satellite calls with a covered 
antenna so the significance of this device is portability.  
The fitting of the other station (bio–laboratory) with Thuraya XT–Dual devices maintain 
the satellite or GSM connection between the two parties. The bio–laboratory needs a device 
which ensures the connectivity in indoor space (inside the container). An indoor transceiver 
has to be installed inside the container which can establish contact with the help of an antenna 
installed on the outside of the container. This could be the FDU XT–Dual device which is a 
fix established docking station, with which the telephone device becomes capable of commu-
nication. With the use of FDU we can realize full–featured fax, voice and data communica-
tion and the loading of the device is also solvable.
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Figure 5. Thuraya FDU and XT–Dual [8]
The above described device is excellent for serving the sampling group’s communication 
needs. Although there are many devices to choose from, in our opinion the devices made by 
Thuraya, in the present case, have several positive characteristics. [9]
The external microwave communication of the sampling group 
A possibility for an installed contact between the sampling group and the bio–laboratory as a 
duplicate of the satellite (and GSM) contact is microwave link. Microwave is an electromag-
netic wave which is between 1 meter and 1 millimetre and its frequency is higher than 300 
MHz and lower than 300 GHz. Nowadays, the increasing spread of devices for information 
exchange mainly use the lower part of the range of frequency for communication and tele-
communication. Today, companies and individuals often use such tools which have mainly 
been characterized by telecommunication service providers. 
The microwave link provides all the requirements which must be supported by the com-
munication system of the bio–laboratory. It provides a constant, reliable connection for long 
distances between the endpoints and its high–speed data connection allows the voice, image, 
video and videoconferencing communication. The GSM phones, the Bluetooth devices, the 
devices for wireless data transmission (WLAN), the television and radio systems and the 
satellite stations also use microwave transmission. 
The disadvantage of the microwaves is that a line of sight is needed for the installation of 
connection. Landmarks in their way can obstruct, absorb or force their deflexion. Of course, 
the deflected signals can reach the destination between the transmitter and the receiver anten-
na in another way. This phenomenon exists because the microwave tufts spread in the air not 
by point so the extent of the tufts should be taken into account during the planning. We also 
have to take into account that there are different zones in which the deflected signals are in 
phase, that is to say, are not in phase with the central signal. These are called Fresnel–zones. 
(see on Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Line of Sight [10]
The secure establishing of the connection is realizable with encrypted, closed–channel 
microwave management. This type of connection has the same characteristics as the wire 
networks so it is very well able to establish temporary connections which can replace a wire 
network. The range is extendible by using higher gain antennas and a Point to Point or a 
PMP8 connection is also established. The Point to Point connections are suitable for bridging 
distances more than tens of kilometres with high–speed data transmission speed. Besides 
the use of 5GHz ISM bands, we can use the frequency bands designated by the National 
Media and Communications Authority. Most of the small sized, deployable antennas have 
IDU–ODU9 systems, which include indoor and outdoor units. It operates on the principles of 
SNMP10 and support Qos services and bandwidth management in order to be effective. 
The implementation of the communication between the bio–laboratory and the sampling 
group can be executed by establishing a Point to Point contact. A reliable and secure connec-
tion can be achieved in any environment, field and weather conditions. The contact estab-
lished by Ethernet microwave antenna can operate as a wireless bridge. The alvarion micro-
wave (Ethernet) antenna can be tools which can appropriately serve the requirements. The 
connection is also realizable with different organizing principles. If possible, we can connect 
to public networks11 with the antenna and these might provide a wider range of connection. 
Figure 7. Two microwave links between  
sampling group and laboratory (source: own)
8 Point Multi–Point
9 Indoor Unit – Outdoor Unit
10 Simple Network Management Protocol
11 PSTN: Public Switched Telephone Network
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The alvarion antenna operates in a time–division duplex mode which allows separated 
two–way communication (uplink/downlink) in a same frequency using different time slots. 
The antenna uses ODFM12 channel access methods with error correction coding.13 
Thanks to the advanced multipath contact of the ODFM, the system does not need a direct 
line of sight between the antennas. The system supports other adaptive modulation methods 
such as the BPSK14 the QSK, or the quadrature amplitude modulation (16, 64 QAM). 
Figure 8. IDU and ODU units  
of alvarion Ethernet antenna [11]
The antenna can be configured with encrypted/authenticated channels, with WEP15, or 
AES16 algorithm and with 128–bit key. Basic protection can be achieved with these methods, 
but it is only the configuration of antennas used transmission path that can be supplemented 
with other security solutions. 
The system supports the virtual networks with the service IEEE 802.11Q VPN17. This is 
a so–called tunnelling–technic and it ensures that the information forwarding will be hidden. 
We call VPN that network in which the transmission of data is made through a public infra-
structure while the data remain confidential. 
Conclusion
The first step of the tasks of the rapid diagnostic laboratory is sampling. The sampling pro-
cess has to be started after the relocation of the bio–laboratory, which is a long and complex 
process and which needs professional support. 
The sampling team collects the samples from the specified field section or the contami-
nated area; brings them to the laboratory where the analysis is executed. If they have more 
information it helps the biological examinations. The communication system of the bio–lab-
oratory should forward this information. 
12 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
13 FEC: Forward Error Correction
14 Binary Phase–shift Keying
15 Wired Equivalent Privacy
16 Advanced Encryption Standard
17 Virtual Private Network
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The information link of the sampling group defines two main directions. One of them is 
the direction of the bio–laboratory which is implemented mainly with satellite connection. 
The satellite connection ensures the voice– and data connection between the two endpoints 
which can be implemented by Thuraya XT–Dual device. If possible, the device is able to 
connect to GSM networks. The microwave Ethernet connection is able to duplicate the link 
established by satellite phone device, which allows a long–distance voice and data connec-
tion with the help of the connected computer or telephone.  
The overall conclusion is that the infocommunication system of the sampling group 
which operates as a part of the deployable rapid diagnostic laboratory is a complex system 
which applies various technology and technical devices. 
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War Grave Excavation Methods:  
Survey, Results and Suggestions
TÓTH Zsolt1
War graves, or war heroes’ graves, are burial places for soldiers who fell in bat-
tle while serving their homeland, or as a result of fighting for their country. War 
graves around the world are, from time to time, excavated — either by chance or by 
design — and the earthly remains of the warriors resting within may be exhumed. 
The following study primarily seeks answers to the questions of who should, in 
such cases, carry out the excavation of a war grave? Which areas of science may 
be affected by the excavation? What types of experts can be involved in such in-
stances? And what methods exist for this purpose? A further objective of the study 
is to make recommendations on the optimal methodology that may be applied by 
experts in Hungary.
Introduction — Definition of the Problem
As a Hungarian researcher I have faced the problem in my homeland that there is not a uni-
fied methodology for excavating war graves. I assume the reason for this may be traced to 
events in the past. 
After the Second World War, due to Soviet influence, unlike the period between the 
two World Wars, Hungary could not operate its own war graves research and maintenance 
organisation. The legislative rules stated that the only graves that could be preserved were 
those of “friendly” soldiers from the Soviet Union and from forces fighting on their side.
[1] It is a sad fact how this affected the nation’s own war heroes and their relatives. It was 
forbidden even to visit the final resting places of the “enemy Germans and their hench-
men”. In the 1990s, after the change of the socialist state mechanism, the first research 
could begin on the graves of fallen Hungarian soldiers, both within the country’s borders 
and outside of them. In parallel, data began to be compiled on those foreign soldiers who 
were buried in Hungary. In the last two decades we have seen a large amount of research 
related to war graves and a large number of excavations in Hungary. Most frequently these 
have been carried out by funeral services, without the involvement of experts, and without 
any type of documentation.
The first step in the process of introducing professional war graves excavation in Hun-
gary was to gain an awareness of the international literature on the subject. It is sufficient 
to quote one example of the Western European literature on war grave research [2] for us 
to see how essential it is for excavations to be carried out professionally. One exemplary 
1 zsolt.t@citromail.hu, National Heritage Institute, Budapest, Hungary
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precedent in military archaeology is the excavation of the grave of a First World War Ger-
man soldier, found in 2003.2
Studies of the foreign professional literature on war graves research led us to the con-
clusion that future excavations in Hungary need to be carried out within a framework of 
scientific research, which makes it necessary to develop a method which is appropriate for 
local circumstances. In order to achieve this, we set the objectives of learning about and an-
alysing the research procedures of experienced foreign partner organisations, of comparing 
the different practices, and of evaluating their applicability in Hungary. The most important 
element was to conduct a survey by sending questionnaires to the competent bodies abroad.
Questionnaire–based survey about war grave excavation methods
The questionnaire3 was sent out to a total of 12 organisations in 11 countries4 in the summer 
of 2011, through the Hungarian office for the preservation of war graves. [22] The survey had 
a response rate of 50%, because 6 organisations answered the questionnaire. Based on the re-
sponses from the war graves research bodies in the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Germany, 
Austria and the USA, and in the relevant professional literature,5 our analysis could begin.
Existance of competent organisations
The first question of the questionnaire sent out to the war graves organisations looked for sep-
arate focuses on war grave issues. (Is there a separate body or research team in your country 
which deals with the excavation of war graves? If yes: What is the name of the body and their 
specific function? If no: Who deals with the exhumation of the remains of war heroes in your 
country?)
In Austria, war grave excavations may only be conducted with the permission of the 
Ministry of the Interior, and if necessary, the permission from the country concerned. [3] In 
justified cases, when permission is granted, Department IV/7 of the Ministry of the Interior 
notifies the regional office of the Austrian Black Cross foundation in the State concerned, 
2 The soldier was buried in his uniform. The crowned Prussian buttons on his jacket were revealing enough in 
themselves, but the military archaeologists observed that they were arranged on the remains in a twin column. 
With this fact, it could be established that the jacket was of type “1910 M”. The Brandenburg single–column 
jacket was the one most generally used in the army, but the twin–column Swedish type was only used by 
the guards regiment. This finding led the researchers to the outcome of this professional excavation: almost 
a hundred years after the soldier died, he was positively identified as Jakob Hones. If the buttons had been 
disturbed at the site of the excavation before the military archaeologists could make their observation, it would 
not have been possible to identify the body.
3 Consisting of 7 sections on the institutes of individual countries which deal with war graves research, and on 
the work they do.
4 Austria: Österreichisches Schwarzes Kreuz; France: Pôle d’Entretien des Nécropoles Nationales et des 
Hauts Lieux de Mémoire; Netherlands: Oorlogsgravenstichting; Poland: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i 
Męczeństwa; Great Britain: The Commonwealth War Graves Commission; Germany: Volksbund Deutsche 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge e. V. and Deutsche Dienststelle; Italy: Commissariato Generale per le Onoranze ai 
Caduti in Guerra; Russia: Vojennije Memoriali; Romania: Oficiul Naţional pentru Cultul Eroilor; Ukraine: 
State Interdepartmental Commission for Perpetuating the Memory of the Victims of War and Political 
Repressions at the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; USA: Laboratory Director and Forensic Anthropologist 
The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command.
5 Example: РУКОВОДСТВО ПО ПОИСКОВЫМ И ЭКСГУМАЦИОННЫМ РАБОТАМ. Москва ТОО 
“Люкс-арт” 1997. http://may1945bibliotek.narod.ru/eksgumacion01-0.htm (downloaded: 14 05 2013)
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which is responsible for coordinating the exhumation. This non–profit organisation has been 
responsible for war graves throughout Austria, as well as the war graves of Austrian citizens 
abroad, for more than 80 years. [23]
Since 1919, the German War Graves Agency (in German: Volksbund Deutsche Kriegs-
gräberfürsorge e. V — VDK) [24] has had the task of researching and preserving the war 
graves of German soldiers, and in the event of reburial, of exhuming the soldiers’ remains. 
With a staff of 560 people, this is probably the largest war graves preservation body, with the 
task of maintaining the final resting places of 2.5 million fallen heroes. In order to simplify 
access to and care of war graves, and the execution of commemorations, one of the principles 
of the VDK is to re–inter, in central cemeteries, the bodies of German soldiers who were bur-
ied in different places. Each region, and each country, employs local experts who are charged 
with researching and exhuming German soldiers’ earthly remains, and with organising their 
reburial. In the last few decades, 55 mass cemeteries have been built in Eastern, Central and 
Southern Europe, and 716 000 soldiers have been reburied.
The responses gave the following answers: in the Netherlands, the Recovery and Identi-
fication Unit of the Royal Netherlands Army (RIU/RNLDA) has the task of researching and 
excavating the graves of civilian and military war victims, and of identifying the dead. The 
unit employs three specialists, who work in the laboratory of Camp Soesterberg. 
The central body for the preservation of war graves in Poland6 does not have a separate 
research team. The task of the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites 
is, first and foremost, to preserve the memory of war events, sites and role players, which 
manifests itself mainly in the maintenance and care of war graves and military burial sites. 
Research into the human remains of war and their excavation falls within the competence of 
the regional provinces, the Voivodeships. Although there is no central apparatus in Poland for 
war graves research, investigations are still carried out using scientific procedures. The dis-
trict attorney of the relevant Voivodeship involves various local scientific bodies in the work. 
Site research using geo–radar and excavations are carried out by specialist research teams7 or 
by archaeologists from the local universities8, anthropological and DNA tests on the remains 
are conducted by employees of the institutes of forensic medicine in the Voivodeships9, and 
any artefacts or documents found in the graves are examined by museum historians.
In Romania, the National Office for Heroes Memory (ONCE) [25] is the institution which 
supervises and has the authority to approve the exhumation of the earthly remains of heroes 
who fell in the Romanian War of Independence, the Balkan Wars and the World Wars. There 
is, however, no specialist agency to carry out research, excavation and investigations, so this 
work is done on a case–by–case basis.
The USA has the largest war graves research organisation, not just among the respondents 
to the questionnaire, but also in the world. The Joint Prisoners of War, Missing in Action Ac-
counting Command (JPAC) [26] is an organisation of more than 400 people, whose main aim 
is to locate, repatriate and identify the bodies of 83,000 American soldiers around the world, 
those who never returned from the Second World War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War 
6 The Ministry for Cultural and National Heritage oversees the work of the Council for the Protection of 
Struggle and Martyrdom Sites (Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa, http://www.radaopwim.gov.pl/). 
7 Example: Pomorze1945 (http://www.pomorze1945.com/); “Pomost” Society (http://www.pomost.net.pl/)
8 Example: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika; Kazimierz Wielki University In Bydgoszcz.
9 Example: Department of Forensic Medicine, Pomeranian Medical University, Szczecin.
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and the Cold War. The institution came about in 2003 through the union of several former 
research institutes with similar missions, and the Command centre is located on the Hawaiian 
island of Oahu. The organisation operates the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL), which 
is the largest anthropological laboratory in the world. JPAC has four permanent contingents, 
located in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Hawaii, as well as logistical support teams stationed 
around the world from Europe to Papua New Guinea. A separate file is opened for each 
individual case, and a research team is set up to investigate it. In addition to the permanent 
contingents, JPAC has the capacity to operate 6 research teams at a time, with a staff of 4–9 
people. More than 1300 successful identifications have been made so far, and there are cur-
rently over 1000 cases in progress.
Affected scientific areas
The second question focuses on special methods and scientific areas used in identification 
and reconstruction.
The Austrian war graves foundation involves anthropologists and museologists during 
exhumations.
In the German agency, the emphasis during war graves research and identification of vic-
tims is placed on the historical sciences. The VDK has a database containing biographical data 
on approximately 860 000 war dead, as well as information about their military careers. Addi-
tionally, roles in German research may be played by anthropology, odontology and museology.
In order to identify unknown victims, the experts of the Dutch organisation use the sci-
entific methods of a variety of archaeology, anthropology and military history known as 
battlefield research. The archaeologists and military historians have a thorough knowledge of 
the military events that took place in Dutch territory, as well as the military uniforms worn 
and equipment used, and this plays an important role in the research. The anthropologists 
mainly uses osteological (determining the age and height of victims, and investigating any 
bone anomalies or traumatic alterations) and odontological (examining the teeth and making 
odontological maps) methods. The odontological examination can lead to a positive identifi-
cation if the research team has access to the soldier’s dental records.10 
With regard to the areas of science affected, the leader of one of the Polish research insti-
tutes which deals with war graves research, dr. Andrzej Ossowski, professor at the Pomera-
nian Medical University, Szczecin (Pomorski Uniwersytet Medyczny w Szczecinie), and an 
expert in judicial genetics and personal identification, gave his response to our question. He 
informed us that war grave research in Poland combines the methods of the historical scienc-
es, forensic medicine, (military) archaeology and criminology. Probably the most important 
condition in achieving a successful outcome of the research is the research team itself, which 
needs to include the following experts: 1. anthropologist, 2. forensic geneticist (these two 
positions are often filled by a single person), 3. military historian, 4. military uniform and 
equipment specialist, 5. criminologist, 6. expert in electronic devices. The professor also adds 
that other essential qualities are a passion for this type of activity and commitment. Some 
members of research teams in Poland are often volunteers.
10 During the World Wars of the 20th century, American and German forces, for example, made dental records of 
their soldiers. Unfortunately this was not the practice everywhere, and so this method cannot be applied in the 
case of research into Hungarian soldiers.
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Colleagues at the Romanian institute conduct excavations using historiological, archaeo-
logical, anthropological and — as indicated in their letter to us — military and health proce-
dures. There are no anthropological experts within the Romanian war graves organisation, but 
those taking part in the excavations examine bones in situ, in search for traumatic alterations.
The scientific work process of JPAC commences with the activities of historians. These 
are the people who constantly are collating data from veterans, families, special reports, 
archives and other documentary sources. Archive photographs are examined by a special 
photographic historian. If the historians uncover enough data to investigate a case, with the 
possibility of finding the earthly remains of a missing soldier, JPAC sets up a research team 
depending on the nature of the task, with members that may include a historian, an anthro-
pologist (or taphonomist), a bomb disposal expert, a geologist, a spatial informatics special-
ist, a linguist, a forensic photographer and a technician. Technicians are involved in special 
situations, for example when excavating a crashed aircraft. If required, underwater archae-
ologists may also be called on to participate in the work. Any “material evidence” found in 
the vicinity of the earthly remains is examined by the archaeologists of JPAC in an attempt 
at making an identification.
Methodologies, auxiliary materials, publications
Three questions in the survey were about the written support materials, methodology descrip-
tions and publications that the partner organisations are aware of in connection with the field 
of war graves research.
From the response received from Austria, we learnt that exhumations conducted there 
basically begin with the excavation of the skeleton’s legs. Austrian experts also place a high 
priority on the material relics recovered from war graves.
In Germany, the VDK conduct excavations of war graves on the basis of methodological 
instructions which are issued centrally. Work proceeds in line with the following main stages: 
• acquisition of all the permits required for the excavation; 
• notification of the local authorities; 
• review of the historical documents and lists of losses for the area concerned; 
• estimation of the number of dead located there; 
• determination of burial site numbers (if they exist); 
• determination of the direction in which the bodies lie; 
• involvement of employees; survey of the burial site; 
• estimation of the depth at which the bodies are buried; 
• construction of a fence around the excavation site; 
• start of documentation; photographs before work starts; 
• removal of plants and the topsoil; manual recovery of bones, continuously photo-
graphed; 
• placing the bones in exhumation coffins; 
• full excavation of the graves; 
• filling the holes and restoring the environment; 
• photography after work is completed; handing back the area; 
• writing reports; 
• placing the coffins in a temporary location at the end of each working day.
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The reburial registers completed during the excavation and the objects used for identifica-
tion are sent, when the work is completed, to the central office of the organisation in Berlin. 
The information received there is analysed and compared with historical documents and re-
ports on losses. After the objects have been examined, identification can be made using iden-
tification markings and personal effects (such as rings with engravings) if any are found, or on 
the basis of individual physical characteristics (such as bone deformities or dental imprints).
The Dutch researchers recommended the publication titled Battlefield Archaeology [4], 
as well as a few works within the body of literature on anthropology, which are described 
as essential. [5] In addition to traditional anthropological and odontological examinations, 
the RIU/RNLDA also uses DNA analysis and three–dimensional facial reconstructions. The 
Dutch experts also belong to a vast system of connections, with members consisting of war 
graves preservation partner organisations, military corps, museums, justice organisations and 
historians. The work of war graves research is often carried out with the involvement of this 
circle of professionals.
Professor Dr. Andrzej Ossowski informed us that in Poland, the field work is prepared 
by historical research. This includes a review of the documents in the local archives and the 
parish registries, and in some cases also consists of interviews with surviving eyewitnesses 
of wartime events. Obtaining maps from the time of the events and from the present day, and 
making aerial and satellite photographs, are also part of the preparatory phase, and this con-
tributes greatly to the success of the research. When all the documents and maps are available 
to the researcher, these are analysed and interpreted. The next stage of the process, which is 
the start of field work to locate war burial sites, is conducted on the basis of the analysis. The 
fieldwork is conducted with the use of GPS devices, metal detectors and magnetometers. 
After a burial site is identified, the dimensions of the grave are recorded, and then the human 
remains are excavated using archaeological methods. When excavating a war grave, howev-
er, it is important to uncover the bones as quickly as possible, so the process could be called 
“quasi–archaeological”. During the careful excavation, special attention must be paid to any 
relics which could help in identifying the people concerned, such as identification markings 
(“dogtags”), documents and personal effects. Every such find must be carefully rescued and 
recorded. Following the excavation of the skeleton, the in–situ anthropological tests take 
place, and a sample is taken for later DNA tests. In Poland there is an increasing number of 
scientific articles being published on the subject of war graves research. [6] One of the most 
important publications on this subject, also published in the English language [7], presents 
the research methods used during the excavation of the land around a former concentration 
camp. More than 600 000 Jewish prisoners were killed in the death camp at Belzec. One of 
the main objectives of the research was to find human remains. The work was complicated 
by the fact that the majority of victims’ bodies had been burnt in crematoria. Excavations at 
the approximately 6 hectare site were prepared for by making a thorough study of written 
documents and site plans, as well as a summary of witness testimonies. Ground–penetrating 
radar11 and pilot digs were used to locate relics during the research. In 1997–1998 a total of 
2227 soil samples were taken at five–metre intervals over a network which covered the whole 
area, with their precise locations meticulously recorded on a site plan at a scale of 1:100. The 
samples were submitted to archaeological analysis, and the structure of the soil could then 
11 Pürckhauer type sampling auger. It is 65mm in diameter, and can be used for depths of 6–8m.
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be accurately determined. A total of 225 samples contained evidence of a grave — such as 
human teeth, hair or bone fragments, traces of mortuary wax12 or ashes of cremated bodies 
— at depths ranging from 1.7m to 5 m. [8: 73] By tracing the origins of these samples back 
to their positions on the map, the locations of mass graves were identified. Following this, 
archaeological methods were used to pinpoint the limits of the graves and to excavate them. 
With this method, a total of 33 mass graves were identified in Belzec.
In Romania, ONCE has formulated a methodology which is followed when carrying 
out excavations, research and reburials. [9] It distinguishes between three different types 
of war grave. 
The precise location of human remains is known. In type 1, the methodology starts from 
the premise that based on the grave markings; an attempt will be made to identify the location 
of the pelvic bone of the war dead. This bone is large enough to be found relatively easily, 
and is therefore the simplest from with which to determine the position in which the skeleton 
is lying. During excavations, archaeopedology, that is the archaeological study of soils, is 
also applied.
Only the approximate area of burial is known, and the war grave is unmarked. In type 2 
war graves, pilot digs are recorded on a site map, with the aim of finding the first grave, which 
can later be used as the basis for comparisons. 
There is no knowledge about the location of the war grave. A different procedure is used 
for each of the above cases. In type 3 war graves, pilot digs are also carried out, similarly to 
those in type 2, with the aim of finding graves in the supposed area of burial by progressing 
along two opposed diagonals. The methodology extends particularly to phenomena which 
can be used by the researcher to determine the presence of multiple graves or mass graves. 
The description covers traces of traumatic alterations that may be observed on the bone, 
which can be used to determine the cause of death. It also issues a warning that at this stage of 
the excavation; the grave may only be excavated by hand, using small tools, such as a small 
rake, to reduce the chance of damage to any relics. The grave must be thoroughly examined 
until all artefacts have been found by the researchers. Following this, the bone fragments may 
be raised one by one, and placed in plastic bags, with the place and time of the exhumation 
clearly indicated on them. Those taking part in the excavation must make an accurate record 
of the bones. Because of the risk of oxidation, the material remains are quickly placed in an 
environment which is protected from air and sunlight, and are transferred to the museum of 
military history for examination. The methodology also describes how bones and teeth can 
be used to work out the age of the victim at the time of their death, and other anthropological 
methods for determining their gender. It also contains a basic description of craniometrical 
techniques. Later it describes the methods of making an inventory of bones and the rules for 
storing and reburying the remains, in line with the principles of criminalistics.
The American research teams conduct their work using a variety of rules and supplemen-
tary materials. JPAC operates in accordance with defined political principles and with high 
expectations for ethics, professionalism and conduct. For example, according to principle no. 
12 Grave wax or mortuary wax (adipocere) is a fatty substance derived essentially from the saponification of a 
mixture of ammonium, potassium and limestone salts with fatty acids (especially palmic acid). It is formed 
particularly in environments where the muscles and soft tissues of corpses have lain for many years in 
moist clay soils or water. All the soft part are transformed into this wax-like mass, which usually preserves 
the form of the tissues and organs. Source: Pallas Nagylexikon (http://www.kislexikon.hu/hullaviasz.html  
(downloaded: 02 02 2013)
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4, colleagues must carry out the highest level of scientific work to provide forensic service of 
exceptional quality. This requires the following conditions: competency, continuous training, 
acquiring experience, familiarity with laboratory procedures, professional development and 
the application of known scientific protocols and methodologies. The tasks of JPAC and their 
implementation are described in detail in their operating rules. [10] These define the mission 
of the institution, and the operations relating to research and investigation, laboratory proce-
dures and identification. The operations and working methods of the CIL are regulated sep-
arately [11], and the methodologies are defined in supplementary laboratory manuals. [12] 
Additionally, the employees of the Command also have at their disposal a range of scientific 
publications and auxiliary materials [13], and databases for example, on the places where 
American troops served and missing persons. Due to restrictions of space, this study cannot 
make a thorough exploration of the American methods for every branch of science, but it is 
nevertheless useful to highlight at least one basic procedure. During in situ examinations, the 
historian and the linguist have the important function of garnering as much information as 
possible about past events from the local population. A good example of the importance of 
the method of questioning is shown by the research carried out by JPAC and their predeces-
sor organisation in Yeong San, Korea.13 The bodies of American soldiers killed in fighting 
in the area — during battles fought by Manchu troops — were not all found by researchers. 
Research carried out half a century later, however, led to success, when members of JPAC 
learnt from an elderly local person that after the fighting, the local residents had buried the 
bodies themselves. As the researchers in the 1950s had not used the method of questioning 
— merely searching for victims on the battlefield, when locals had taken them elsewhere for 
burial — it was impossible for them to be successful. [14]
Bone remains after excavation
The next question in the survey was concerned with the fate of the remains after exhumation.
German soldiers are reburied with honours, with the cooperation of the local represen-
tative of the VDK, in the closest German military cemetery to the scene of the excavation, 
generally during a special commemoration. Reburials are governed by strict rules. [15]
The Dutch team informed us that the bone remains of war victims are always subjected to 
anthropological tests. When the victims were soldiers, they are reinterred in a heroes’ burial 
garden with military honours.14
The war graves research team in the Voivodeship of Pomerania in Poland has already 
excavated a huge number of soldiers’ graves from World War II, numbering some 3000. As 
a result of professional excavations and the anthropological and genetic tests that are carried 
out on the bodies, around 1000 of the war dead have been identified. 
In Romania, the reburial of excavated war heroes is governed by law. [16] The bone re-
mains are reburied in exhumation coffins, measuring 60x40x20 cm, and made of cardboard 
or wood. If the religion of the victim is known, they are accorded the appropriate funeral cer-
emony, and if not, they are laid to rest in accordance with the rites of the Romanian Orthodox 
13 AGRS — American Graves Registration Service
14 Dutch soldiers are reburied in the Grebbeberg or Loenen Military Cemeteries, British soldiers in one of the 
burial gardens maintained by the GWGC, such as the Military Cemetery in Arnhem–Oosterberg, and German 
soldiers are buried in the Military Cemetery in Ysselsteyn.
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Church. If more than one soldier is reburied, their coffins are not placed in separate graves, 
but side by side in a common grave. The soldier is finally given a new war grave marking, in 
accordance with their religion. [17]
The slogan “Leave no man behind”, used by the US military forces, also extends to fall-
en American soldiers. In various parts of the world, JPAC not only researches the earthly 
remains of American soldiers, but repatriates them in every case. When members of the 
research team find the bones of a missing soldier, they are sent for examination, along with 
any relics found nearby, to the CIL, where thorough forensic tests are carried out by the 
laboratory’s scientists. In the laboratory, forensic anthropologists and odontologists attempt 
to reconstruct the skeleton, and to determine the origin of the victim, their gender, their age 
at the time of death, the cause of death and any traumatic alterations or illnesses, from all 
this the victim’s biological profile is put together.  The main aim is to establish the identity 
of the soldier. The laboratory is equipped with a high level of technology, and is capable of 
conducting DNA sampling, nuclear and mitochondrial DNA analysis, scanning electron–mi-
croscopic and radiological tests, and thin–section bone histological examinations. Personal 
identification is assisted by computer programs which have been specially developed by 
JPAC. One such program compares the dental records of soldiers with the dental finds from 
the burial site. A further aid to personal identification may be provided by a database con-
taining the results of optical tests, which is particularly useful if eyewear is recovered from 
the grave. When the laboratory tests have been carried out, JPAC hands over the remains 
of every American soldier to the American Battle Monuments Commission [27], which has 
the responsibility for re–interment of the soldier. Unless the relatives specify differently, the 
USA reburies their war dead with military honours in the central military garden of rest at the 
Arlington National Cemetery near Washington DC.
Documentation/ Record methods
The final question in the survey concerned the types of documentation produced during war 
graves research. 
In Austria a separate file is created for collecting the documents generated during the 
excavation of a war grave: lists of the bones and the soldier’s objects (uniform remnants, 
indications of rank, medals and insignia).
The VDK makes a record of all the information uncovered during a war grave excava-
tion, and register visual phenomena and artefacts. As far as documentation is concerned, it is 
probably the German agency which makes the most complete set of documents. This is also 
indicated by the remarkable amount of material which is attached to the reburial documen-
tation that is prepared during every excavation. The documentation contains the following: 
• a printed registration form; 
• a list of the artefacts found; 
• data on the property where the excavation took place; 
• map and site plan; 
• plan of the grave(s); 
• photographic documentation of the condition before, during and after the excavation; 
• certificate verifying the restoration of the site after the end of the work; 
• archive and other relevant documentation.  
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Data uncovered during the excavation are recorded on a form, known as the reburial 
register. The compilers of the form have provided space for recording all the important in-
formation — such as the site of the exhumation, details of the victim, objects found in the 
grave, data about the people taking part in the excavation — but it is also possible to mark the 
recovered bone and tooth remains on anthropological and odontological maps.
The Dutch researchers exhume human remains using archaeological methods, during 
which the stages of the process are photographed. The GPS coordinates are also recorded, 
along with the compass points of the grave and its dimensions. An investigative report is 
made for every excavation, which is sent, in the case of foreign soldiers, to the competent 
partner organisation and the relevant embassy.
Generalising from the example of the research team named Pomorze 194515, it can be 
stated that the process of excavation work in Poland is documented by photographing the 
work, making an identification report, and preparing a site map and a list of relics found.
In Romania, ONCE workers complete a form during every excavation, which records the 
following details: the location of the exhumation, the location of the new grave, lists of the 
bones and objects that were recovered, the place where they are stored, and other observa-
tions, and if it is possible to establish any of them the form also records the gender and height 
of the victim, and their name and the regiment they were in.
The experts at JPAC open a separate “missing in action” file for every individual case. 
Scientists from the different fields summarise the data, and document in detail the observed 
phenomena and the results of the test they have carried out. In order to remain objective, 
however, the persons carrying out the tests have no knowledge of the other details of the case. 
All the data and documents generated during the work process are placed in the file, including 
reports by historians, archaeologists, forensic experts and all other experts involved in the 
case. After all the test results have been included in the file, the scientific director of JPAC 
evaluates the case before closing it.
Summary and comparison of the presented procedures
Based on the above, we will attempt first to summarise the types of war grave research bod-
ies according to the way they are organised. This concerns the principles under which they 
operate, the types of experts they employ, the particular methods that the experts apply, the 
way they record their results, the places where the personal identification of the war dead 
is carried out and where the soldiers are reburied. In order to simplify the analysis of the 
knowledge received so far the table below summarises a few important elements of the data 
presented. 
15 The excavations carried out by the Pomorze 1945 research team can be traced back on their homepage: http://
pomorze1945.com/?co=117&lang=PL (downloaded: 12 05 2013)
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The presentation of the 6 war grave research bodies that submitted responses and their 
methods builds up a comparative picture from which we can draw some general conclusions. 
Countries with larger populations and with stronger economic potential not only maintain 
organisations which deal with the preservation of war graves, but are also able to operate 
separate war grave research and excavation teams and identification laboratories. The best 
example of this is the United States of America, whose JPAC organisation embodies the most 
professional variant of institutional war grave research. Outside the closed set of countries 
that participated in the survey, we can also state that, in addition to the USA and Germany, 
Great Britain and Russia also maintain war grave preservation and research organisations 
with large numbers of employees, which supports this general conclusion. Other countries in 
a favourable economic position, or which do not have significant numbers of unknown war 
heroes, or war heroes whose final resting places are unknown, have organisations operating 
with a smaller apparatus, but still with high level technical conditions. In these cases, howev-
er, the application of scientific methods cannot be described as fully comprehensive. In states 
which do not have the material resources to operate a separate research institute for their 
war dead, the excavation of war graves and the identification of soldiers are carried out in 
different ways, but these states are also capable of dealing with these issues in a professional 
manner. Preconditions for this, however, are political will and well considered and prepared 
organisational work. Based on the above, countries may be classified into three categories 
depending on their war grave research organisations: 
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1. those with permanent war grave research institutions (e.g.: USA–JPAC; Germany —
VDK);
2. those with permanent war grave research offices (e.g.: Netherlands — RIU/RNLDA);
3. those which engage war grave research teams on a case–by–case basis (e.g.: Poland, 
Romania, Austria).
The efforts individual countries make related to war graves research is also closely linked 
to economic factors. The principle taken by the USA, whereby every single fallen soldier is 
researched and repatriated, is something that only a few countries can afford. It is also possi-
ble to classify the procedures into three categories, depending on the principles they operate 
under:
1. the “No one left behind” model: The aim is to research and excavate the graves of all 
fallen soldiers, and to repatriate and rebury their earthly remains (e.g.: USA);
2. the “We care for everybody” model: The aim is to research and excavate the graves 
of fallen soldiers, and to rebury their earthly remains in the closest national military 
cemetery (e.g.: Germany);
3. the “We won’t let it be destroyed” model: There is no planned permanent research, and 
the aim is not to centralise war graves, but to rebury the earthly remains of soldiers 
whose graves are in danger, or are uncovered by chance, in the closest military ceme-
tery or in the local cemetery (e.g.: Romania).
From the preceding chapters and the table we can see the types of experts used by the 
competent bodies during the work processes carried out in different countries. It is possi-
ble to refer to a type of institution that employs specially trained staff who are capable of 
carrying out work in more than one branch of science at the same time. This type includes 
the example of ONCE in Romania, which has an employee who is both a historian and an 
anthropologist. On the other hand, there is a type of institution that employs a separate expert 
for every branch of science involved in the procedure. Common denominators here are the 
historian, the archaeologist and the anthropologist. In addition to these, there are numerous 
independent sciences or branches of science which may be represented by experts in the field 
of war graves research.
The particular methods of each field of the sciences are applied, if not identically, then at 
least similarly by the different organisations. There may be differences when, in addition to 
the basic fields of science in war graves research, namely historical science, archaeology and 
anthropology, additional branches of science are also applied in the research. With regard to 
the conduct of the procedures, however, a definite division may be drawn. A distinction must 
be made between the work processes used during well–prepared research work and those 
followed subsequently when a war grave is excavated by chance. These can be summarised 
according to the components set forth below, and the order in which they occur.
1. prepared war graves research: military historical examination → field research → ex-
cavation → museological, anthropological and genetic tests → summary and analysis 
of results → military historical examination (e.g.: USA, Germany);
2. unprepared war graves research: excavation → museological, anthropological and ge-
netic tests → military historical examination → summary and analysis of results → 
military historical examination (e.g.: Austria, Romania).
The second procedure omits the field research, and its first military historical examination 
is carried out not as a precondition to the work process, but as a consequence of it.
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Concerning the documentation of research work there are no differences of principle 
between the different states, and all of them consider it important. There are, though, some 
differences regarding the amount of data recorded and the different formulas.
Exhumed soldiers — regardless of whether they are successfully identified or not — must 
be laid in their final resting place. As regards the location of the reburial, there are also three 
categories into which the organisations may be classified: the reburials may be described as 
central, regional or local:
1. central: In this case the earthly remains of soldiers are reburied in a central national 
military cemetery (e.g.: USA, Netherlands);
2. regional: In this case the earthly remains of the fallen are reburied in the closest nation-
al military mass cemetery (e.g.: Germany);
3. local: In this case, soldiers are laid to rest in the same place, or in the nearest cemetery 
(e.g.: Romania).
This all presents us with an overall picture of the nature and operations of war grave 
research organisations. With this knowledge in mind, we can venture at an adaptation of the 
organisations and methods to the circumstances in Hungary.
Recommendation for a new method — a potential model for  
Hungary
Although Hungary does not yet have a regulated formula for carrying out war graves re-
search, several attempts have already been made to implement one which is based on science. 
The Hungarian body with responsibility for preservation of war graves, which has changed 
its name on several occasions, operated in the early 2000s in the Institute and Museum of 
Military History. In the bastion of Hungarian military historical research, the first profes-
sional work came about as a co–production of the office for war graves preservation and 
the department of military archaeology, and following some reorganisation the work was 
continued from the Ministry of Defence. Representatives from the two departments travelled 
to many locations, during excavations, to try out the methods borrowed from other branches 
of science or read about in foreign professional literature, and to formulate new methods 
with the aim of reconstructing historical military events and identifying the war heroes. At 
the same time, the civil sphere also recognised the importance of researching and preserving 
war graves, and an abundance of societies, foundations and scientific groups were formed 
and are working hard for the common goal. [18] Following the initial attempts made with the 
knowledge of the major English language textbooks and publications on the subject [19], a 
new method needs to be developed, based on a knowledge of the methods used by foreign 
partner organisations, and adapted to be suitable for local conditions, and after it has been 
successfully tested, the new method needs to be launched.
Due to the fact that, even today, it is not uncommon for human remains of soldiers to turn 
up in Hungarian soil, it would be extremely useful to operate a permanent war graves research 
institute or office, functioning either as a separate organisation working closely with the 
Ministry of Defence Institute and Museum of Military History and the Ministry of Defence 
Department for the Preservation of Military Traditions and War Graves, or as a part of one 
of them. As for the composition of the research team, I consider it essential, on the basis of 
international experience, to use the “triumvirate” of a military historian, an archaeologist and 
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an anthropologist when war graves are excavated. A three–person team of this kind would be 
an engine driving war graves research in Hungary, and would carry out both the prepared and 
the occasional (unprepared) types of work. During the process, every single excavation site 
would be accorded a collection of documents, containing the following attachments: 
• exhumation register; 
• list of material artefacts; 
• site plan; 
• photographs of the excavation; 
• expert opinions by the museologist and the anthropologist; 
• related military historical descriptions and sources; 
• maps; 
• reburial data sheet; 
• photographs of the reburial. 
These tasks could also be carried out without the presence of one or other experts, but 
in such an event the research would fail to include numerous investigative reports, and this 
could encumber the realisation of certain goals, such as personal identification. The Hungari-
an Army would provide a bomb disposal expert to join the research team if the circumstances 
require. The principle of war graves research, based on the economic clout of the country, 
would only stretch as far as the “We care for everybody” model. It would have the aim of re-
searching and excavating the graves of fallen war heroes, and of reburying them in the closest 
national military cemetery. It would be possible to introduce and provide a central military 
cemetery in Hungary for Hungarian soldiers (and for those of unknown origin), as well as 
other central Hungarian military cemeteries in individual foreign countries.16 If and when a 
central military cemetery is established, the research team would also assume responsibility 
for transferring human remains there, but until this situation arises, it will be necessary to 
involve local funeral services in carrying out reburials locally. The three–person research 
team would represent only the core of the organisation, and the headcount would need to be 
expanded, either for functional tasks or for professional tasks. As a temporary measure, until 
it is possible to set up a professional research team, we recommend the creation of an inter-
net website, based on the Dutch model, which experts from the different fields (historians, 
archaeologists, anthropologists, archivists, amateur researchers, etc.) in Hungary would be 
invited to participate in. This would provide an opportunity for information to be shared and 
processed, for contacts to be made, and, if the situation arises, for “locally competent” ex-
perts to undertake excavation and investigation work, under the coordination of the Ministry 
of Defence. In my experience, the involvement and cooperation of enthusiastic researchers 
would throw up plenty of opportunities.
Afterword
The recommended method described above, which is based on the international professional 
literature and on the survey, is currently undergoing testing. In recent years the Ministry of 
Defence and other independent researchers have made efforts to implement scientifically 
based research in this area. Most recently, the method was used during an excavation that 
16  For example, based on the model of the Hungarian central cemeteries in Russia (in Boldirjevka and Rudkino).
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took place close to the city of Szolnok on 26th July 2012, which is presumed to be a mass 
war grave from the autumn of 1944. A positive sign for the future is given by the fact that 
scientific issues [20] and articles [21] on this subject are now being written by Hungarians. 
One of the main objectives of the research carried out by the author of these lines is to devel-
op a Hungarian step–by–step methodology for war graves research – an article with greater 
detail than this study – which could lay the groundwork for future requirements in this field 
of research. It is our hope that the establishment of a Hungarian research team and the appli-
cation of a unified methodology will produce great results in a variety of scientific branches. 
Furthermore by setting up central cemeteries, a contribution may be made towards bringing a 
final closure to the destructive World Wars of the Twentieth Century, as “the war is only over 
when the last war hero has been buried.”
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Capabilities and application possibilities of 
the intelligence functional sub–system of 
“HUTOPCCIS”1 computer–aided command system 
operating on a geospatial information systems basis
FURJÁN Attila2
Operational command is to be implemented always in the area of operations, or 
area of responsibility, using command assets that have a direct effect on the op-
erational activities, and are able to quickly and operatively react to changes in 
the situation, and to make available the necessary forces and equipment in due 
time corresponding to the current situation in order to support the combat activity. 
These requirements are met by field command systems.
This study is aimed at presenting the development results, capabilities, and ap-
plication possibilities of the computer–aided intelligence planning and command 
and data processing functional sub–system operating on a geospatial information 
systems basis.
Head words: “HUTOPCCIS” command system, target intelligence, target report-
ing, target analysis, target data processing, digital map, geospatial information 
systems, intelligence planning on digital maps, visibility examination, detected tar-
gets, monitoring of the fire for effect.
Introduction
Operational, tactical leadership is a command and control system that is different from ordi-
nary peacetime command, and its main purpose is to plan the economic and focused usage 
of the available capabilities, to define tasks and missions on the operational or tactical level, 
and to control the processes of employment.
The modern armed forces can fulfil the tasks determined at the so–called levels of ambi-
tion, the forecast tasks — in employment either under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
or not — and meet the requirements of today and those set by the alliance only if they possess 
and apply a “Tactical Command and Control Information System” which — as an element 
of the automated command system of future land units — ensures the employment planning 
as well as the command of combat (manoeuvre), combat support, and combat service units, 
sub–units, forces as an element of the automated command system of future land units.
The sub–systems of the battlefield system are led on the forces level but must be in-
dependent to an appropriate extent on each independent intermediary level. Access to the 
1 HUTOPCCIS — Hungarian Tactical Operational Command and Control Information System — Magyar 
Harcászati Hadműveleti Vezetési és Irányítási Információs Rendszer
2 Lieutenant–Colonel, PhD., Associate Professor (Univ.), National University of Public Service, Budapest, 
Hungary
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data and information is controlled at every employment and command level; a lower–level 
command element, its office staff, departments have access only to those superior–level data 
and information which have been permitted and made available by the superior level for the 
accomplishment of the mission.
Already developed sub–systems of the “HUTOPCCIS” command system:
1. Manpower and technical establishment registry and maintenance functional sub–system;
2. Intelligence planning & command and data processing functional sub–system;
3. All–arms (operational) functional sub–system;
4. Fire support functional sub–system;
5. Route planning and march command functional sub–system;
Developers of the computer–aided tactical command system:
• Furján Attila, 
• Chief Programmer: Lepesi Györgyné.
The subject of this study is the essence and the capabilities of one of the most important 
sub–systems of the command system: the intelligence functional sub–system.
Combat support sub–systems — intelligence functional  
sub–system
The purpose of the intelligence functional sub–system
The intelligence and data processing sub–system ensures the planning and allocation of in-
telligence tasks, the determination of combat missions, the creation of the data base of the 
expected enemy and non–friendly forces, and the planning of grouping, deployment, and 
activities of the intelligence/reconnaissance elements in the phase of operations, combat ac-
tivity, and employment of the combat (manoeuvre), combat support, and combat service 
units, sub–units. Through supporting all these tasks, it ensures the professional elaboration 
and preparation of plans, orders, sketches, documents, registries which are necessary for the 
commanding of operations, battles.
The sub–system allows for the collection, accurate recording, operational and tactical 
elaboration of the data and information gathered and reported by the elements of the uni-
fied intelligence system (combat recce, long–range recce, artillery, engineering, chemical 
protection, etc). On the basis of the data bases and plans created during the preparation of 
operations and combats, it develops comprehensive information and enables the information 
to be transmitted to command posts, working groups, departments.
The sub–system supports and ensures the creation and continuous maintenance of the 
“Intelligence Log” in both paper– and digital format.
Capabilities and application possibilities of the intelligence functional 
sub–system:
• it can be used in tactical and operational situations as well as in crisis management;
• to use it, professional knowledge and intermediate level PC skills are necessary;
• in processing intelligence data, matches NATO STANAG requirements;
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• the DTA3–50 digital map and digital elevation model created by the Hungarian De-
fence Forces Geo–information Office are used as the base platform;
• provides the possibility to set different scales on the digital map and to adjust the UTM 
grid;
• UTM, MGRS and geographical coordinates used by NATO may be entered into and 
acquired from the digital maps;
• coordinate transformation for the adjacent zones in the UTM projection system is fully 
supported;
• distance measurement is possible on the digital map;
• height data can be acquired (through a digital elevation model);
• a raster (scanned) map can be used as a base platform;
• digital orthophoto can be used as a base platform;
• stationary and mobile target intelligence data can be entered, intelligence information 
can be gathered, processed, and displayed on a digital map with NATO standard sym-
bols (in accordance with APP–6C);
• the value of the intelligence information can be defined in accordance with NATO 
STANAG;
• the intelligence information can be queried by selecting the symbol of the detected 
targets on the digital map;
• the positions, posts of the intelligence/recce forces and assets can be planned using the 
digital map;
• the reconnaissance capabilities and visibility can be displayed and examined from the 
intelligence/recce positions and posts;
• the capabilities and overall visibility of all intelligence sources can be examined;
• target zones can be displayed on the digital map (zones A, B1, B2, C, and D);
• the detected targets can be grouped by priority, listed, and printed;
• the manoeuvres and movements of the intelligence/recce forces and assets can be man-
aged, manoeuvre estimations and calculations can be carried out;
The intelligence process
1. “The intelligence cycle is an activity during which information is acquired, gathered, 
and turned into intelligence data, to make those available for users.” [1: 51]
The intelligence process (cycle) includes four parts:
• control (tasking);




The first phase of the intelligence process involves the definition of requirements by the 
Commander and the intelligence and operations staff. The Commander defines the basic 
3 Digitális Térképészeti Adatbázis — Digital Cartographic Database
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intelligence mission and guidance, and together with the staff, carries out the planning, com-
mand and control and decision–making tasks to define the assessment of intelligence data 
and to ensure continuous implementation.
Intelligence data are mainly required by G2 or S2 as well as G3 or S3 officers, and the fire 
support coordinator officer (FSCOORD). The G2 or S2 controls intelligence data gathering 
and the assessment work for all data sources, and ensures that battlefield information and 
intelligence data are quickly distributed.
The Commander defines the so–called “Primary Intelligence Requirements” on the basis 
of proposals by the G2 or S2. They investigate the assigned task, the status of the enemy, 
terrain conditions, Commander’s guidance and concept of operations (combat) so as to define 
the intelligence data– and information needs. The tasking so developed will contribute to the 
completion of the common primary goal of intelligence carried out through all intelligence/
recce forces and assets, that is: to provide the necessary intelligence data about the enemy 
and the terrain for ensuring foresight, drawing correct conclusions, and destroying the enemy 
by fire. 
Content and preparation of data bases
The necessary data are prepared and refined during computer processing. The expected en-
emy targets are entered into the data base of “Expected and Detected Targets”, taking into 
account their structure. (Figures 1, 2). They indicate destruction of targets in the destruction 
field in order of their priority, consistent with NATO requirements. As follows:
I  immediately, interrupting an on–going strike if necessary;
A  upon acquisition, as soon as the assets are available;
P  as per the plan.
They clarify the enemy High Value Targets (HVT’s) in the “System of Targets” data base 
(Figures 3, 4). The HVT’s represent high value from the standpoint of the enemy, that is the 
forces and assets most necessary for the accomplishment of their mission. For example: if 
the enemy forces are preparing an attack operation (battle) in an area where several river 
crossings are located then those engineering assets ensuring the crossing of rivers will qualify 
as high value targets. 
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Figure 1. Data base of expected and detected targets (own resources)
Figure 2. List of expected and detected targets (own resources)
High Value Targets (HVT’s) — from which High Pay–off Targets are to be selected — include 
the following groups of targets:
• Weapons of mass destruction (e.g. missile platforms suitable for the delivery of weap-
ons of mass destruction);
• Artillery weapons (artillery, multiple–barrelled launcher, and mortar batteries and pla-
toons);
• Antiaircraft artillery (antiaircraft missile and artillery batteries and platoons);
• Command posts (observation posts of fire support and observers, automated fire and 
strike control centres of the artillery, command observation posts, forward command 
posts, communications centres, up to the first echelon brigades, command, guidance, 
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control, and warning centres and posts of air forces, up to brigade level);
• Intelligence and target intelligence assets, data processing centres;
• Electronic warfare (EW) assets (means of electronic recce, command posts of radio 
jammer battalions);
• Combat (attack) troops, reserves;
• Logistics units, logistics centres;
• Airports.
The Commander shall identify the so–called High Pay–off Targets (HPT’s). High Pay–off 
Targets (HPT’s) are High Value Targets (HVT’s), and attacking them will highly contribute 
to the completion of operational (tactical) aims. The G2 or S2 branch, in cooperation with the 
fire support officer (FSO) and other staff branches, proposes which HVTs shall be qualified 
as HPTs. In my opinion, the proper interpretation of these two is of utmost importance, as 
the so–called FM publications include translation inaccuracies, e.g. both HV and HP targets 
are called “high value targets” in the translation several times, which is wrong, since their 
English denominations are different, and their definitions are substantially different, too. The 
literal Hungarian translation of “High Value Target” expresses the sense of the expression. 
The literal Hungarian translation of “High Pay–off Target” (HPT) would mean targets that 
pay off, that is their destruction is of priority from the point of view of one’s own forces for 
the completion of operational (tactical) aims. (Figure 3)
Its literal translation into Hungarian does not fit the language; therefore, it is better to 
nominate them “targets of high priority” in Hungarian. So, high pay–off targets (HPTs) are 
selected from high value targets (HVTs), that is, every high pay–off target (HPT) is also a 
high value target (HVT), but not every high value target (HVT) will be a high pay–off target 
(HPT). The decision to qualify a HVT as HPT demands careful coordination work within the 
staff. Only those HVTs will be qualified as HPTs, which are to be reconnoitred and struck in 
order to accomplish the tasks specified by the Commander.
HPTs, because of their importance, have priority in the course of specifying intelligence 
tasks. HPTs are to be identified both in the data base of expected and detected targets (Figure 
1) and in the system of target data base (Figure 4). Thereby, the software will group HPTs 
separately from the rest of the reported targets during data gathering.
The needed initial data shall be entered in the first phase of the intelligence process, such as:
Name, call sign and coordinates of own intelligence/recce sub–units; — coordinates are 
UTM, as in NATO. The list of own forces can be printed in the form of a chart.
The data base includes the standardized symbols of all intelligence/recce assets, so they 
can be displayed on the digital map.
The exercise maintenance data base shall be prepared during planning, and the following 
data shall be entered:
• the number of target data processes; — which means the set of intelligence data to be 
processed in a tactical (operational) time interval. A new target data processing can be 
opened at any time — in accordance with the tactical situation — and the old target 
data processing can be saved and recalled at any time;
• the basic direction;
• the coordinates of the battlefield (width and depth);
• the beginning of the exercise.
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The targets are grouped in a logical order (main group of targets, group of targets, name 
of the target, type and nature of the target) in the system of target data base. The default target 
properties are indicated, such as coverage, size, whether it qualifies as a HPT, when its de-
struction is planned. Furthermore, the database can store images of the targets (installations, 
equipment) and their most important battle and technical data. Thereby these image and text 
data can be recalled and examined at any time during assessment of the targets (Figure 11). 
The system of targets presently includes the data of 203 targets but it can be augmented — 
also during a battle. The data base includes the NATO standard symbols of the targets, so they 
can be displayed on the digital map.
 
Figure 3. Composition of targets (own resources)
Figure 4. System of the targets data base (own resources)
Besides these, the following data bases are available:
• the actual target no. file; — from which the software provides a target no. for the tar-
gets; — The numbering of targets includes two letters and four numbers, consistent 
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with NATO STANAG. The first letter stands for the country, the second for the military 
unit (e.g. QB0801).
• maintenance of equipment; — includes the intelligence/recce assets and their prop-
erties (accuracy– and reliability properties and reconnaissance capabilities of intelli-
gence sources and assets). The list of intelligence/recce assets can be printed in form 
of a chart.
The front edge is designated on the digital map in the combat preparation phase. There are 
two ways of its designation:
• Designing it directly on the digital map during planning;
• After assuming battle formation, artillery intelligence sub–units report the accurate 
coordinates of the front edge by polar or Cartesian coordinates along the front edge, 
with 50–100 m gaps.
The forward artillery intelligence sub–units have the obligation to continuously observe 
the front edge, so that in case the front edge is displaced by 500 m the artillery intelligence 
troops (fire support and fire observation groups) located at front can instantly report and sub-
mit the new front edge in form of map data, which will then be refined by the software and 
be visible on the digital map accordingly.
The NATO concept on target intelligence prescribes the division of the enemy’s opera-
tional (tactical) areas into zones. These zones in practice include adjacent target zones. As 
such, the HVTs are located in these zones during the operations (battles). In the course of 
assessing the enemy targets, they shall find out in which zone the HVTs are expected to be 
located, and indicate that in the “target zones” column of the data base of expected and de-
tected targets. 
Location of HPTs within the target zones
The first zone is zone “A”, in a distance of 0–5 km from the line of contact. The enemy’s 
combat troops, field and anti-aircraft artillery, reconnaissance, ranging and target intelligence 
assets, command posts, communications centres are located in this zone.
The primary task of visual reconnaissance is to specify the HPTs in zone “A”. 100 mm 
armour–piercing guns, which are usually used for direct laying but usually also capable of 
indirect laying, are located in this zone. The equipment of the division artillery group is situ-
ated 3–6 km deeper towards the end of zone “A”. These assets include 130 mm guns suitable 
for the delivery of nuclear warheads, 152 mm gun–howitzers, self–propelled and motorized 
howitzers, 122 mm and 220 mm multiple–barrelled launchers.
 These weapon systems have great destruction capabilities, posing direct danger and 
threat to one’s own troops.
Destruction of command posts in due time is very important in the fight against the en-
emy’s artillery. War experience has shown that a bigger part of the enemy’s artillery is not 
able to conduct a return fire due to the neutralization and suppression of command posts, 
communications centres and lines. In modern circumstances, this task can be carried out 
more efficiently by radio electronic suppression, which does not exclude the necessity of 
destroying command posts by artillery means. The intelligence/recce organization types of 
the Hungarian Defence Forces have different forces and assets for the reconnaissance and 
graphic intersection of targets in zone “A”.
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The company fire support and fire observation groups and combat reconnaissance 
troops possessing laser range–finders are able to detect targets to the full depth of zone “A” 
— dependent on the line and range of sight — and to specify the coordinates accurately (to 
75 m accuracy). Besides the above–mentioned visual reconnaissance sub–units, the SNAR 
radio locator stations of the combat reconnaissance and artillery intelligence troops are also 
able to detect and accurately specify the position of mobile enemy targets – depending on 
visibility.
However, a sufficient amount of this equipment is not available, so they are not able to 
cover zone “A” of the combat area in full width without gaps. The reconnaissance of artil-
lery and mortar batteries can be carried out in that depth by the sound–ranging battery in a 
reconnaissance width of 12 km and up to 20 km depth. It is advisable that the sound–ranging 
battery be employed in the area of main efforts of reconnaissance.
In night–time conditions, only those flash ranging sub–units are able conduct reconnais-
sance — up to 2 km — which are equipped with night vision devices. As for the future, it is 
necessary that flash ranging sub–units shall be equipped with night vision devices.
Also the combat (manoeuvre) forces located at the front edge can provide useful in-
formation on this zone, although the positioning may be inaccurate and shall be refined by 
additional intelligence.
It must be noted that in a situation at the threshold of war and during crisis management, 
the border guard patrols serving alongside the border of the country can provide the first in-
formation up to a depth of about 3 km from the border, with inaccurate positioning. 
The second zone, zone “B1” is the strip between 5–20 km from the line of contact. Most 
of the high pay–off enemy targets, that is the artillery–, anti–aircraft artillery, mortar, mul-
tiple–barrelled launcher batteries and platoons, intelligence, ranging, target reconnaissance 
assets, command posts and communications centres, radio electronic devices are expected 
to be located here. The division artillery group is situated at the edge of zone “A” or at the 
front end of zone “B”, usually at 3–6 km from the line of contact. These means include 
130 mm guns and 152 mm gun–howitzers, howitzers, and multiple–barrelled launchers. The 
multiple–barrelled launchers stay at a covered (hidden) place until they receive fire order. 
Upon receiving the fire order, they will take their prepared firing position areas, deliver fire, 
and immediately make manoeuvers. The firing position area will be abandoned within 5–15 
minutes. This system of employment is applied by tactical missiles, too.
Today, the basis of the artillery group is made up of self–propelled artillery systems, most 
of which (about 80 %) are armoured. These have a great manoeuvring capability, which en-
ables them to stay in the firing positions only for the time of firing. This actually takes about 
10 minutes, and even less for multiple–barrelled systems. However, there are even stricter 
requirements for future fire systems. The duration of stay of the sub–unit in the firing posi-
tion area shall not exceed 5 minutes. Foreign military experts argue that by decreasing the 
duration of stay of artillery sub–units in the firing positions, a higher invulnerability can be 
ensured than by a technically furnished firing position.
An effective destruction of targets with great manoeuvring capability, such as self–pro-
pelled artillery sub–units, can be successful only by destroying them immediately after de-
tection. This in turn tightens the requirements regarding intelligence/recce assets, data gath-
ering, and data processing. These shall supply comprehensive target information including 
data about – besides the coordinates – the calibre and number of the guns and the size of the 
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area taken by the sub–unit. These data will facilitate the selection of the forces and equipment 
to be involved in destroying the targets, ensure the choosing of the proper firing method, and 
exclude unnecessary use of forces and equipment when destroying individual (roving) guns.
Therefore, the application of long–range and accurate target detection assets is of utmost 
importance. Even the flash ranging sub–units that are equipped with laser rangefinders are 
able to support reconnaissance and firing only up to 10 km from the front edge, 5 km deep 
from the edge of zone “B1”, that is to 1/3rd of the zone. The sound–ranging battery is able 
to locate the position of the enemy’s mortars by graphic intersection up to — depending on 
calibre — 5–8 km and the artillery batteries up to 18–20 km from the deployment area. As 
the sound–ranging sub–unit is deployed at 3 km depth from one’s own front edge and in a 
width of 8–10 km, this complex is capable of carrying out reconnaissance only to the middle 
of zone “B1”.
The SNAR–10 radio locator station can detect mobile targets (columns) to the depth of 
23 km with an accuracy of 20 m. Therefore, this asset can be used for the full depth of zone 
“B1”. But it has its limitations. Its reconnaissance sector is limited to: 4–40 mils, and they 
are able to reconnoitre high pay–off targets (artillery batteries) only when they are moving or 
carrying out a manoeuvre.
In favourable visibility conditions, visual aerial reconnaissance is possible up to 15–20 
km. The coordinates of the target shall be specified through map–terrain synchronization, 
which will result in approximate accuracy or inaccuracy. In the development process of artil-
lery systems, there is a strong tendency of further increasing the range of fire, to higher than 
40 km. That enables the location of fire positions outside the range of ground radio locators, 
which increases the significance of aerial reconnaissance.
It must be stated that Hungarian Defence Forces do not possess such reliable reconnais-
sance assets that would be able to locate the high pay–off targets, especially artillery equip-
ment by graphic intersection in that zone. Mortars are high pay–off targets with great destruc-
tion capability and are especially difficult to detect, since they usually take firing positions in 
ravines, on the opposite side of mountains, in pits or gullies, on steep riverbanks, behind in-
stallations, in ruined buildings and basements, bushy areas, forest clearings, and other places 
where their camouflage is easy and reconnaissance is difficult. Mortar fire does not give such 
easily detectable signals as guns. Therefore, detecting enemy mortars is extremely difficult 
due to the small number of detectable signals and the great manoeuvring and camouflaging 
capabilities. As for artillery sub–units, their destruction is hindered due to their staying in the 
firing positions for an insignificant duration of time.
Guns, multiple–barrelled launchers, and mortars are most likely to be reconnoitred while 
they are firing. NATO reconnaissance sub–units use AN/TPQ–36 locators (up to 20 km) 
and AN/TPQ–37, 47, ARTHUR and COBRA locators (up to 35–50 km). These locators can 
range the enemy artillery– and mortar batteries (platoons) very fast and accurately, and allow 
immediate destruction after detection. The locators work with computer processing. They 
detect and follow artillery– and mortar shells in flight. The data acquired by following the 
shell path is used to determine the trajectory, which allows for the estimation of the position 
of the weapon or the impact point. The locator operator can send the data in the required 
form, digitized to the supported fire control centre, and store them in the locator’s memory, 
or delete them if the situation demands. These assets are radiation emitters and therefore 
exposed to electronic warfare.
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The equipment of the army artillery group is also situated in zone “B1”, at a distance of 
about 4–12 km from the line of contact. The army artillery group involves tube fire means 
and heavy mortars.
Zone “B2” is situated 20–40 km from the line of contact. This zone is probably taken by 
enemy tactical– and antiaircraft missiles, the division command post, anti-aircraft defence 
centres, supply and logistics centres and the second echelon of combat troops (reserves). 
Targets in this zone represent very high value, and — mainly the tactical missiles — pose 
significant danger to own troops.
The reconnaissance sub–units of the Hungarian Defence Forces presently do not possess 
such intelligence/recce assets that would enable them to detect high pay–off targets in this 
zone. Similarly, — due to the firing range — our artillery is not capable of destroying targets 
in that zone, therefore, this mission would devolve upon the air force if the reconnaissance 
issue was solved. It is highly necessary to introduce long–range artillery — primarily multi-
ple–barrelled — equipment.
Promising is the fact that the HDF are developing an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, 
which would ensure continuous reconnaissance and fire support in full tactical depth. The 
advantage of the system lies in the fact that the data processing centre would receive in-
formation about enemy targets simultaneously with reconnoitring, and also the results of 
destruction by fire could be directly and reliably specified. It is also very important that radio 
locators for the detection of artillery equipment be introduced within the artillery organiza-
tion, which would provide the capability to reconnoitre high pay–off targets in zones “B1” 
and “B2” and support firing at these targets.
Zone “C” is at 40–60 km from the line of contact, and this is where the reserve (2nd ech-
elon) of the enemy is situated in their quartering area. Information about these targets can be 
gathered mainly from intelligence sources, and their destruction would only be possible by 
the air force.
Zone “D” is the area 60–150 km from the line of contact, and expectably the enemy 
operational–, antiaircraft missiles, command posts and communications centres, airports, lo-
gistics units, supply centres and storehouses are located there. Any target information about 
this zone can be obtained through intelligence channels, and their destruction would only be 
possible by the air force.
Scientific investigations by Western and Russian military scientists have shown that fight-
ing high pay–off targets, especially artillery equipment of great destruction in the modern 
circumstances can only bring success if the time elapsed between the detection of the target 
and firing is less than 1 minute. This can be achieved only by the comprehensive integration 
of intelligence/reconnaissance and destruction assets; full automation of intelligence data 
gathering, processing, and transmitting to firing means; and rational allocation of zones of 
reconnaissance, zones of destroying by artillery, and zones of radio electronic suppression.
These target zones are also indicated on the digital map, paving the way for professional 
tasking with regards to high pay–off targets.
Acquisition of data (data collection)
As per the NATO definition, data collection is defined as: “In the sense of intelligence, it is a 
step of the processing phase of the intelligence cycle, during which the registry of events is 
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developed by grouping the correlated pieces of information and intelligence data, facilitating 
further processing.” [2: 47]
In accordance with NATO principles, the intelligence data are collected from different 
sources. This information is immediately processed in order to provide the target data neces-
sary for tactical decisions. In order that the Commander can make full use of the fire power 
under his command, an efficient intelligence data collection shall be developed. The primary 
conditions of successful collection of intelligence data are continuous planning and system-
atic coordination of the collection activity.
So to use the intelligence sources, forces, and assets involved in the data collection as 
effectively as possible, their employment possibilities, capabilities, and limitations shall be 
well known to the people controlling target intelligence. 
Through computer processing, users can enter the accurate coordinates and intelligence/
recce capabilities of the intelligence forces (assets) of any units (brigade, division) into the 
data base. The application of the digital map facilitates proper data gathering. 
“The digital map is the product of a map production technology fully based on computer 
support — source analysis, data collection, editing, updating, storage, electronic and repro-
duction outputs — which will be closely connected with a topologically uniform digital data 
base, and therefore will be able to convey all cartographic elements and property data neces-
sary for the production of paper, film, and digital products which can be assigned to the 2D 
or 3D digital information.” [3: 223]
The “digital elevation model” (DDM) facilitates the proper planning of intelligence forc-
es and assets on the digital map. The digital elevation model of Hungary is stored on 3 CDs. 
With the DDM, the terrain can be modelled, and visibility can be quickly and properly im-
plemented by placing a vector or raster digital map on the map model, and so the location 
of intelligence assets can be properly and quickly planned in the phase of operation (combat 
activity) preparation and implementation (Figure 5). With the DDM, the uncovered areas can 
be quickly and accurately specified and assigned to those reconnaissance forces that are able 
to reconnoitre them (e.g. aerial reconnaissance).
Figure 5: Reconnaissance capabilities and visibility examination  
of reconnaissance assets on a digital map (own resources)
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Conclusion
The strategic direction specified by the General Staff and the National Public Service Univer-
sity has priority in the scientific and educational activities of our institute, for the work of the 
teachers and researchers of the faculty. The Faculty carries out its education– and scientific 
tasks in that spirit. One of our priorities is to research the employment possibilities of mili-
tary forces engaged in combat, in asymmetric warfare, and the supporting of command and 
control by means of computer networks and systems.
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Mali: a new challenge for peacekeeping 
RITTER Noémi1
In the past few years many conflicts have intensified in Africa, one of which have 
caused a new peacekeeping mission to be deployed to Mali, and already existing 
operations to be strengthened. Mali was the first victim of the chaos caused by the 
Arab Spring and the international intervention in Libya. The heavily armed Tuareg 
returned to Mali after the Libyan intervention, and their separatist aspirations 
caused an interior conflict that escalated when terrorist groups got involved. A 
democratically functioning country collapsed from one day to another. The crisis 
in Mali is a difficult challenge for the international community because it has to or-
ganize a multidimensional peacekeeping mission, while having to fight against ter-
rorism. Moreover, the global economic crisis forced these nations to reduce their 
military spending without compromising effectiveness. The present paper deals 
with the complexity of the conflict in Mali and examines whether the United Na-
tions Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the 
peacekeeping mission in Mali, is able to comply with the expected requirements. 
Keywords: Mali, terrorism, international intervention, peacekeeping mission, co-
operation  
Introduction 
The international community has a long history in peacekeeping. In the past 20 years peace-
keeping missions have rapidly developed. The African Continent had a leading role in this 
development. [1] After the Cold War many countries in Africa sequentially collapsed. The 
financial assistance from the super powers dried up, economic problems came to the surface 
in addition to other historical conflicts that led sometimes to bloody clashes or even worse 
events. Then international peacekeeping operations with limited mandates were deployed 
into the countries most affected by the conflicts. Mostly these missions were unsuccessful 
in peacekeeping. The massacre in Rwanda made the international community reconsider the 
framework and possibilities of peacekeeping. [2]
The past few years saw similar crises triggered by revolutions in the Middle–East, which 
then spread to Africa. The conflicts in the African countries have some common features 
rooted in their historical background but every conflict has its own specific character. In this 
article I try to examine the new challenges of peacekeeping in Africa through the crisis in 
Mali. The short history of Mali could explain the roots of the conflict not just in Mali but in 
Africa. Economic and ethnic conflicts are common in the African countries. The global eco-
nomic crises and the aftermaths of the revolutions in the Arabic world created new challenges 
for states in the African region and changed the security environment in the region. [3] Mali 
1 ritter.noemi@hotmail.com
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was one of the most democratic countries in Africa but it collapsed in a short time as Mali’s 
interior crises increased into an international problem when the radical Islamists infiltrated 
the country. The escalation in Mali was the first sign of the vulnerability of African states and 
of the fragility of international peace.  
MINUSMA was the latest peacekeeping mission deployed in Mali after an international 
intervention but when it started its operation Mali was too far from peace. The new trends in 
the African conflicts resulted in some changes in the peacekeeping missions. 
An introduction to Mali 
The Republic of Mali is located in West Africa. It is bordered by Algeria, Niger, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania. Its territory is 1 240 192 square kilo-
meters, making it the 24th largest country on Earth and the 8th in Africa. Its capital city is Ba-
mako. Mali is a landlocked country with two rivers: the Niger and the Senegal. The climate 
is subtropical in the south and arid in the north. Mali is mostly flat and the northern area lies 
in the Sahara Desert. Its highest point is Hombori Tondo. Mali’s population is slightly below 
16 million and is ethnically divided: 50% of the population is Mande, 17% Peul, 12% Voltaic, 
10% Tuareg and Moor, 6% Songhai. The official language is French. More than 94% of the 
people are Muslim. The majority of the inhabitants live in the southern regions of the country 
near the rivers. [4]
Mali’s northern and southern parts are so different in many aspects that it has caused 
conflicts through its history. Northern Mali is covered by sand and neither the land nor the 
climate is suitable for agriculture. The northern population is characterized by ethnic and 
cultural diversity, there are sedentary and nomadic groups living together. The main minority 
in the northern area is Tuareg, traditionally connected to North Africa with their Berber Arab 
origin, while the majority of Malian people are Black African with African traditions. [5]
Mali is the 25th poorest country in the World, agriculture, cotton and a gold mining sector 
have the main role in its economy and the country has some uranium deposits too. [4] In the 
past few years the region suffered from droughts that increased its economic problems. 
Mali was a French colony in the 19th century as part of French Sudan. In 1959 Senegal 
and Mali got its autonomy as the part of the French Community and they formed the Mali 
Federation. One year later both countries became independent. 
The first president of Mali was Modibo Keita, who stabilized his own power in a dicta-
torship and built a single–party system. In 1968, just like in Egypt and Libya, there was a 
military coup d’état against Keita, whom had returned to the Franc Zone due to economic 
reasons. After a bloodless revolution Lieutenant Moussa Traoré seized power but the dem-
ocratic transition was not completed until 1992. Traoré declared a new constitution in 1974 
and at the same time he established a political party, called the Democratic Union of the Mali-
an People. Mali held its first election in 1979. Traoré won it and consolidated his single–party 
regime in the framework of civil legislation. In the 1980s students organized an uprising 
against the anti–democratic regime. The riot did not reach its aims but did mark the beginning 
of those changes which led to a real democratic transition in 1992. Traoré recognized that 
the system needed liberalization in the economy and allowed independent press and political 
association. These reforms established the background of a democratic change. In 1991 stu-
dents led a riot again, with the support of military officers. Traoré was arrested. Mali became 
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a democratic country with a semi–presidential multiparty system. Alpha Oumar Konoré was 
the first democratically elected president of Mali for two terms, then in 2002 Amadou Tou-
mani Touré, who had been the leader of the military group in the 1991 revolution, won the 
election. Touré was the president until March 2012 when a military coup removed him from 
power and a transitional government, led by Dioncounda Traoré, was established. [6]
The background of the crisis in Mali 
Mali was the most democratic country in Africa in the past 20 years. Although Mali was the 
first victim of the North African unrest, there are many other fragile states in its neighbour-
hood. There were three main reasons for the crises in Mali. Firstly, there was a historical 
conflict in society. The Tuareg minority, who lives in the northern part of the country, wanted 
autonomy in the Azawad region. Moreover, Mali had to face deeper economic problems 
worsened by drought and increased by the global economic crisis. Slavery further escalated 
the social and political conflicts. Secondly, there was a revolutionary wave in the Arabic 
countries, which started in North Africa. Finally, radical Islamist groups joined the rebels 
thus the Mali crisis presented a threat to the regional and the international security. 
We shall try to describe the connection of these three main reasons and explain how they 
escalate a crisis which necessitated an international intervention in the end. As we mentioned 
above, Mali is ethnically divided. Tuareg are nomadic Berber people wandering in the desert 
of the Sahara.2 They live in northern Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Mauritania. After the French 
colonization the western powers established borders without regard for the ethnic groups. 
The newly drawn borders are the reason for many conflicts all over Africa because they 
fragmented the tribes and ethnic groups. When Mali gained independence in 1960 Tuareg 
wanted autonomy but the government forces were better equipped so they repressed the Tu-
areg rebellion then they established strong military control over the three northern regions. 
Socialism and nationalism effected Keitha’s governing method and he took the land from 
the Tuareg, so they fled to the neighbouring countries: Algeria, Niger, Mauritania and Lib-
ya. While Mali went on to a democratic transition in 1992 the Tuareg started an insurgency 
again. The transitional government was ready for negotiations with two Tuareg factions: the 
Azawad Popular Movement and the Arabic Islamic Front of Azawad, but not all the Tuareg 
community got involved. [7] At the end of this process the National Pact was signed. The 
Tuareg people got political rights, the government granted their local representation and their 
combatants were allowed to join the Malian Armed Forces. These agreements were not able 
to put an end to the violence as the Islamic Front of Azawad did not sign the National Pact 
and continued the attacks. 
The final moment which led to the Malian crisis was the Libyan regime change. After 
Gaddafi’s return in Africa in the 1970s he welcomed the Tuareg migrants. Gaddafi integrated 
them into the Libyan Forces. They played an active role in the civil war on both sides. After 
Gaddafi’s death these experienced and heavily armed fighters had to leave Libya. They re-
turned into Mali and that triggered the Mali crisis. 
2 Tuareg: In the past Tuareg people connected East and West Africa, they had the main role in the trans–
Saharan–trade. 
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The main actors of the conflict 
This conflict was more complicated than it seemed. The rebel Tuareg groups were fragment-
ed, with different objectives and the turmoil in Mali attracted terrorist groups that established 
their bases in the country. 
In October 2011 Tuareg fighters founded an organization called National Movement of 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA, in French: Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Aza-
wad). This was the moderate wing of the rebellion because it was a nationalist movement not 
an Islamist formation. Their aim was to establish an independent and secular country in the 
territory of Azawad. During the escalation the MNLA became fragmented and some smaller 
groups broke off. 
Ansar al–Dine is another group founded by a Touareg fighter Iyad Ag Ghali. This group 
is an Islamist group but it is not part of an international terrorist network. Ansar al–Dine 
aims at creating an Islamic country in Mali, to be governed by Sharia law. At the beginning 
of the conflict the MNLA and Ansar al–Dine co–operated, but after Northern Mali fell Ansar 
al–Dine took control from the MNLA and started to reach its own goals. [8]
Al–Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a regional jihadist group in the Sahel, a 
branch of al–Qaida. It is not clear if Ansar al–Dine and AQIM are connected to each other but 
both have similar objectives. Their members were not only Malian or Tuareg but there were 
well trained fighters who had come from Afghanistan and Somalia, and young people from 
the neighbouring countries. [9] The movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) 
is another terrorist organization which split off from AQIM. Their goal is the same but MU-
JWA operates in West Africa and its leaders are black African. [10] This group was formed 
in Mauritania in mid-2011. The objectives of the MNLA and Ansar al–Dine do not meet: the 
MNLA wants autonomy for the Tuareg while Ansar al–Dine envisions an Islamic Mali. The 
real danger for regional stability is AQIM and MUJWA. [8]
The escalation of the conflict and the international military  
intervention 
The Tuareg rebellion started in January 2012. In response, government troops were deployed 
but the Malian Forces were not able to isolate the riot in the north. While the Tuareg aspira-
tion for autonomy were rising the government of Mali had to face internal political problems. 
The MNLA leaders stated that the autonomy of Azawad is off the negotiation agenda and 
they started the occupation of the northern cities. On 22nd March in 2012 a group of Malian 
officers overthrew the civilian government having seen its inability in managing the northern 
conflict. The leader of the coup d’état, officer Amadou Sanogo, was trained by the US mili-
tary while fighting against terrorism. 3 [11] 
By the end of March the MNLA had taken control over Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu: the 
main cities in the northern part of the country. At the beginning of the insurgency the MNLA 
and Ansar al–Dine fought together with the Malian army, until they occupied the whole 
northern region. On 6th April the MNLA declared the separation of the North as an inde-
3 US AFRICOM was founded in 2008 as part of counter terrorism in cooperation with the countries in the 
region. In this frame US troops were deployed and organized training for the national armed forces. 
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pendent state: Azawad. After the separation the Islamists seized power from the MNLA, 
implemented Sharia laws and by the autumn of 2012 most cities were in Islamist hands. As 
the northern conflict widened there was a fear that it could further extend in the southern part 
of the country and spread in the region. The government of Mali and Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) requested an international military intervention. On 12th 
October 2012 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2071, which was an ac-
tion plan for military intervention in Mali. According to this plan ECOWAS and the African 
Union were to lead the forces which had a limited timeframe of 45 days. [6] This resolution 
did not authorize the deployment of the international forces. One month later the United Na-
tions Security Council adopted Resolution 2085, which gave a mandate for the intervention 
of African–led troops and the French forces to take all the necessary measures. [12]
Operation Serval 
France supported the intervention from the beginning of the crisis not only because of the 
historical background but also for political reasons: the uranium from neighbouring Niger en-
sures a large part of the French energy supply and the escalation of the conflict could threaten 
its access. [13] The French forces started their operation on 11th January 2013. The interven-
tion was urgent because the radical groups captured the city of Konna, with a military airport 
nearby which had real importance in logistical terms for foreign troops. [14] At the beginning 
of the operation France did not deploy land forces except the Special Forces and as in Libya 
they attacked the Islamist targets with air strikes launched from armed Gazelle helicopters, 
Mirage and Rafale fighter jets. The French operations quickly suppressed the Islamist mili-
tias. The African–led mission had been deployed sooner than planned with the first troops 
arriving on 17th January. Due to international actions in Mali the Algerian wing of AQIM 
attacked a gas field in Algeria and took the foreigner workers hostage. The Algerian Security 
Forces acted quickly but seven hostages became victims of this incident. [15]
France continued its operation assisting the Malian army. By the end of January the main 
cities in the north were cleared of the Islamist forces but it did not mean the end of the cri-
sis. The Islamist groups retreated into the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains and continued their 
attacks. French forces were planned to be withdrawn in the end of March 2013, but the situa-
tion in Mali forced them to stay longer as the Malian army would have been too weak to fight 
with the Islamist units alone. The Chadian troops played an important role in resolving the 
conflict in Mali. When the French forces pushed back the Islamist groups in the Arder des If-
oghas and Tighargar the experienced Chadian troops followed them and destroyed their bases 
and killed the terrorist leaders. [16] Until then the terrorist groups presented a real threat to 
Mali, they made their presence felt by constant terrorist attacks. France started the withdraw-
al of half of its troops but approximately 1000 French troops stayed in Mali in cooperation 
with the international peacekeeping mission. [17]
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) 
The French forces did not fight alone with the Islamists in the military intervention; well 
organized and coordinated cooperation with the troops of AFISMA was witnessed. As I 
have mentioned above, the African–led International Support Mission was established by 
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the United Nations Security Council Resolution with a one–year mandate to restore peace 
and security in Mali. The European Union created a support mission beside the French and 
African troops. It was a training mission for developing the Malian Armed Forces.4 [18] The 
French intervention and the forces of AFISMA worked in cooperation, but their motivation to 
intervene was far different. France wanted to defend its political interests in the region while 
AFISMA came to put an end to the humanitarian crisis in Mali and prevent the escalation 
of the conflict in the region. Despite the French participation the mission of AFISMA did 
not alter the well–tried method in peacekeeping with the western countries and international 
organizations providing the financial background and the equipment for the military opera-
tions while 3rd world countries deployed their soldiers. [19] The main financial contributors 
to AFISMA were: Japan with 120 million USD, the United States 96 million USD and the 
EU 75 million USD. [20] The member states of the African Union and ECOWAST sent the 
troops for AFISMA.5 [20] The initial plan was to deploy 3000 troops in Mali but when the 
operations started their strength increased to over 6000. Chadian, Nigerian and ECOWAS 
troops were over–represented in the forces of AFISMA. 
As the objectives of the peacekeeping missions were to achieve a longstanding solution, 
AFISMA had to act in wider dimensions of security during the military actions and further 
on. [21] AFISMA took part in political solutions, ECOWAS mentored the process of negoti-
ations between the transitional government and MNLA leaders. As a result of the mediation 
they signed a peace deal on 18th June 2013. [22] Experiencing the incapacity of the Malian 
security forces the mission had to assist with rebuilding the army of Mali. AFISMA took part 
in legal reforms with a special regard for minority rights. After the intervention reached its 
main goal to stop the extremists and stabilize the northern region AFISMA transformed into a 
multidimensional peace–building mission supporting the stabilization of peace and security. 
MINUSMA 
In the end of February 2012 the transitional government took back control in the northern 
cities, as a result of the international intervention, and started peace talks with the MNLA.6 
[23] Thanks to these successful military actions the Islamist groups were displaced from their 
bases in the mountains. It seemed that the crisis in Mali subsided but it did not mean the end 
of the conflict. The extremists did not give up their aims and their countless attacks remained, 
marking their presence. The Malian government was urged to take steps in the transition 
with the assistance of MINUSMA, European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali and the 
French troops. [24]
On 25th April 2013 the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 2100. AFISMA 
was transformed into a peacekeeping mission called Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Mali. On 1st July 2013 MINUSMA took the authority from AFISMA. MI-
NUSMA started its operation with 12 640 uniformed personnel and civil staff. The mandate 
of this mission is wide enough. Although the northern territory came under the control of the 
Malian government the country was far from stability yet. MINUSMA got a large mandate 
4 Hungary also participated in the mission of EUTM Mali 
5 The African countries that contributed to AFISMA with troops: Nigeria, Ghana, Chad, Niger, Benin, Burundi, 
Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone.
6 18 June 2013 MNLA and the government of Mali signed a peace deal in Burkina Faso
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regarding the complexity of the situation in Mali. The mission was established as a peace-
keeping mission but it has some specifications, namely: its mandate did not authorize the 
use of force just the limited use of weapons for self–defence and protecting civilians, which 
means they can take military action at tactical level only. MINUSMA stands on the line of 
a traditional peacekeeping mission and peace–enforcement. [25] The most important aim 
of this mission is to guarantee the peace and the security in Mali. To achieve this goal the 
government troops have to stabilize the key centers while they are assisting with rebuilding 
the security sector. The re–establishment of state authority in the country had to be provided 
support. This mission was called to promote the reconciliation process, support the national 
dialogue and take part in the implementation of the transition in Mali. The mission had ele-
ments to develop human rights and programs for disarmament and reintegration. [26]
Until now the mission has achieved little success but there have been small steps made, 
such as elections held in the summer, which could be the first step to rebuilding the political 
body of the country. There was a backward step too when the MNLA ended the ceasefire after 
the security forces had clashed with protesters. MINUSMA peacekeepers have to face many 
challenges and that makes the solution more difficult. On the one hand there are the interior 
problems in the country like the diversity of ethnicities and the deep economic problems. On 
the other hand there is regional instability with increasing extremism. Having regarded the 
circumstances I do not think MINUSMA will succeed in its mission in the near future. The 
success of the MINUSMA mission is largely inhibited by the strengthening terrorist groups 
in the region. Some participant African states, like Nigeria, were forced to recall their troops 
from the peacekeeping mission due to the radical escalation of the interior conflict.  
Conclusion 
The Northern–Mali crisis started as an interior conflict based on three main problems: the 
ethnic diversity in society, the cultural differences between the eastern and northern parts of 
the country and economic reasons. [6]
Due to external factors the interior problems escalated and this turnaround endangered 
international peace and security. The aftermath of the Arab spring and the international inter-
vention in Libya exacerbated the existing ethnic conflict when armed Tuareg returned from 
Libya complemented with terrorist elements. A military coup d’état overthrew the govern-
ment when the separatist Tuareg rebels captured cities in the north and the Islamist groups 
took control from the Tuareg fighters. The transitional government of Mali requested inter-
national intervention. This request and the spread of terrorism gave the mandate to the inter-
national community to intervene. The regional instability and the collapsed security sector 
of Mali predicted the necessity of a peacekeeping operation after international intervention. 
The French forces and the troops of AFISMA in cooperation with the security forces of Mali 
had taken rapid military actions, recaptured the main cities in the north and driven out the 
Islamist groups. 
After the intervention AFISMA was transformed into a peacekeeping mission. MINUS-
MA functioned as the new generation of peacekeeping. It was authorized to complete multi-
dimensional operations in security, political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. This 
mission works in close cooperation with the French troops as regards the fragile security in 
the country. The French forces continued their military actions against the Islamists. MINUS-
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MA have to face a complex conflict in Mali and asymmetric challenges. The mission has not 
succeeded yet. The unrest is escalating in the region and the terrorist elements are gaining 
strength. That and the fact that some participating countries had to withdraw their troops 
because of their own security, threatened by the terrorist rebels, hampered the effectiveness 
of the mission. There are old conflicts intensifying in South–Sudan, the Democratic Repub-
lic in Congo and the Central African Republic. The international community has to divide 
its troops and financial resources. At present it seems that the stabilization of Mali will be a 
longer process. 
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Place and role of cultural anthropology  
in the Military
SZTANKAI Krisztián1 
Action–anthropology is one branch of cultural anthropology that as an interdis-
cipline can promote the more effective functioning of the system of the Hungarian 
Defence Force’s mission operations planning, training, and task implementation. 
Cultural anthropology — and the sub–discipline action–anthropology — is a 
branch of social science utilizing methods of theory and knowledge to solve prac-
tical social problems; therefore, it is suitable for special research in mission areas. 
Keywords: Anthropology, Action anthropology, cooperation, Hungarian Defence 
Forces (HDF)
Cultural Anthropology
Cultural anthropology is a branch of anthropology. In the UK it is called social anthropology 
or socio–cultural anthropology. Cultural anthropology researches the culture and social orga-
nization of various nations and ethnic groups primarily on empirical basis and upon empirical 
facts. As the main method of gathering material, participant observation is considered, which 
distinguishes it from all other sciences that study culture and society. The methods and scien-
tific thesis make anthropology suitable for studying any small, closed community or subcul-
ture. Learning about other cultures and the development of cultural sensitivity towards other 
societies — ethnic, religious, political, etc. — in addition to teaching tolerance, is extremely 
important to learn both in domestic academic life and in military science and the military 
missions of the future.
In this current work we do not wish to elaborate the relationship of ethnology, ethnog-
raphy and cultural anthropology because it is not the subject of this article, but it is worth 
knowing that folklore is a science that inspects the life of groups who live in a traditional way 
of life and which are mainly peasant, nomad and gatherer groups. Ethnology deals with the 
comparison of these phenomena and the discovery of structure and context.
So what exactly is cultural anthropology?
Definitions: The Dictionary of Foreign Words in 1983, defined anthropology as the science 
of the human that deals with the natural endowments of the human and his organizational 
structure. According to the Encyclopaedia of Folk [6: 104] in Hungary the biological sciences 
include anthropology, and it only refers to the use of economic, cultural and social anthro-
pology. We could learn Ethnography from the Ethnography Encyclopaedia [6: 743] as the 
internationally recognized and used name for ethnography, which is a part of ethnological 
1 k.sztankai@gmail.com
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research. Although from the definition of the Encyclopaedia of Ethnology it is clear that in 
the British areas the science dealing with cultural and social anthropology is known as a 
synonym of ethnography. One should not be surprised that a professional anthropologist per-
ceives himself an ethnographer, or an ethnography researcher, this problem is present in an-
thropology society to this day. One thing is certain, that anthropology is an inter–disciplinary 
science that utilizes both ethnography and ethnographic methods and experience.
Cultural anthropology in the higher education of Hungary
The first Hungarian anthropological work titled “Anthropology is the description of hu-
manity” was published by Fejér György in 1807. In 1878 the National Archaeological and 
Anthropological Society was founded, and the world’s fourth anthropological institute was 
established in 1881. Zoologist Professor Méhely Lajos (1862–1953) with his appointment in 
1920 slightly “misled” the Hungarian scientific approach to anthropology, which lasted until 
his retirement in 1930. The return to anthropological aspects of real habits was due to Bar-
tucz Lajos, who dealt with truly scientific anthropology. Following the war, the status of the 
institute in Budapest and Szeged changed to department. In 1959 Bartucz was appointed to 
lead the Budapest Institute, which he led till his death in 1966. In the academic year 1990–91, 
with the leadership of Boglár Lajos three instructors separated from the Department of Eth-
nology of Eötvös Loránd University, and with the support of the Soros Foundation and of 
the Tempus program, cultural anthropology education was first launched in Hungary. Kunt 
Ernő founded the Cultural and Visual Anthropology Department in 1992 at the University of 
Miskolc. In 1995, after Kunt’s death, the academic chair was been taken over by Borsányi 
László from Budapest. At the University of Pécs and its predecessor, the Janus Pannonius 
University regular training has been conducted since September 1991, which was launched 
in 1989 by Professor Andrásfalvy Bertalan.
The action anthropology
Action anthropology unfolded during the colonial period and was rejected by the anthro-
pologist society, just as military anthropology, which surfaced in the 21st century as a new 
trend. This scientific approach has been called “colonial anthropology” within anthropology. 
In Great Britain the army got in direct contact with trained social scientists during the colo-
nial period. As a result of sudden development, anthropology was deeply linked to colonial 
politics. Already in 1908, anthropology courses started among the people of the Sudan Civil 
Service. This relationship was quickly institutionalized in 1921 when, the International Afri-
can Institute was founded to learn more about foreign cultures and languages, its leader was 
the former governor of Nigeria.[1]
Bronislaw Malinowski — one of the most respected people in the history of anthropolo-
gy — said that action anthropology is nothing more than a means to increase the efficiency 
of colonial policy. It is a fact, that the appearance of this new direction of applied anthro-
pology resulted in a significant difference of opinion, with which governments lived during 
the blooming of the colonial period. Many anthropologists and government officials had the 
intention of using the methods of anthropology to help the development of a colonial square 
alignment of foreign cultural environment, but under the control of the west. Many anthro-
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pologists admitted to — those who took part in the work — really using their skills to serve 
the European expansion and dissemination of ideas. Many mention the name of Radcliffe–
Brown, a very well known researcher in anthropology, and debate the use of his skills and 
knowledge as the instrument of colonialism. He wrote his study at the University of Cape 
Town, which was designated to help to reduce the conflict between the white and the black 
population, and was used to strengthen the British colonial rule in individual colonies. The 
American Anthropologist Association, of course, disfavoured this level of anthropological 
support of governments, so it has repeatedly condemned those anthropologists who openly or 
covertly were involved in such activities So it happened that both Margaret Mead and Ruth 
Benedict also became the target of the organization, having done scientific research at the 
request of the U.S. government in World War II about Japanese culture. To date this is the 
best and most detailed work on Japanese society and Japanese social scientists acknowledge 
it. It deserves even more respect that all of this descriptive research was carried out without 
even having spent time in the country.
The status and importance of applied anthropology is acknowledged by the social scien-
tists dealing with anthropology, despite the slight fear that can be felt from people engaged 
in this science nowadays. Of course, this science has no spotless history, as research carried 
out during the wars supported the political views of a given government to the detriment of 
the studied culture. This was the case with World War II, Vietnam, Burma, the Gulf War and 
today anthropologists are also employed in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Action Anthropology in the Hungarian Armed Forces
In the Hungarian Armed Forces, I look at three different levels and tasks of action anthropology: 
1. At the operational level, in the planning phase;
2. Tactical levels, the appearance in the mission areas;
3. During the training for missions and in higher education.
The toolbar of cultural anthropology is best suited to design the obstacles ahead of us 
and prepare for expected events. In this case, the local cultural differences, local language 
recognition, building and exploring a network of contacts, tracing political units, these all can 
provide such information to the operational planning level that can make the evacuation and 
the start of workflow more efficient, economical and faster. Inclusion of first contact with the 
local population can only be executed by a qualified specialist, but a time of keeping in touch 
is also helpful when an already known specialist negotiates in a foreign country with foreign 
leaders. On a tactical level, the military anthropologist has to appear on the spot, operate 
locally with the military units and continuously collect information about the state between 
the military and the civilian sector, and communicate with local leaders and the local popu-
lation. Without this knowledge, the relocation and work of military units is more dangerous, 
more expensive and takes more time. Thanks to a social scientist’s research, more detailed 
and multidirectional information can be collected about the culture and the troops are more 
sensitive to changes. The disclosed information will not only be used for command and re-
connaissance elements, but it can be integrated into the next shift’s training, not to mention 
its role in military higher education, with which we will be able to train multi–dimensional 
thinking military leaders, who will be able to meet the challenges of the future.
116 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
SZTANKAI Krisztián: Place and role of cultural anthropology in the Military
The building of this program requires no real huge extra cost, since neither a technical 
nor a developmental cost would be needed for the establishment of such a group, wheth-
er on campus or in one of the corps. The only cost is the application and recruitment of 
professionals who would apply their expertise to the task of national defence. More and 
more young anthropologists deal with the idea of military anthropology and the scientific 
and military potential in this science. However no step has been taken to create the ability for 
truly modern future military operations in the HDF. My previous articles have dealt with the 
American Human Terrain System’s (HTS) work, but the British Defence Cultural Specialist 
Unit (DCSU) is also responsible for, among other things, social science methods assisting in 
military operations. [2]  
In the U.S. national and international policy, it is not surprising that U.S. intelligence 
agencies are the main funders of the various secret social science projects in the world. [3] 
The United States and Great Britain launched two programs, which examined the possibility 
of social science application; these were the Intelligence Scholars Program and the Com-
bating Terrorism Countering Radicalisation program. In the United States since April 2004, 
many intelligence agency analyst staff had to re–enroll in American universities to expand 
their expertise and knowledge of cultural anthropological knowledge, which has become 
necessary to carry out their work more accurately. In July 2006, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) joint-
ly launched a 1.3 million pound initiative aimed at analyzing the extremist Islamic groups in 
five countries and six regions . The program’s aim was to better understand the operation of 
terrorist groups and to develop an effective action against them. The fact is that the research 
program was not openly advertised, but MI5’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was involved 
in the planning. [4] The behaviour of smaller or larger communities can help or deeply im-
pede military efforts. The understanding of local people’s responses and their effects on our 
military operations are the keys for success. [5]
In Hungary, at several scientific conferences since 2007 (National University of Public 
Service, and University of Miskolc) examined the potential and indispensability of cultural 
anthropology in military exercises. NATO and the EU have continuously engaged in how 
this kind of methodology could effectively be applied in military planning and exercises, 
which is the most important tool of anthropology. Now only the opinion of the Hungarian 
Defence Forces is missing as to how this capacity could be built in and applied to the task 
force system. 
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Analysis and assessment of targets on a digital map 
and Computer processing of Intelligence data
FURJÁN Attila1 
The Tactical Operational Command and Control Information System shall have 
sub–systems that are capable of covering, ensuring, and servicing — in summary 
supporting — the battlefield systems operated by the combat (manoeuvre) forces 
and combat support units and sub–units during planning and commanding, on the 
land forces, brigade, battalion and company level.
One of the most important such sub–systems is the intelligence planning, command 
and data processing functional sub–system. It allows for a quick and professional 
processing of target intelligence data, displaying them with the standard symbols 
on digital maps, and promptly grouping them by priority; thereby it greatly fa-
cilitates the manoeuvre commander’s foresight, provides assistance for decision–
making, and provides accurate target data to the fire support groups for target 
planning.
Head words: “HUTOPCCIS” command system, target intelligence, target report-
ing, target analysis, target data processing, digital map, geospatial information 
systems, intelligence planning on digital maps, visibility examination, detected tar-
gets, monitoring of fire for effect.
Intelligence data reporting and entering into the computer
The collection and processing of intelligence data would be carried out by the intelligence 
data processing– and command post, which is to be established at the command posts of 
combat troops (brigade, land force); and by the intelligence data processing sections (FAR) 
to be established at the fire control posts of the artillery. Thus, the data necessary for fire con-
trol would be immediately available through the information network, and close cooperation 
would be established between the two groups.
The units directly carrying out reconnaissance, belonging to different intelligence orga-
nization types, report the intelligence data using a standard intelligence–reporting form, the 
“Intelligence Log”, to the intelligence data processing– and command post (FAVP) and to 
the intelligence data processing section (FAR) via radio or a line telecommunications device 
if the means of entering digital data into the computer has not yet been provided (Fig. 6).
The recce sub–units would make reports in the “Intelligence Log” in the columns marked 
black. The numbering of these columns is in line with the computer data entry (Fig. 1–2).
1  National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
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Figure 1. Standard intelligence log (own resources)
Figure 2. The developed digital log (own resource)
Polar coordinates (direction and distance) can also be reported, in which case columns 
6, 7, and 8 shall be filled. For columns 15–18, only those reconnaissance units shall report 
which have no data in the data base.
The operator of the intelligence and data processing centre takes up the report via radio or 
a line device, and enters the data into the computer, following the order of the report.
The software automatically displays and records the time of report when the reported in-
telligence data are entered. In column 9 of the “Intelligence Log”, text input is also possible. 
All sub–objects of a grouped target can be entered and these targets will also be summarized 
by type and nature of target. Of course, besides the type of target, they can report here other 
important enemy information found in a visual way with map–terrain synchronization or 
estimation. Example: “Muhi populated settlement D–1500, enemy has activated infantry–, 
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armour–piercing gun and mortar firing, probably preparing for an assault”. Such and similar 
reports can be made by border guards and different reconnaissance patrols, who inspect ene-
my forces visually, possibly using binoculars. These groups usually do not have any appara-
tuses, probably only maps, so they will specify the location of the target through estimations, 
in relation to an object or a survey point that can be identified on the map.
Further information can be reported about a previously indicated target (target no.), and 
the software will record the report for that same target with the actual time of reconnaissance.
For reporting in columns 10–11, coordinates can be entered using the UTM–system, con-
sistent with NATO requirements (Military Grid Reference System — MGRS coordinates). 
If a target is reported with shorter coordinates, the software will take up the middle of the 
specified square as the location of the target.
For no. 16, the accuracy indicator of positioning by the intelligence data can be one of 
the following:
“P” — accurate, “Pn” — inaccurate.
Accuracy is a basic requirement for the specification of the coordinates, height above sea 
level, and size of detected targets; which ensures the efficiency of destruction by fire.
Accuracy requirements:
• the error of accuracy of specifying the coordinates of the targets shall not be more than 
75 m (Hungarian artillery guidelines of Tü/1, Tü/50);
• the width and depth error of accuracy when specifying the size of groups of targets 
shall not be more than 100 m (Hungarian artillery guidelines of Tü/1, Tü/50);
• the error of accuracy of specifying the height of the targets shall not be more than 5 m;
Accurate (“P”): if the above accuracy requirements are met.
Inaccurate (“Pn”): if the error of accuracy of specifying the coordinates of the targets is 
more than 75 m.
Every reconnaissance asset or method has its characteristic accuracy of specifying coor-
dinates, which is symbolized by the average error (Ek). As the average error is a component 
of the cumulative error of fire aiming, the result of firing directly depends on it. Therefore, 
the effect of this average error can be assessed through the probability of accomplishment of 
the firing mission.
Colonel S. Zajcev, Academy Counsellor, Csc (PhD) of Military Sciences, Colonel V. G. 
Ramicün, Csc (PhD) of Military Sciences, and Major A.N. Sautin conducted research about 
the dependence of the probability of the destruction of different targets on the average error 
of specifying their coordinates. (Chart 2).
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Description
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Chart 1. Relation between the probability of accomplishing the firing mission  
and the average error of specifying their coordinates
The chart shows that with the increase of the average error of specifying coordinates (Ek), 
the possibility of accomplishing the firing mission decreases significantly, especially if the 
average error increases to or over 70 m. The estimations made by scientists have shown that 
such dependence applies to other types of objects, too.
Column 17 of the “Intelligence Log” shall be filled and submitted in case the information 
value reported by the intelligence source differs from the data already included in the data 
base, and they can properly affirm that fact.
The value of information shall be indicated using the NATO standard system
Indications of reliability of the data source and the data collection organ:
• “A — completely reliable;
•  B — usually reliable;
•  C — sufficiently reliable;
•  D — usually not reliable;
•  E — not reliable;
•  F — reliability cannot be assessed.”
“Rating ‘A’ occurs very rarely. This rating can be used if the source is known to have 
broad experience and background with regards to the reported type of information. Rating 
‘B’ means an information source whose integrity is known. Rating ‘F’ means there is no basis 
for assessing the reliability of the source. Data collection organs are usually rated A, B, or 
C. ... if judgements about the data source and the reporting organ differ, the lower indication 
shall be applied.” [1] The reliability of the intelligence source is collected from the reporting 
organ and entered into the data base.
The other component of assessing information value is accuracy, which is indicated by a 
number. The assessment shall be done by the lowest possible level. The classification of the 
information by accuracy for actual (real) targets is shown in Figure 8.
The accuracy indicators for data collection organs are also entered into the data base in 
the combat preparation phase. This shall be known by data collection and reporting organs, 
too. If the judgement regarding the value of information corresponds to the data included in 
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the data base, no report shall be submitted in column 17 of the “Intelligence Log”. Otherwise 
the value of information shall be reported.
Information confirmed by other sources is defined as information established (detected) 
through several intelligence methods independently. These data will have rating “1”, and 
they shall be — beyond any doubt whatsoever — correspondent to the situation and to the 
location of the target.
The information is considered obviously correct if it is correspondent to the situation and 
to the expected enemy activity and has been established through only one intelligence meth-
od and on one occasion. Also in cases where the essential parts of the report are confirmed 
based on already available information. Information of such qualification will be rated “2”, 
and in this case additional intelligence will be needed.
“If a reported fact, regarding which no further information is available, is assessed as con-
forming to the previously observed activities of the target, then it will be qualified ‘probably’ 
correct and rated ‘3’.” [1: 28] 
In this case, additional intelligence is necessary.
Unconfirmed information that does not conform to the observations regarding the activi-
ties of the target, will be qualified “highly doubtful” and rated “4”. 
Information deemed “unlikely”, that is not confirmed by the available data, is consistent 
with the actual situation but not with other data previously gathered from different sources 
and processed. The information which is inconsistent with already available data having a 
rating of “1” or “2”will have this qualification, too. 
These data need clarification, additional intelligence, and confirmation by preferably 
more than one intelligence methods.
“Verity cannot be assessed” qualification applies to those intelligence data which have no 
evidences for a classification on the 1–5 assessment scale due to lack of data regarding the 
target. In this case, additional intelligence is necessary. 
It must be noted that a fully reliable data collection organ may gather and report from ful-
ly reliable sources such data that will in turn be assessed as unlikely when compared to other 
information. Such information will be rated “A–5”. A source assessed as unreliable may also 
report information that proves to be accurate when compared to other sources. In that case, 
the value of the information is E–1.
Information with rating “2–6” will be automatically appointed for additional intelligence.
All the intelligence information rated “1–6” belongs to the group of actual (real) targets. 
(Fig. 3)
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Figure 3. Classification of targets after processing, on the basis  
of their actuality and the accuracy of information (own resources)
However, some targets are deployed by the enemy in order to deceive our troops. These 
dummy targets, belonging to the group of false targets within the category of non–actual 
(unreal) targets, are all deceptive targets. (Fig. 3) 
Deceptive intelligence data are those which do not conform with the actual situation, 
are inconsistent with data collected from other sources, and undoubtedly proven to be false. 
These data are taken into account with the aim of investigating the deception methods of the 
enemy and collecting intelligence about their misinformation system (Fig. 3).
“In the univocal opinion of foreign military experts, the extent to which the expected 
losses of the artillery sub–units can be decreased is practically equal to the number of dum-
my targets. If the amount of dummy firing positions is 20–30 % of the amount of real ones, 
the losses will decrease by 32–34%. This has been proved in the Persian Gulf War, too.” [2] 
Therefore, a thorough analysis and synthesis of all data shall be carried out during the analy-
sis, assessment, and processing of intelligence data. 
The reports on “targets” also belong to the group of false targets where the location of 
own troop elements has been specified by graphic intersection and reported by mistake.
If a target (information) loses actuality, which the intelligence source reports, then it will 
be invalidated and therefore moved from the actual data base to the group of invalid targets 
(Fig. 3).
Destroyed targets will also be taken out of the actual data base and moved to a separate 
group of targets. Both the destroyed and deceptive (dummy) targets have distinct symbols on 
the digital map.
Experience from intelligence exercises show that reported intelligence data rarely comply 
with the requirements of actuality and accuracy of specification of coordinates, and with the 
strict requirements of information assessment. Even intelligence data representing high infor-
mation value and accuracy (of positioning) often do not ensure the timely accomplishment of 
firing missions, primarily due to the slow processing of intelligence data, and also reversely: 
the timely submitted reports may have low value due to the inaccuracy of coordinates.
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With the reporting process, data entry is finished and computer processing starts.
Processing of intelligence data
“Processing — the development of intelligence results through collection , definition of val-
ue, analysis, and integration of information and/or other intelligence data.” [3: 53]
Data processing is carried out on different levels, including the assessment done by the 
data collection organ, and up to the highest level. The lowest–level data processing is called 
pre–assessment, and it usually only involves the conversion of raw data into a comprehen-
sible form (e.g. interpreting the symbols of the locator screen or editing patrol reports). On 
this level, the gathered data can still be compared to the data formerly collected by the data 
source.
Data processing actions include three parts:
“1.  Recording: the depiction of the collected information in a written or other graphic 
form, and the allocation of pieces of information to the associated groups.
2.  Defining the value: the clarification of the relation between the intelligence data and the 
operations, the reliability of the data source or data collection organ, and the accuracy 
of information.
3.  Analysis: defining the importance of the information — in relation to the already known 
data and intelligence information — and drawing conclusions regarding the anticipated 
meaning of the assessed information.” [1: 18]
Data processing is a continuous activity. 
Computer processing
When a target is reported, it is instantly entered into the system of targets, that is, the target 
type, target subtype, nature of target, and group of targets will be specified. The software 
classifies the targets into four priority groups:
• Group I: High Pay–off Targets (HPTs);
• Group II: High Value Targets (HVTs);
• Group III: Important Other Targets;
• Group IV: Other Targets (Fig. 9).
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Figure 4. Computer processing of the reported targets (own resources)
The priority of intelligence data determines their value and is directly related to their 
urgency.
High Pay–off Targets are selected from High Value Targets. These targets can have essen-
tial (critical) impact on one’s own troops in the course of the operation (combat), therefore, 
they must be destroyed immediately. 
The present literature focuses on the high value targets and the high pay–off targets, and 
does not address the analysis of “other” targets. The group of high value targets is very broad. 
The armed forces of a small country have a limited number of intelligence assets and firing 
means of combat. In our research, we have come to the conclusion that the wide scale of other 
targets should be divided into two parts. One of these groups would include the category of 
“important other targets” and the other group “other targets”. That would facilitate the prior-
itization of targets for the destruction by fire. 
The important other targets are the ones which can have an impact on the own troops 
soon, that is why their destruction is desirable as soon as possible. Such are the enemy’s near 
reserves, march columns, heavy means of fire in an open position, groupings manoeuvring 
close to own troops, helicopters on landing ground, armour–piercing equipment, etc. Based 
on the tactical situation, some of the important other targets may be re–qualified as high 
value or high pay–off targets (HPTs). Similarly, targets having been assigned to the group of 
high value targets can be re–assigned to a lower priority group of targets. For example, if no 
air strikes are planned to be conducted in one of the defence phases of defence combat, then 
anti-aircraft artillery means will not be high value or high pay–off targets. On the other hand, 
in the course of counterattack by own forces, armour–piercing missiles will be high value or 
high pay–off targets.
Other targets are: those that have (or may have) an impact on own troops but cannot have 
decisive effects soon, and they can be destroyed by other equipment (e.g. all–arms), and/or 
destroying them soon is not the most important task. These include e.g.: personnel and means 
of fire in an open position.
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False targets include those own troop elements whose location has been specified by 
graphic intersection and reported by mistake, as well as the dummy and deceptive enemy 
targets.
During assessment, the target coordinates shall be subjected to a safety filtering.
This means that the software compares the target coordinates with the coordinates of own 
troop elements, and in case they match (there is no more than 200 m difference between the 
x y coordinates of the target and the own troop element), the software will indicate that and 
highlight these targets, grouping them separately as “False targets”, and prompt to delete 
them. The front edge is also regarded as an own troop element (it is included in the data base), 
that is why the software will block the targets at the front edge, those whose location has been 
specified by graphic intersection and reported by mistake. Both groups of false targets can be 
printed in form of a chart.
In my opinion, this safety analysis and assessment phase is very important. I have directly 
experienced this problem at a corps–level intelligence exercise, where, during direct engage-
ment with the enemy, our own reconnaissance sub–unit (artillery observation post) specified 
the location of own forward observation posts and reported them as targets several times, 
which we could discover through conventional data processing.
In the next phase of analysis and assessment work, the value of the targets (intelligence 
information) is defined, that is: the target data will be compared with the previously reported 
target data.
Single targets with single targets, single targets with groups of targets, and groups of tar-
gets with groups of targets will be compared to nature, type, coordinates, accuracy indicator 
of location (accurate or inaccurate), reliability indicator of the intelligence source, and the 
value of the intelligence information, among targets located in a circle with a certain (default: 
200 m) radius.
Figure 5. Analysis and assessment of targets  
on a digital map (own resources)
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The requirements of the analysis and evaluation work:
• the software shall be able to investigate targets detected within a specified time period 
(e.g. 1 hour);
• every previously reported target located within a circle with 200 m radius from the 
currently reported target shall be displayed, indicating also the distance. These targets 
shall also be displayed on the monitor with the standard symbols, the most recent one 
in a different colour — for distinction — (Fig. 10).
• if there is less than 75 m distance between the coordinates of one or more single targets 
of the same type, they shall be considered as one target, and the no. and coordinates 
of the target shall be those of the target located by the more accurate means. The other 
target(s) shall be invalidated and allocated to the data base of invalid targets.
• if the graphic intersection has been carried out by assets of the same type, and the dif-
ference is less than 75 m, a mean coordinate (E, N) value shall be taken. The no. of the 
new target will be the no. of the target first reported.
• if the coordinates of a single target are compared with the coordinates of the centre 
of a group of targets, and the distance of x and y is less than 200 m, the single target 
will be considered as part (sub–object) of the group of targets (confirmation of group 
of targets);
• if a single target is compared by coordinates with one or more targets of different or 
same nature, e.g. a tank, an armoured personnel carrier, a machine gun, an armour–
piercing gun, etc., and the difference between the coordinates (E, N) is less than 400 
m, it shall be considered as part of a new group of targets.
• the new group of targets will have a new target no. (the software will issue a target no. 
from the target no. file), and the components (single targets) of the group of targets 
will also be recorded (stored) as sub–objects. The coordinates of the group of targets 
will be the mean value of the E and N coordinates of the single target components, its 
height will be the mean height values of the single target components. The software 
also calculates the width and depth of the generated group of targets, — in accordance 
with professional requirements — perpendicular to the basic direction.
• if the coordinates of a group of targets are compared with those of another group of 
targets, and the difference between the coordinates is less than 75 m, then it is the con-
firmation of one group of targets. The no. and coordinates of the group of targets shall 
be those of the target located by the more accurate means. If the graphic intersection 
has been done by means having similar accuracy, a mean coordinate value shall be 
taken, and the no. of the new target will be the no. of the target first reported.
As such, groups of targets can be created during assessment:
1. Based on the report from the original intelligence source — an original group of tar-
gets;
2. If the original group of targets has been confirmed by separate reports on single targets 
— a group of targets confirmed through single target(s);
3. Creation of a group on the basis of single targets through analysis — new group of 
targets;
4. Confirmation of a group of targets by another group of targets.
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The assessed targets will be displayed on the analyser’s digital map with NATO standard 
symbols (Fig. 10). 
Assessment of the value of the target (intelligence information):
• The software will consider the targets (intelligence information) as confirmed by other 
sources if:
• “1” is reported in column 17 of the “Intelligence Log” for the accuracy indicator of 
the information,
• two or more targets of the same nature and with a difference between the coordinates 
(x, y) of less than 75 m, reported with information accuracy indicators “obviously 
correct” (“2”), “probably correct” (“3”), “highly doubtful” (“4”), “unlikely” (“5”), or 
“verity cannot be assessed” (“6”), – “not confirmed by other sources”, shall be con-
sidered as one target and will be rated as “confirmed by other sources” (“1”). The no. 
and coordinates of the new target shall be those of the target located by more accurate 
means. If the graphic intersections have been done by similar means, the no. of the 
new target will be the no. of the target first reported, and a mean coordinate value shall 
be taken.
• if the nature and coordinates (E, N) of a target “not confirmed by other sources” (“2”, 
“3”, “4”, “5”, “6”) are the same (within 75 m) as those of the target “confirmed by 
other sources” (“1”), then the data of the target “confirmed by other sources” (“1”) 
shall apply;
The software groups the targets “confirmed by other sources” also by priority, group of 
targets, and size: The targets are sorted in a chart, which can also be printed.
The evaluated targets are fed back to the data base of expected and detected targets, where 
they will be summarized by type and nature (Figure 2).
The software moves the reported dummy targets to a separate group (file) and displays 
them on the digital map with their NATO standard symbols.
By size of target, there are:
• groups of targets,
• single targets.
The targets “confirmed by other sources” need additional intelligence based on the cumu-
lative assessment of their priority (threat), timeliness of intelligence data, and other aspects, 
usually immediately before destroying them, and this intelligence is to be carried out by the 
reconnaissance sub–unit that is going to support fire. 
The software carries out the necessary visibility estimation regarding the target for the 
positions of all reconnaissance assets, taking into account their intelligence/reconnaissance 
capabilities — which can also be displayed on the digital map — and proposes what recon-
naissance assets should be involved in additional intelligence. The polar coordinates and 
elevation of the target viewed from the position of the chosen reconnaissance asset will be 
displayed.
After destroying the target, the data bases “Amount of expectable and detected targets” 
and “List of destroyed targets” will be updated, and the symbol of destroyed target will show 
up on the digital map.
 The reconnaissance sub–unit supporting fire will report data consistent with NATO re-
quirements in column 19 of the “Intelligence Log”, as follows:
• the extent of destruction:
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• the no. and description (name) of destroyed objects;
• whether they can continue the activities: yes or no;
• the extent of destruction of the type of target (%).
These data are recorded in the data base.
The target is to be considered as “not confirmed by other sources” if:
• nothing, or any of the following has been reported in column 17 of the “Intelligence 
Log”:
• obviously correct (“2”)
• probably correct (“3”),
• highly doubtful (“4”),
• unlikely (“5”),
• verity cannot be assessed (“6”),
or if:
• a target “confirmed by other sources” (“1”) and a deceptive (“Mt”) target have the 
same nature, and the difference between their coordinates (E, N) is less than 75 m. (In 
that case “verity cannot be assessed” (6)) 
The targets “not confirmed by other sources” are allocated to a separate group, similarly 
to the confirmed targets. Every unconfirmed target needs additional intelligence, since the 
data about them do not allow their immediate destruction. These targets are sorted in a chart, 
which can also be printed.
The software proposes what reconnaissance assets should be involved in additional in-
telligence based on the visibility examination and the reconnaissance capabilities of recon-
naissance assets.
After the additional intelligence, the targets can be allocated to different groups depend-
ing on the assessment and processing, such as to the:
• group of targets “confirmed by other sources” (“1”);
• group of targets classified as “verity cannot be assessed” (“6”),
• group of deceptive (“Mt”) targets.
The targets, owing to their high manoeuvrability, change their positions quickly in the 
course of intelligence. Therefore, the reconnaissance personnel are obliged to report to the 
data processing centre if targets leave the previously reported positions. In that case, the tar-
get will be moved from the actual data base to the group of “invalid targets”. This group of 
targets can be printed in form of a chart.
The digital map also allows target planning using the software. The planned targets will 
be drawn on the analyser’s digital map with NATO standard symbols.
A reconnaissance–observation source has to be assigned to the planned targets. This is 
easy by the visibility examination carried out by the software. The software will examine 
which reconnaissance source (included in the data base) has sight of the target, taking into 
account the reconnaissance capabilities. It will display the visibility list, after which the anal-
yser–evaluator shall choose the intelligence sources. When they are chosen, the software 
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displays the polar coordinates and elevation of the target viewed from the position of the 
reconnaissance asset. The data will be transmitted to the designated reconnaissance asset 
through digital transmission or conventional telecommunications, and, using those data, they 
will carry out aiming at the target in the field. The data about the planned target, together 
with the data of the chosen intelligence source will be recorded in the chart “planned and real 
targets”, and can be printed.
During the analysis and assessment work, all intelligence data about the target can be 
recalled — by selecting the standard symbol of the target — on the digital map.
Figure 6. Recalling data about detected targets from the data base  
(own resources)
Drawing conclusions is the last step of information analysis. During drawing conclusions, 
we will find out what significance the intelligence data has in the combat area. They might be 
helpful for the anticipation of the future activities of the enemy.
Usage, distribution
The last step of the intelligence process is usage or distribution. The information shall imme-
diately be made available to the user. Access to the intelligence data shall be granted to all 
concerned command levels and work groups. In my opinion, the intelligence data processing 
group and the fire support section (who allocate targets among forces and fire means) shall 
work in close cooperation, and they should be located next to each other, in accordance with 
NATO principles.
The examination of “important other” and “other” targets is carried out by the software 
analogously.
Basic requirements for the digital map software:
• display the intelligence data (targets) assessed by the computer with NATO standard 
symbols on the map;
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• during the analysis of the displayed targets, all of their intelligence data shall be recall-
able (e.g. time of reconnaissance, nature of target, UTM (MGRS) coordinates, height, 
width (length), depth, description of the intelligence source, accuracy and reliability 
indicators, combat properties, parameters, and imagery of the target, the value of the 
intelligence information);
• a distinctive symbolization of destroyed targets, and all the information regarding the 
target and the destruction shall be recallable (e.g. by which sub–unit and when it was 
destroyed, the result of destruction — damage in %, no. and description/name of de-
stroyed objects);
• display own reconnaissance forces and assets with the standard symbols;
• drawing up the reconnaissance capabilities for all positions of reconnaissance assets;
• visibility examination and drawing up the visible (and invisible) area for both the own 
and enemy reconnaissance assets and targets (this is of great help in planning intelli-
gence and proper and fast designation of the location of reconnaissance assets);
• drawing up the Brigade combat area (Division defence zone) with NATO standard 
symbols;
• drawing up the front zone with standard symbols using the reports by reconnaissance 
sub–units including polar coordinates, as well as by putting directly into the digital 
map;
The front edge can be quickly and properly modified on the digital map during combat, 
and the map information can be immediately forwarded to addressees via digital data trans-
mission. 
Conclusion
The experience of the exercises conducted with “HUTOPCCIS” has been promising and 
demonstrates that, taking conventional planning and combat command and control into ac-
count, computer–aided tactical control can provide faster and more reliable information to 
headquarters and staff. The conventional telecommunications methods and tactical control, 
and the information flowing through an IT system complement and reinforce each other, 
making command and control more reliable. 
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Origin and development of the thoughts on military 
keynesianism during 1936–2012
Luboš ŠTANCL1, Vendula HYNKOVÁ2
The aim of the paper is to show how the thoughts of military Keynesianism have 
been developed and to define the role of military Keynesianism. First, the term 
‘military Keynesianism’ will be introduced and its birth in the history of economic 
development will be dated and explained. Second, the development of the thoughts 
of military Keynesianism and also the development of the military–industrial com-
plex will be described and the main different views on the application of military 
Keynesianism policy will be included. Finally, the authors will try to interpret 
opinions on the application of military Keynesianism during the economic reces-
sion, 2008–2012. 
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Introduction
The term “Military Keynesianism” is related to increasing military expenditures in order to 
improve economic situation, more exactly to enhance the real gross domestic product (GDP). 
Firstly, let us have a look at the situation of military spending in the world, regardless of 
whether there is a state of war in a region or just increased military spending for a certain pur-
pose(s). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world 
military expenditure in 2012 was estimated to have been $1.756 billion, that represents 2.5 
percent of world gross domestic product and it is about $249 for each person on our planet. 
[1] What we can observe nowadays is that there is a shift in global spending, in particular, 
from the West to Eastern Europe and the developing world (mainly North Africa). As we 
shall see in Table 1, due to continuing economic recession and rising government debt, states 
in North America, Western and Central Europe have tried to reduce government spending, in-
cluding military expenditures (North America -5.5%, Western and Central Europe -1.6%). In 
contrast, there are regions in the world where the rate of growth is relatively high and accel-
erated (bolded in Table 1): North Africa (7.8%), Central America and the Caribbean (8.1%), 
East Asia (5%), South East Asia (6.0%), Eastern Europe (15%) and the Middle East (8.3%). 
The 15% rise in Eastern Europe is mostly the result of the Russia´s State Armaments Program 
started in 2011 and a further rise is expected to fullfil the program completely in 2020.  
1 CSc, lubos.stancl@unob.cz
2 Ph.D., vendula.hynkova@unob.cz 
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Table 1. World military spending, 2012 
Region Spending  ($ b.) Change %
Africa 39.2 1.2
North Africa 16.4 7.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.7 -3.2
Americas 782   -4.7
Central America and the Caribbean 8.6 8.1
North America 708   -5.5
South America 65.9 3.8
Asia and Oceania 390   3.3
Central and South Asia 59.8 -1.6
East Asia 268   5.0
Oceania 28.2 -3.7
East and South East Asia 33.7 6.0
Europe 407   2.0
Eastern Europe 100   15   
Western and Central 307   -1.6
Middle East 138   8.3
World total 1756   -0.4
The figures are in current (2012) US dollars. [1]
East and South Asia also showed a rise of 5 and 6%. We have to stress China and its rapid 
military build–up that seems to be disconcerting mainly for Japan, such as when China took 
actions allegedly to back its claims to Japanese–held islands in the East China Sea. Japan 
started to enhance its military spending and to build up offensive military power. According 
to SIPRI Yearbook 2013 statistics, China is the second highest military spender and Japan the 
fifth highest spender in 2012.
If we consider reasons for increasing military expenditures, there are several arguments 
— the state of war, defense security policy or deterrent policy, and there is a reason where 
increasing military power is considered a “stimulant” for economic growth. This argument in 
favor of military expenditures has become well–known as “Keynesian Militarism” or “Mil-
itary Keynesianism”, when military expenditures serve as an effective instrument of fiscal 
macroeconomic policy. Nowadays we usually understand military Keynesianism as an eco-
nomic policy that uses massive military expenditures to attain economic growth. And there 
are, of course, positive and negative evaluations and many intense discussions are held about 
the influence of massive military spending. Now we take a look into the roots or origins of 
military Keynesianism.
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Roots of military Keynesianism
The roots of military Keynesianism are included in Keynesian thought when English econ-
omist Sir J. M. Keynes was solving the causes of the “Great Depression” and suggested 
enhancing government spending. J. M. Keynes was aware of military expenditures place 
within the additional effective demand stimulating economic growth. He understood military 
spending as a public demand impulse helping the economy, but was not able to generate a 
sufficient level of private investment and consumption and encourage full employment.
While in 1936 J. M. Keynes talked about military spending as a theoretic example of how 
to increase aggregate demand, four years later, after a less than effective “New Deal” policy, 
he pointed out the war could improve the economy and enhance employment: “It appears to 
be politically impossible for a capitalistic democracy to organize expenditure on a scale nec-
essary to make the grand experiment which would prove my case except in war conditions”. 
[2:159] [3: 129–130] As well he added that military spending had to be enormous. [4] Prepar-
ing for unavoidable war without casualties and damage can positively influence the economy. 
Economist Michal Kalecki was the first who was concerned more deeply with military 
expenditures influence on economic growth. In 1943 he demonstrated his military spending 
model using the situation of Nazi Germany. He considered tremendous military expenditures 
more effective than other government expenditures because of the danger of labor unions 
and employee empowerment. In his version the government should accentuate nationalism 
and create a need for defense. Massive military expenditures helped to recover the German 
economy and overcome global recession, although the economic growth was a “secondary 
product”. Thus the Kalecki concept became inspirational for US right–wing politicians. 
The United States engaged in World War II at the end of the “Great Depression”. Many 
economists and politicians believed that it was no “New Deal”, but the war that dug the US 
economy out of recession. Economist Robert Lekachman noticed: “The war pointed at a 
sharp Keynesian moral. As a public works project, all wars (before the nuclear era) are ideal. 
Since all war production is sheer economic waste, there is never a danger of producing too 
much”. [5]
Table 2. U. S. military expenditures during World War II 
(mil. dollars, at constant prices of 1940) [6]

















1940 101.4 9.47 9.34 1.66 1.64 17.53
1941 120.67 19.00 13.00 37.28 10.77 6.13 269.28 5.08 47.15
1942 139.06 15.24 30.18 132.15 21.70 22.05 259.71 15.86 73.06
1943 136.44 -1.88 63.57 110.64 46.59 43.98 99.46 32.23 69.18
1944 174.84 28.14 72.62 14.24 41.54 62.95 43.13 36.00 86.68
1945 173.52 -0.75 72.11 -0.70 41.56 64.35 2.51 37.19 89.49
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The US economy had expanded during 1941–1945. Gross domestic product increased 
markedly from 88.6 Mld USD in 1939 to 135 Mld USD in 1944 (measured at constant prices 
of 1939). Military production as a percent of GDP intensified rapidly from 2% in 1939 to 
40% in 1943. [7]  
World War II not only helped the U.S. economy overcome economic crisis, but also im-
proved the partnership among the government, private sector and labor unions. This was a 
positive influence in the following years and enhanced production. The U.S. economy was 
propelled by military industry expansion and provided the U.S. immense economic advan-
tage in comparison with the allies and rest of the world. The U.S. government became an 
administrator of the strongest economy in the world and gradually a center of the after–war 
world economy.
States preparing for war have to carry out the economic conversion of civilian production 
to military production, extend armament industry capacities and other production capacities 
and services. The economy is experiencing recovery, but enormous military expenditures 
create or deepen state budget deficits. J. M. Keynes considered wars extraordinary situations 
that enabled reaching almost full employment. Thus he supported increasing armament pro-
duction and militarizing the economy and he thought that the militarization process would 
not necessarily invoke serious negative consequences, including war. However, many econo-
mists disagree and believe military expenditures are the least effective way to allocate budget 
resources, because they do not invest in profitable infrastructure building.
Military Keynesianism and military–industrial complex    
Since 1944 attention has been paid to the conversion of military production to civilian pro-
duction. At the end of World War II economists and politicians were afraid of the “Great 
Depression” continuing. So they hoped the Cold War would start providing the expansion of 
military prosperity, because disarmament and peace could have caused economic and polit-
ical problems.3 In 1950 The U. S. National Security Council submitted a secret report to the 
president of the U.S. This document designated NSC–68 [8] was unclassified in 1977. 
The military Keynesianism Policy supporting the Korean and Vietnam War encouraged 
rapid military spending, not only in the U.S., but also in the rest of the world. Table 3 demon-
strates military expenditures during the period 1949–1968. The U.S. military spending in-
creased very sharply during this time and the U.S. government made efforts to hold the strong 
position and confirm investor’s and consumer’s confidence.    
3 Chester Bowles added: „ One of the first things we must realize is that in the 1930´s we never really did find 
the answer to full employment. Only the defense program in 1940 put our people to work and only the war 
and the cold war that  followed have kept them at work“. In [4]
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Table 3. Military expenditures trend during the period 1949–1968 
(mil. USD, at constant prices of 1960) [9: 200]
1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1961 1962 1966 1968
United 
States 16 629 37 781 54 409 44 428 46 843 47 335 51 203 57 951 68 213
NATO 23 905 50 231 70 287 58 985 62 382 63 689 69 101 76 776 87 755
Soviet 
Union 8 800 10 709 11 978 11 888 10 747 12 889 14 111 14 889 18 556
Warsaw 
Pact 13 600 15 509 16 778 16 688 16 235 20 712 22 651 25 148 31 156
World 43 659 74 094 95 291 84 013 87 848 95 623 104 311 119 492 138 851
Moreover, U.S. Keynesian macroeconomic policy was supported by industrial corporations 
and labor unions. Major industrial corporations got very lucrative government contracts and 
strengthened their position. Strong labor unions agreed to a high level of military expendi-
tures in order to keep the social contract and minimize the number of strikes. 
Increasing volumes of military expenditures deepened the militarization of economies 
and military–industrial complex expansion.4 US President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned 
against this effect in 1961. He also started to use the term “military–industrial complex”. 
He pointed out the danger of the militarization of the economy and potential threats. [10] 
The main idea is that military production should comport with the need of the defense of the 
country. 
At present we distinguish two types of military Keynesianism. The first type, according to 
P. Custers, [11] was implemented during the R. Reagan and George W. Bush administrations. 
Military spending is perceived as the main factor of economic growth. The second type was 
carried out during the B. Clinton administration. The second type is characterized by gov-
ernment contracts stimulating investment in defense and the civilian sector. In this second 
instance military spending is not the main factor of economic growth. 
Military Keynesianism and its criticism 
The critics point out the negative social consequences of military Keynesianism policy. Ex-
cessive armament during peace can provoke nations to enter war. Moreover, there is the 
danger of militarization and nationalism. Enormous military expenditures speed up the in-
creasing influence of the military–industrial complex. For instance, the contracts with the 
Pentagon enabled the formation and development of new industries and supporting corpora-
tions. One of the biggest suppliers for the U.S. Government Lockheed Martin profits mainly 
from government contracts and exporting weapons. [12]
4 The term “Military-industrial complex” was firstly described by American Philosopher Ch. W. Mills in 1956. 
The main idea is that there are elites in the industrial state, including cooperative (economic), political and 
military bureaucracy unified by the collective interest of the public policy. The phrase “Military–industrial 
complex” was firstly used by Dwight D. Eisenhower.
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Table 4. Top 10 Armament Corporations, excluding China (2011) [13]




1. Lockheed Martin (U.S.) 36 270 2 655
2.  Boeing (U.S.) 31 830 4 018
3. BAE Systems (GB) 29 150 2 349
4. General Dynamics (U.S.) 23 760 2 526
5. Raytheon (U.S.) 22 470 1 896
6. Northrop Grumman (U.S.) 21 390 2 118
7. EADS (Europe) 16 390 1 442
8. Finmeccanica (Italy) 14 560 -3 206
9. L–3 Communications (U.S.) 12 520 956
10. United Technologies (U.S.) 11 640 5 347
The military–industrial complex represents interest and personal connections with state 
bureaucracy, political elite and military–industrial corporations. Thus it is very hard for the 
government to decrease military spending or eliminate state budget deficits. As a result, there 
may be a continual cycle of war and peace changing and related to government spending.
There is a discussion about the contribution of investment in military research and de-
velopment. Some economists suppose that military R&D is less effective than civilian R&D 
and use the examples of the Japanese and German economy. H. Garrett–Peltier and R. Pollin 
point out that a one dollar investment in the civilian sector brings more jobs than one dollar 
investment in defence. [14] 
The critics of military Keynesianism usually use the concept created by Frédéric Bastiat 
called “The parable of the broken window”. In the theory he describes a shopkeeper whose 
window is broken by his young son, and who has to pay for a glazier to fix his window. It 
brings some transactions into the economy and increases money circulation. Sir M. Keynes 
saw that it was worth building, for example, totally useless pyramids in order to stimulate 
the economy, raise aggregate demand, and encourage full employment. But the main idea is 
that society loses the value of things which are uselessly destroyed and that we must take into 
account the opportunity cost. It means that the shopkeeper could have spent money on some-
thing else, but he was forced to spend his money on a new window. So military Keynesianism 
also ignores the opportunity cost.
Independent economists usually oppose the idea that high level military spending invokes 
high percentage tax rate cuts for the disposable incomes of householders and profits of corpo-
rations. By this they emphasize the long–run effects of military Keynesianism policy.
World military spending during 2008–2012
According to SIPRI, global military expenditure in 2008 showed an increase of about 4 per 
cent in real terms compared to 2007. US military expenditure increased, mostly due to the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but at the expense of expanding stat budget deficit, and also the 
mortgage crisis started in the United States. Military spending in Western and Central Europe 
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was an almost constant average, but Russia continued to enhance its military expenditures 
to fulfil plans in the future, despite economic problems. States, such as China, India, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Brazil, increased military spending, but military spending in the Middle 
East fell slightly, excluding Iraq where there was a large rise. At the low point of the world 
economic recession we could observe some efforts to help the U.S. economy and avoid the 
crises via the policy of military Keynesianism. Here is a citation concerning the RAND Cor-
poration´s proposal, presented to the Pentagon in October 30, 2008. 
“…the RAND Corporation recently presented a shocking proposal to the Pentagon in 
which it lobbied for a war to be started with a major power in an attempt to stimulate the 
American economy and prevent a recession.”
“…RAND suggested that the $700 billion dollars that has been earmarked to bailout Wall 
Street and failing banks instead be used to finance a new war which would in turn re–invig-
orate the flagging stock markets.” [15] 
The RAND Corporation (www.rand.org) is a nonprofit institution that helps improve pol-
icy and decision–making through research and analysis. One of its core research areas is na-
tional security. According to the article, the Corporation is allegedly connected with the U.S. 
military–industrial complex and this tie could be a useful reason to start a policy of military 
Keynesianism. The thought consequently caused alarming debates, mainly in China, Japan, 
Russia and North Korea.
In 2009 despite the world recession, almost all regions registered an increase in military 
spending, except the Middle East. According to SIPRI, the global military expenditures in-
creased by 6% in real terms compared to the previous year. Now we can speculate whether 
the idea of military Keynesianism was integrated to counteract the classical recession (i.e. 
decreasing aggregate demand in the economy, inducing deflation and lower output). Not-
withstanding, smaller economies cut military spending, nine of the top ten spenders in the 
world increased their military budget. The world economic recession caused a fall in resource 
revenues (mainly from oil production) in some countries, but not so much on average.
The continuing recession in developed countries did not allow spending much on the 
defense sector in 2010. Economic growth is a key enabler; military spending is not in many 
cases able to grow faster than gross domestic product (GDP). In countries, such as China, 
Brazil, India, Russia or South Korea, the GDP grew almost rapidly and military powers were 
developed. The causes can be current or potential conflicts, as well as a perception of military 
power. Some countries had to change the budget priorities in favour of or against military 
spending. This is a very controversial topic under conditions of increasing social needs in a 
country.
In 2011 there was no increase in world military expenditures and it was the first fall since 
1998. Compared with 2010, in real terms military spending remained almost unchanged. 
Mainly the continuing economic and financial crises in developed countries influenced gov-
ernment spending. Avoiding budget deficits the governments in Western and Central Europe, 
particularly, decided to cut military spending. In the U. S. the decade–long rise in military 
spending appeared to be ending (a result of the end of the Iraq War, the winding down of the 
Afghanistan War and also budget deficit–reduction measures), however the fall in US mili-
tary spending in real terms was not as substantive as in Europe.
World military expenditure in 2012 fell by 0.4 per cent in real terms versus in 2011. That 
was the first fall since 1998. US military spending declined by 5.6 per cent in real terms in 
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2012, together with the year 2011, which might be a consequence of a post–war situation. The 
trend and future level of US military spending was a main topic for political debates. Under 
conditions of rising government debt it was an unwanted situation for the military. In Western 
and Central Europe, states continued to cut military spending. In contrast, the rise in military 
spending followed in Eastern Europe and the developing world (higher rates of growth in the 
Middle East and North Africa, as expected). And Russia´s military expenditures accelerated, 
because Russia has tried to fulfil its ambitious State Armaments Programme.  
Conclusion
This paper has dealt with an introduction to military Keynesianism as an instrument of fiscal 
policy, the birth of this idea in Keynesian though when the positive effect of massive military 
expenditures on economic growth was expected. The authors explained two types of mili-
tary Keynesianism and the role of the military industrial complex. The criticism of military 
Keynesianism was mentioned to point out the negative consequences for society. In the last 
part, main trends in military spending were described and also macroeconomic problems 
influencing the military expenditures in many countries.
Mainly during the post–war era, most advanced countries made efforts to use the military 
Keynesianism policy and build military power and develop an armament industry. The main 
goal was to stabilize the economy and enhance production. Thereby the militarization of 
economies became stronger and stronger. But we can observe these days that some countries 
increase their military expenditures to build up their army to compete with foreign military 
powers, and there is still a danger of militarizing economies.
Contrary to the civilian sector, the motion of military industrial development lies in the 
political sphere. As the analyses of the military–industrial complex shows the military–indus-
trial complexes existence is based on a continuing symbiosis between the government (polit-
ical elites) and armament corporations. The symbiosis is also an instrument for strengthening 
government power and re–election. The empowered political elites improved the opportuni-
ties for allocation of resources in the defense sector and increased their abilities of putting 
through their interests, including a combination of military and civilian Keynesianism.
There is a need to continuously examine the consequences of military Keynesianism 
policy and explore the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth (in-
cluding the long–run effects). In addition, we should examine not only economic aspects, but 
also political, social and other aspects concerning the militarization of the economy. 
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Hazardous Activities in Hungary —  
in terms of Industrial Safety
KÁTAI-URBÁN Irina1, VASS Gyula2
Storage, processing and use of dangerous substances which are present in hazard-
ous activities involve the risk of major accidents. The experience of recent history 
shows that industrial accidents can cause catastrophic effects to the environment 
of dangerous industrial establishments and citizens living nearby. The aim of the 
authors of this article is to categories the Hungarian hazardous activities and pro-
vide the readers with a general overview of their vulnerability. 
Keywords: disaster management, industrial safety, vulnerability, Hungary, hazard-
ous activities.
Preface
The Hungarian Parliament, in order to improve the safety of the public and of the environ-
ment and the efficiency of the prevention of manmade disasters, to strengthen the system of 
disaster management organizations and to improve the results of emergency actions, by the 
adoption of Act CXXVIII/2011 on disaster management and on the amendment of individual, 
related acts (Dis. Man. Act), created on January 1st 2012, a standardized system of authority 
tasks, organizations and procedures for industrial safety. [1]
The newly enacted industrial safety regulations (the third individual sector beside civil 
protection and fire prevention) cover the prevention of major accidents involving dangerous 
substances, and the protection of shipments containing dangerous goods, protection of criti-
cal systems and installations and the disaster management tasks of nuclear safety. [2]
In the present article the objective of the authors is to identify the hazard sources relevant 
for the occurrence of manmade disasters. Their objective is furthermore to typify such hazard 
sources and then to evaluate the exposure to major dangers in terms of industrial safety. The 
article is dedicated exclusively to sources of danger (hazardous activities) that are relevant 
in terms of the application of the law by the disaster management authority and we prepared 
only a general status report about the present status (June 30, 2013) of the implementation of 
the legal regulations. 
We have used basically the public data (prepared for the general information of the pub-
lic) provided by the National Directorate General for Disaster Management of the Ministry 
of the Interior (MI NDGDM), National Chief Inspectorate for Industrial Safety. Furthermore 
we have used also the specialist literature that is rather limited in this field. 
In this article, in a way not yet examined by others, we propose a hazard source classi-
fication system based on the industrial safety aspects of manmade disasters. In addition we 
provide a comprehensive overview about the exposure to hazardous activities in Hungary. 
1 kataii@tuzoltosagbp.hu
2 National Directorate General for Disaster Management, Ministry of the Interior
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General classification of activities posing disaster risks
There are several versions of grouping disasters (hazard sources) known by professionals 
and scientists. In the legal provisions it is only the implementing regulation of the disaster 
management act, [3] where there is a split related to effects posing hazards, applied in risk 
assessment procedures. From the scientific point of view several grouping systems can be 
identified, however it is common in those systems that disasters are basically assigned to two 
groups: natural and a manmade group. 
In terms of industrial safety, we shall evaluate manmade disasters, major accidents and 
other events endangering human health and life, the environment and critical assets affect-
ing them. This will be done from the point of view of the disaster management act, “critical 
system components” covered by the regulations about critical systems and installations or 
related to “dangerous activities”, or the “transportation of dangerous goods”. 
Dangerous activities are, in the application of the disaster management act, art. 3 §. clause 
31 “is an activity carried out by using industrial, biological (agricultural), chemical proce-
dures, which, if it becomes uncontrolled, can endanger massively human health, the environ-
ment and the safety of life and security.” [4]
Hazardous activities (stationary sites) can be classified in terms of industrial safety basi-
cally as follows:
• activities related to dangerous substances and goods;
• activities related to hazardous wastes;
• activities related to radioactive materials;
• and hazardous mining activities.
The transportation of hazardous goods (mobile hazard sources) are differentiated in al-
most all technical literature in Hungary by transportation on public road, by railway, inland 
waterways and air transport. 
Critical systems are defined in Act CLXVI/2012 on the identification, selection and pro-
tection of critical systems and installations (hereinafter: Lrtv.) in the explanatory provisions 
(Lrtv. 1. § clause g) are as follows: “a system component of systems, assets, installation be-
longing to one of the sectors defined in the annexes 1–3, that are essential for the completion 
of social tasks, thus in particular for healthcare, for the personal safety and security of the 
public, for economic and social public services, which, in case of their unavailability, due to 
the lack of the continuous completion of these tasks would result in major consequences.” [5]
Critical system elements can be assigned according to the law to 10 main groups: energy, 
transportation, agriculture, healthcare, finances, industry, information and communication 
technologies, water, law and order, government and public safety and defense.
Following the aforementioned concept, on figure No. 1 the principal summarized results 
of the classification of activities (based on aspects of industrial safety) that pose risks of man-
made disasters are illustrated. 
Hereinafter we will cover only the general evaluation of the hazards posed by hazardous 
activities in Hungary. In the present article the transportation of hazardous goods and critical 
systems and installations are not analyzed. 
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Production, storage and processing of hazardous goods
In the course of major accidents happening during the production, storage, processing of 
dangerous substances (goods) there can be a fire or explosion and substances harmful to the 
health and environment might be released into the air or watercourses, thus endangering the 
public and the environment. The harmful effects of fire and explosions will most probably 
cause damage in the direct vicinity of dangerous establishments only, harming human health 
or the environment, within a very short time after the accident. The release of dangerous sub-
stances into the air, depending on the type, quantity, physical properties, the meteorological, 
surface and other conditions, can cause danger several or, in extreme cases, several tens of 
kilometers far away from the location of the accident. This takes, according to my experi-
ence, several tens of minutes, maybe hours. In case of substances with a permanent effect the 
effects can be long–lasting, occasionally even for decades. [6]
In Hungary, because of the hydrography of the country, dangerous substances can get 
into watercourses because of incidents, a low technological level of operation or human mis-
take. The effects of the catastrophic contamination of living waters can last for several days, 
maybe even several weeks, and the danger can emerge even several hundreds of kilometers 
far away. As 95% of the water catchment area of Hungarian rivers is located outside of our 
borders, in the course of the preparation it is not enough to consider only dangerous industrial 
establishments located in Hungary. 
Explosions happening in the course of major accidents, radiating heat, or burning ma-
terials emitted can trigger, within or outside of the establishment, further major accidents 
(domino effect) and can cause massive panic resulting in major consequences. 
From the four main groups of dangerous activities, I have checked the activities involving 
dangerous substances and dangerous goods in terms of industrial safety first. 
In the field of the production (manufacturing) storage and processing of dangerous sub-
stances and goods, activities designated as installed establishments can be divided into two 
main groups. 
a)  Establishments involving dangerous substances and below tier 
establishments
Establishments involving dangerous substances covered by the rules regulating major acci-
dent prevention, and so called below tier establishments belong to the first group. 
The establishments involving dangerous substances, the so–called “Seveso establish-
ments” mean dangerous activities identified in line with the rules of the Seveso II. Directive. 
Based on the definition of the disaster management act, § 3, clause 28, the establishment 
involving dangerous substances “is the complete area under the management of an opera-
tor, where, in one or more installations involving dangerous substances, common or related 
infrastructure included, there are dangerous substances present in quantities reaching the 
tier value specified in the legal regulation issued for the implementation of the present act.” 
Establishments involving dangerous substances can be assigned on the basis of the meth-
odology listed in the implementing regulation, annex 1, to lower and upper tier categories. 
The basis of categorization is the quantity of dangerous substances at the sites (including also 
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materials that will expectedly be produced because of the runaway reaction of the process) 
and their danger categories [6]. Dangerous substances (chemical agents and formulations) 
are assigned to danger categories in line with Ac XXV/2000 on chemical safety and the re-
lated implementing regulation. 
In the implementing regulation, annex 1, table 1 the most frequent dangerous substances 
and the related lower and upper tier quantities are listed. In table No. 2 the danger categories 
of dangerous substances and the related lower and upper tier quantities are listed. Dangerous 
substance is the substance included in table 1 or belonging to any danger class of table 2, 
and being present in the establishment as raw material, product, semi–finished product, by-
product or wastes. The threshold quantities specified in the tables apply to one establishment. 
In case the quantity of the dangerous substances being present in the establishment reach-
es or exceeds the value specified in column 2, then the establishment is a lower tier establish-
ment, if it reaches or exceeds the values specified in column 3, the establishment is an upper 
tier establishment.
As of January 1, 2012, in addition to the lower and upper tier establishments involving 
dangerous substances covered by the Seveso II Directive, the procedures and obligations 
applying to the operators of below tier establishments have been added. [6]. 
The new regulation (Dis. man. Act Chapter IV. and its implementing regulations) impose, 
in addition to the existing regulations, obligations on operators as well, at whose sites there 
are dangerous substances in quantities exceeding one fourth of the lower tier quantity spec-
ified in the regulation but not reaching the lower tier level and on operators of installations 
that shall be handled with priority. 
The sites, where chlorine or ammonia is present in quantities of at least 1,000 kg, where haz-
ardous wastes are neutralized by incineration, and installations used for the transportation of haz-
ardous wastes, dangerous substances beyond the battery limits are also included in this group. 
Installations used for the transportation of hazardous goods that are, as a main rule, not 
covered by the Seveso II. Directive belong to the second group. When regulations were 
amended in Hungary in the year 2012, the codifier extended the effect of the regulations over 
establishments involved in the temporary storage of hazardous goods and installations used 
for the transportation of hazardous goods by pipeline. 
However in the practice of the application of law in Hungary switching yards and ports 
are an exception. As the authority regards switching yards and ports to be part of transpor-
tation activity, they are not yet deemed establishments involving dangerous substances. In 
connection with the modification of disaster management regulations the codifier subjected 
these activities to authority inspection. However the licensing and supervising activity at 
dangerous establishments and the application of emergency plans are still missing.
The dangers resulting from the dangerous establishments installed can be most simply 
demonstrated by the application of a GIS tool (danger map or hazard map).
The Major Accident Hazard Bureau working at the Joint Research Center of the European 
Commission has prepared, in line with the Seveso II. Directive, Art. 13 on trans–boundary 
effects, the Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System (SPIRS). “Seveso establishments” 
can most simply be typed on the basis of the SPIRS system. In the SPIRS system — irrespec-
tive of the actual dangers of the dangerous establishment, the danger resulting from lower tier 
establishments is demonstrated by a circle with a diameter of 2 km, and in case of upper tier 
establishments by a circle with a diameter of 5 km. [7]
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In the practice of the application of the law in Hungary the elements of SPIRS are inte-
grated into the Industrial Accident Information System (IAIS) of the disaster management 
authority. IAIS includes, in addition to the Seveso establishments, also the basic data of be-
low tier establishments, like their geographic location (address of the site), their status (low-
er, upper tier and below tier) or the industrial classification of the dangerous establishment. 
Based on the IAIS the establishments producing, processing and storing dangerous sub-
stances can be assigned to a total of 17 groups (activities). The activities of the IAIS, because 
of the characteristics of below tier establishments, are not fully in conformity with the SPIRS 
classification. The disaster management authority sends a list, address, status and activities 
of the establishments to the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission every year.
The classification of below tier establishments is identical with that of Seveso establish-
ments, with the difference, that among below tier establishments there are “installations to 
be handled with priority”. In these hazardous activities the 25% threshold of the lower tier is 
not considered. The establishments where there is at least 1,000 kg of chlorine or ammonia 
present, if these establishments are not establishments dealing with dangerous substances, 
belong to the group of below tier establishments. The installations used for the transportation 
of dangerous substances by pipeline are registered as installations used for the transportation 
of hazardous goods, while installations used for the neutralization of hazardous wastes by 
incineration are recorded among establishments involving hazardous wastes.
Based on the data of MI NDGDM the number of 169 lower and upper tier establishments 
covered by the regulations before 2012 increased by 37% because of the new regulation tak-
ing effect. In Hungary, as of July 2013, there are 129 lower tier, 97 upper tier and 509 below 
tier establishments and 3 more establishments are being constructed. There are further 537 
below tier establishments under the effect of the new regulation, and accordingly there are 
already 758 dangerous establishments covered by the dis. man. act and by its implementing 
regulation. 
The upper tier establishments covered by the agreement of the UN Economic Commis-
sion for Europe (UN ECE) about the trans–boundary effects of industrial accidents are locat-
ed along the Slovakian and Ukrainian border. The number of dangerous activities identified 
within a 15 km zone of the state boundary is 9, whereas the number of activities identified in 
the water catchment areas and endangering Croatia and Serbia is 14 [8] The Hungarian Di-
saster Management authority is responsible for the implementation of the technical, bilateral 
and multilateral provisions of the UN ECE international piece of legislation. The technical 
information provided for the purposes of the bilateral cooperation is written in safety docu-
mentation handled in by the operator of the upper tier establishments dealing with dangerous 
substances. [9]
The next figure illustrates on the basis of the authority records of MI NDGDM the geo-
graphical location of establishments involving dangerous substances in Hungary. 
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Figure 1. Location of establishments involving dangerous substances  
and below tier establishments in Hungary (source: MI NDGDM  
National Chief Inspectorate for Industrial Safety, July 1, 2013.)
b) Installations used for the transportation of hazardous goods
Installations used for the transportation of hazardous goods can be divided into five groups, 
in line with the transportation methods, as follows:
• Installations used for the road transportation of hazardous goods
• Installations used for railway transportation;
• Installations used for the transportation over inland waterways;
• installations used for the preparation of air transport;
• Installations used for transportation by pipeline.
Installations used for the road transportation of hazardous goods, that is warehouses used 
for the storage of hazardous goods in ADR (the European Agreement concerning the Interna-
tional Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road) packaging, are recorded. Almost all warehouse 
halls that are of great significance in terms of logistics are located in the agglomeration of 
Budapest. This is otherwise also logical, as most of the consumption and business life is con-
centrated in Budapest and in its direct surroundings. From this region the products desired 
can be transported to any point of the country within 2–3 hours. [10]
Installations used for railway transportation are first of all switching yards that do not 
belong to the group of establishments involving dangerous substances. These installations 
shall prepare an internal emergency management plan in line with RID 1.10 and this plan 
regulates basically the consequence mitigation and prevention rules of the Seveso Directive 
applied to safety reports. On the basis of the data of MI NDGDM MÁV Zrt. identified a total 
of 14 yards in the area of Hungary, the most significant ones are the yards in Ferencváros, 
Miskolc, Szolnok and Záhony. [11]
Another major type of the installation of rail transport is the switching yard and sidings of 
establishments producing, processing and storing dangerous substances. Switching yards lo-
cated in the area of establishments involving dangerous substances or in the area of below tier 
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establishments or sidings closely related to the sites pose major hazards. Sidings connected to 
sites can cause individual and significant dangers, as there is a high number of wagons there 
without any physical protection, without the supervision of the operator and of the authority. 
Railway, public road, and trans-shipment facilities can be established dealing with dan-
gerous substances or establishments not classified. The most significant operating establish-
ment is in Budapest (Bilk Kombiterminál Zrt.). During the trans-shipment of containers the 
fact that the safety of containers arriving at the terminal depends on the variable quality of 
dispatch in Hungary or abroad and on the technical condition of the wagons is a frequent 
problem.
Loading and unloading facilities of establishments involving dangerous substances and 
ports dealing with dangerous substances are registered as installations used for inland water-
way transportation. In Hungary there are loading and unloading installations at the petroleum 
port in Csepel (MOL Csepel base site, and Oil Tanking Kft.), at MOL Plc. Danube Refinery 
in Százhalombatta and at the site of Lukoil in Dunaföldvár. [12]
In case of the facilities used for the preparation of air transport the warehouses used for 
the storage of dangerous goods at the airport (Liszt Ferenc Airport) are registered, which 
cause, due to the relatively low material quantities, no significant danger compared to other 
transportation methods.
The implementing regulation includes the definition of the transportation of hazardous 
substances by pipeline (as establishments to be handled with special attention). Transpor-
tation pipelines, pump, compressor and distribution stations belong to this group, with the 
exception of the distribution pipelines used for natural gas supply to the public, and the 
collection pipelines with a nominal diameter below 400 mm used for hydrocarbon mining. 
Activities dealing with hazardous wastes
Activities involving hazardous substance temporary storage facilities, used for the storage of 
hazardous wastes produced at establishments involving hazardous wastes, are listed. There 
might be hazardous wastes produced in below tier establishments, and in low quantities at a 
high number of non–classified sites.
The hazardous wastes accumulated in these facilities are assigned to hazardous waste 
categories on the basis of the environmental regulations and are transported to neutralization 
plants or to other sites specializing in the preparation and collection of hazardous wastes. 
The classification of hazardous wastes according to the European Waste Catalogue (EWC) 
is, based on the KöM (Ministry of Environment) regulation No. 16/2001 (VII. 18.), and is the 
task and duty of the producer. Classification is influenced also by other objective aspects and 
interests. If a waste is hazardous or not is determined by the aforementioned KöM regulation, 
according to the presence of components expressed in % and characterized by R–phrases. 
New hazardous wastes or hazardous wastes with unknown composition can be classified on 
the basis of the composition and hazard parameters. Based on the production technology of 
wastes (statistical approach), the EWC systemizes wastes in predefined groups. In the techni-
cal content of these groups some of the exact physical, chemical and other parameters applied 
in ADR can be found in exceptional cases only.
Among the neutralization activities, from the point of view of hazards, establishments 
neutralizing hazardous wastes by incineration are regarded as the most dangerous. 
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There is just a low number of hazardous waste incineration plants in Hungary, the most 
significant ones are in Dorog, Győr, Sajóbábony, Balatonfüred, Tiszaújváros and Tiszavasvár. 
Among the activities involving hazardous wastes the ones that are most significant from the 
point of view of hazards are subject to the regulations about the prevention of major accidents. 
One of the unresolved questions of the last decades is environmental safety, and within 
this the handling of hazardous wastes as independent hazard sources. In Hungary several 
million of hazardous waste are generated every year. The quantity of industrial wastes and 
liquid and sludge–like hazardous wastes is decreasing, while the quantity of solid hazardous 
wastes is increasing. 
Some 30% of the hazardous wastes recorded (based on the calorific value) can be com-
busted. Other wastes need further treatment, first of all physical, chemical, biological decon-
tamination, whereas unavoidable residues require professional disposal. Some 0.5–0.7 % of 
domestic solid wastes are hazardous wastes. 
In my opinion hazardous wastes are first of all an environmental and health problem and 
jeopardize mainly the environment, human health is only indirectly endangered. The risk of 
danger occurs in case of the various environmental elements, usually as permanent environ-
mental pollution. 
Activities involving radioactive substances
Activities dealing with radioactive substances can be divided in terms of industrial safety into 
two main groups: nuclear installations and isotope laboratories. 
a) Nuclear installations
With regard to the potential risks, among the nuclear installations in Hungary Paksi Atom-
erőmű Zrt. with its 4 pieces of VVER–440 (Voda Voda Energo Reactor — Water–Water 
Power Reactor) power generation blocks ranks first. The blocks are arranged in two pairs, in 
a “hermetic space” protected by a localization tower preventing/delaying release in case of 
minor/major accidents, respectively. 
Next to the reactors, but outside of the hermetic space there are the spent nuclear fuel 
pools, where the spent fuel is cooled for 5 years before outbound shipment. There are 70 set-
tlements within the 30 km radius of the power plant. The settlements belong to Tolna, Bács–
Kiskun and Fejér County in terms of public administration. Depending on the emissions and 
weather conditions, a smaller or larger part of this region might require emergency response. 
The probability of exposure of regions farther off to danger is low but not nil [12]. 
The research reactor of the Central Research Institute of Physics (Központi Fizikai Ku-
tatóintézet — KFKI) and the teaching reactor of the Nuclear Technical Institute of the Tech-
nical University of Budapest (BME Nukleáris Technikai Intézet) are less significant from the 
point of view of accidents. 
The Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel (Kiégett Kazetták Átmeneti Tárolója — KKÁT) is 
a separate organization, but it is physically located within the battery limits of the Paks Nucle-
ar Power Plant. The danger of KKÁT is that of accidents during transportation and loading.
Spent fuel is transported since the commissioning of KKÁT, in exceptional cases only, 
thus the related risk is also low. At the same time the activity of spent fuel is significantly 
higher and it is harder to localize due to its gamma radiation and requires more expertise. 
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Accidents happening during the transportation of highly active isotopes is also similar, where 
the restoration of the protection of the isotope is the most urgent task. The effect of transpor-
tation between the spent fuel pools and KKÁT and of accidents happening here beyond the 
battery limits is not probable.
The risks resulting from nuclear installations in Hungary can be characterized on the basis 
of the planning zones applied in response activities following nuclear accidents, as shown in 
the next table. The individual installations are assigned to hazard planning categories (cate-
gory I–V), where
• Zone of Preventive Precautionary Actions (Megelőző Óvintézkedések Zónája — 
MÓZ) in case of installations belonging to the 1st planning category this is a pre–se-
lected area, for which urgent precautionary actions are planned in advance, and the 
implementation of such actions are ordered immediately after the identification of a 
General Emergency Situation. 
• Zone of Urgent Precautionary Actions (Sürgős Óvintézkedések Zónája — SÓZ) in 
case of installations belonging to planning category I or II this is a pre–selected area, 
for which urgent precautionary actions are planned in advance.
• Zone of Foodstuff Consumption Restrictions (Élelmiszerfogyasztási Korlátozások 
Óvintézkedési Zónája — ÉÓZ) is the area, within which the restriction of the food-
stuff consumption of the population, the checking of agricultural producers and of the 
food processing industry, the strict regulation or restriction of their activities by legal 
regulations (as needed) becomes necessary. [13].
Table 1. Designation and area of planning zones [13]
MÓZ SÓZ ÉÓZ
I. VTK
Paks Nuclear Power Plant 3 km 30 km 300 km
II. VTK
KKÁT – – 3 km
Budapest Research Reactor – KFKI site 1 km
Izotópintézet Kft. – KFKI site 1 km
III. VTK
BME Teaching Reactor – – –
RHFT – – 3 km
NRHT – – 3 km
V. VTK
Bohunice 3 km 30 km 300 km
Mohovce 3 km 30 km 300 km
Krsko 3 km 30 km 300 km
Dukovany 3 km 30 km 300 km
Temelin 3 km 30 km 300 km
The data of the table above expressed in figures are visualized on the following figure 
also as a map. 
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Figure No 2. Nuclear hazards in Hungary [13]
There is a Preventive Precautionary Zone marked in Hungary around the Paks Nuclear 
Power Plant only, this is an area with a radius of 3 km. There is also an Urgent Precautionary 
Zone marked in Hungary around the Paks Nuclear Power Plant only, this is an area with a 
radius of 30 km and the KFKI site that includes the Budapest Research Reactor. 
The circles with a radius of 300 km around the Paks Nuclear Power Plant and around for-
eign nuclear power plants, that is the Precautionary Zone of Food Consumption Restrictions 
cover practically the whole area of Hungary, only small areas east from the line Vásáros-
namény–Mátészalka are not affected by this zone. 
Due to the location of nuclear power plants abroad their marked Preventive and Precau-
tionary Zones do not reach Hungary [13]. 
b) Facilities producing radioactive materials (isotopes)
Based on the data of MI NDGDM 3 of the facilities producing radioactive substances (iso-
topes) are in Budapest and two are in Debrecen. Radioisotope is being produced in the ex-
perimental nuclear reactor of the Nuclear Energy Research Institute (Atomenergia Kutató In-
tézet), while the Institute of Isotopes Co., Ltd. (Izotóp Intézet Kft.) produces iodine radiation 
source. PET (Positron emission tomography) radioisotope is being produced in a medical 
cyclotron by the University of Debrecen (Debreceni Egyetem) Medical and Health Science 
Centre (OEC — Orvos– és Egészségtudományi Centrum) Nuclear Medicine Institute (Nuk-
leáris Medicina Intézet) in Debrecen and by Pozitron Diagnosztikai Kft. in Budapest. Medi-
cal and industrial radioisotope is being produced by MTA ATOMKI (Atommagkutató Intézet 
— Institute for Nuclear Research) (MGC–20E cyclotron) at their site in Debrecen.
Based on the data of MI NDGDM there are a total of 33 pieces of “B” and “C” category 
isotope laboratories with no patients working in the country, which pose only limited danger 
to their environment in terms of disaster management. 
The aspects used for the civil defense classification of isotope laboratories depend mainly 
on the classification of the laboratory (A, B, C levels), and on the category of importance of 
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the installation (priority, I., II., III. category). In addition to the aforementioned aspects the 
factors of the activities of laboratories dealing with radioactive substances posing a risk to 
the public influence the classification as well. The EüM (Ministry of Health) regulation No. 
16/2000 (VI. 8.) on the implementation of the Nuclear Energy Act No. 1996/CXVI. includes 
detailed provisions about the aforementioned point. 
With regard to the civil defense classification, the establishment of adequate safety sys-
tems in laboratories that frequently work with volatile, gas– and steam phase radioactive 
isotopes with long half–life period, and with toxic radioactive isotopes with long half–time 
period, and the regular inspection of such laboratories, combined with environmental sam-
pling is highly important. 
In addition to radioactivity measurements, in justified cases, the inspection shall be car-
ried out by sampling and by radioactivity analytics, chemical, biological measurement car-
ried out in special laboratories. The frequency of the authority inspections at isotope labora-
tories is properly described in the regulation 16/2000 (VI.8.) EüM, Annex 7.
Hazardous mining activities
a) Mining activities
We have anticipated that in the field of hydrocarbon production, the mining of crude oil and 
natural gas, the primary processing of the raw material takes place still within the battery lim-
its of the mine. In the course of the processing of the produced and imported hydrocarbons 
intermediate products; fuels and lubricants; and the byproducts of processing (e.g.: bitumen) 
are produced. Most of the substances are highly flammable and explosive, and can cause 
major industrial accidents, disasters and environmental disasters. 
In the course of the extraction and processing of hydrocarbons the following dangerous 
situations might arise: 
• danger and environmental damage caused by unexpected bursts during the extraction 
of crude oil and natural gas, and exploratory drills;
• fire or explosion, environmental damage during the storage or primary processing of 
the extracted crude oil and natural gas in the area of the mine; 
• fire or explosion, or environmental damage caused during the processing and storage 
of imported and extracted crude oil (crude oil refining, production of secondary prod-
ucts (PB gas); 
• fire and explosion, environmental damage during storing and logistic activities (prod-
uct pipeline).
Major crude oil fields are in Algyő and the oil field in North and South Zala. 
There are major natural gas fields in Jász–Nagykun–Szolnok, Hajdú–Bihar and Zala 
County. 
There are some 700 exploratory and extraction wells, MOL Plc. carries out crude oil and 
natural gas extraction activities at 5 mining plants, and six business organizations specialize 
in crude oil exploration. In Zala, in the course of crude oil extraction the danger of fire and 
explosion, and the potential release of carbon dioxide used in high quantities can be antici-
pated. Toxic gases that are harmful to human health (H2S) that are heavier than air and that 
are released in a mixed condition, can jeopardize several settlements and several thousands of 
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people for several days due to the local relief conditions and in case of unfavorable weather 
conditions. The extracted crude oil and natural gas and significant quantities of the PB gas 
produced are stored in 5 underground gas storage containers (e.g. gas storage in Pusztae-
decser in Zala) at 8 PB gas filling sites and in above–ground facilities (e.g. PB gas storage in 
Algyő — 30,000 m3). Among the industrial plants processing crude oil the white and black 
storage capacities of the Danube, Tisza and Zalaegerszeg refineries are significant. 
The danger related to hydrocarbon transportation pipelines is covered in the subchapter 
“Transportation of hazardous goods”, but due to its nature it shall be mentioned here. In case 
of transportation pipelines the starting and relay stations and process installations used for 
operation (e.g. pressure booster, loading, unloading etc. stations) pose major hazards. The 
exposure to dangers results mainly from above–ground installations, where the accidents 
and disasters described in the chapter about dangerous industrial installations might happen.
Coal and lignite mining pose no special hazard in terms of industrial safety. The facilities 
used for the storage of crude oil drilling mud considered hazardous waste can pose a danger 
to the environment [13].
b) Facilities used for the storage of mining wastes
According to the records of the NDGDM there are 400 facilities for the storage of mining 
wastes in Hungary and most of them are not classified. The total number of qualified “A” 
type facilities is 12 pieces. Some storage sites e.g.: the red sludge storage in Ajka are split into 
several cassettes. The disaster management authority pays special attention to the safety of 
facilities used for the storage of mining wastes following the industrial disaster in Kolontár.
In connection with the dam break of the red sludge reservoir on October 4, 2010 in 
Kolontár the Environmental Chief Inspectorate of the European Commission (EiB) sent an 
official notice on October 22, 2010 regarding the disaster at the site of MAL Zrt. in Ajka. 
EiB asked for information among others on the classification under 96/82/EC Council 
Directive (Seveso II.) about the inspection of hazards of major accidents related to dangerous 
substances. 
With regard to the applicability of the Seveso II. Directive the European Commission 
accepted in its reply the standpoint of MI NDGDM, as Hungarian authority, namely that the 
red sludge and sodium hydrate do not qualify as dangerous substances under the Seveso II, 
thus the installation is not covered by the Directive. 
The first step in Hungary in the elimination of deficiencies affecting environmental and 
mining law identified and complained about by the European Commission was the amend-
ment of regulations in Hungary regarding mining wastes. In the topic of mining wastes the 
Hungarian Parliament has adopted Act CLXXXI/2010 on the amendment of individual ener-
gy acts and of Act LXXVIII/1997 on the alteration and protection of the built–in environment. 
According to the law, the Mining Act No. XLVIII/1993 was amended as of January 1, 2011. 
Certain parts of the amendments were aimed at the conformity with the Directive No. 2006/21/
EC (March 15, 2006), namely the treatment of wastes produced in the mining of minerals. 
Accordingly the effect of Act No. XLVIII/1993 covers mining wastes (wastes produced 
during mining and red sludge produced during the processing of bauxite). 
The competence of the Mine Inspectorate was extended by authority procedures related 
to the management of mining wastes and to the construction, commissioning and operation, 
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closing and aftercare of related facilities and installations. Resulting from the change of the 
legal regulations, the regulation No. 267/2006 (XII. 20.) on the Hungarian Office for Mining 
and Geology has been amended, and this allows the disaster management authority to par-
ticipate, as specialized authority, in the construction and occupancy licensing procedure to 
check the internal emergency management plan. With the amendment of the GKM (Ministry 
of Economy and Transport) regulation No. 14/2008 (IV. 3.) GKM the regional organizations 
of MI NDGDM will prepare, revise, along with the mayors of the settlements concerned, the 
external emergency plans serving for the protection of the settlements and have them drilled.
With the modification of the regulation of mining rights, with the introduction of external 
emergency response actions, there is a possibility to manage the coordinated activities of 
disaster management, and of the state and municipal organizations involved in the rescue and 
emergency response. 
Facilities used for the storage of mining wastes can be divided into two main groups: (1) 
sludge reservoirs and sludge settlement ponds and (2) pit–heaps and soil depots. 
Sludge reservoirs are divided into four main groups according to the raw material extract-
ed: (1) red sludge reservoirs (2) spent nuclear fuel storages (3) non–ferrous sludge reservoirs 
and (4) iron ore sludge reservoirs. The wastes produced in the course of coal and lignite 
mining are stored on pit–heaps and on soil depots.
Conclusions
In the article the dangers resulting from hazardous activities in Hungary covered by industrial 
safety regulations, being part of disaster management have been generally analyzed. 
The evaluation of the activities in Hungary that pose risks of disaster, based on the aspects 
of industrial safety can essentially be found in case of establishments involving dangerous 
substances only, where dangerous establishments have maps illustrating the individual risk 
of fatalities and the hazard zones of establishments will be integrated into the land–use plans. 
The data base of MI NDGDM (IBIR — Információ Biztonsági Irányítási Rendszer; In-
formation Security Management System) offers adequate possibilities for the extraction of 
statistical data. The data of authority work are included in the so called Authority Data Base 
(Hatósági Adatbázis, HADAR) not connected to the IBIR. The hazard sources are visualized 
as a map in the GIS data base of the NDGDM, however there is no direct data base connec-
tion. The results of the hazard analyses are available for each establishment in the safety 
documentation, however the maps applied there are not standardized. The data of events 
related to industrial safety are also separately recorded, and these records shall continuously 
be updated to prepare executive summaries and reports.
With regard to sludge reservoirs and isotope laboratories there is a separate registration 
not linked to central data bases. 
In terms of nuclear hazards we are aware of precautionary action zones established em-
pirically. These zones are visualized on maps as well. 
All in all it can be established that most of the activities covered by industrial safety regu-
lations in Hungary are visualized on so–called hazard maps, where data can be analyzed as to 
the main parameters and location of the hazard source. The danger maps corresponding to the 
quantitative risk criteria are available for the establishments involving dangerous substances, 
but at the present they are not visualized on the GIS platform.
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The identification of activities that pose risks of manmade disasters (hazard identifica-
tion), the creation of standardized data bases, the completion of hazard analyses, the visual-
ization of the results on maps are the continuous task of disaster management organizations. 
It is possible to develop mainly by bundling the authority and professional data bases and by 
standardized data handling. The use of GIS shall be given priority in this activity.
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International Public Sector Accounting Standard 
(IPSAS) 12–Inventories: Determining exemplary 
requirements for military logistics systems
Holger SCHEPPELMANN1
In this paper the author shows that it is conceptually possible to derive from Inter-
national Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) 12–Inventories exemplary re-
quirements that can be used as a basis to assess in principle the compliance of mil-
itary logistics systems with IPSAS 12. However, the utility of isolated requirements 
for compliance with IPSAS 12 is limited, since these requirements certainly need to 
be integrated with requirements derived from other IPSASs and with requirements 
related to the accounting system used to prepare IPSAS annual financial state-
ments. As a result of such a requirement’s integration process it is very likely that 
noticeable changes and/or augmentations of the proposed exemplary requirements 
for compliance with IPSAS 12 will turn out to be necessary. 
Introduction
The intention of this paper is to contribute to closing the existing gap in the current litera-
ture with regard to practical issues typically encountered in real world implementations of 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS). While in an earlier paper [1] the 
question how and to what extent existing military logistics data can be reused for IPSAS fi-
nancial reporting has been discussed, this paper intends to focus on the necessary capabilities 
military logistics system need to have in order to store and process financial data, which meet 
the requirements of IPSAS 12–Inventories.
Chan [2] pointed out in his analysis of the institutional and conceptual issues related to 
IPSAS that IPSAS neglect the system capability, i.e. the “infrastructure for collecting, re-
cording, and summarizing financial data”, which implies, in his view, the necessity of using 
(for IPSAS compliant annual financial statements) an accounting (information) system that 
has as necessary capabilities:
“(1) the accounting equation, assets = liabilities + net assets, as its conceptual foundation;
(2) a detailed chart of accounts for the elements of the accounting equation, as well as revenues and 
expenses as changes in net assets;
(3) a double–entry recording system; and
(4) the ability to translate standards (such as IPSAS) into specific policies and procedures applicable 
to the organization concerned” [2], 
which “have to be incorporated in the hardware and software of the accounting system, 
(...)”.[2]
1  Holger.Scheppelmann@gmx.net
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The intention of this paper is therefore to determine the requirements for military logistics 
systems that need to comply with IPSAS in order to support the preparation of IPSAS finan-
cial statements of a NATO–led or UN–led International Military Headquarters. For current 
and future International Military Headquarters (HQs) the compliance of their military logis-
tics systems with IPSAS has become relevant, since both organizations decided in 2002 and 
2006, respectively, to use IPSAS as the standards for the preparation of their annual financial 
statements.
Determining a set of exemplary IPSAS 12 requirements allows HQs to assess the degree 
to which their currently operated military logistics systems comply with IPSAS 12 and can 
also provide a basis for determining the requirements of planned future military logistics sys-
tems. The discussion in this paper is therefore applicable to a broad range of logistics systems 
from manual paper–based logistics systems to fully automated logistics systems that may be 
part of an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system.
Scope of requirements
IPSAS requirements can be grouped in two major categories: requirements for IPSAS finan-
cial statements as a whole, such as qualitative characteristics like relevance, faithful repre-
sentation, understandability, timeliness, comparability, verifiability, materiality, cost–benefit, 
the fundamental principles of completeness [3], and requirements mandated by a specific 
IPSAS standard, such as e.g. IPSAS 12–Inventories or IPSAS 17–Property, Plant and Equip-
ment. From an IPSAS point of view the scope of this paper is therefore limited to those 
requirements that can be directly derived from IPSAS 12. [4]
Likewise, a discussion of the more generic requirements for software applications used 
to process information to be used in the preparation of IPSAS financial statements will be 
considered to be outside of the scope of this paper. Examples for such generic requirements 
include e.g. controls to ensure the completeness of processed data or the realisation of seg-
regation of incompatible duties through roles–and–responsibility concepts as can be seen 
from the ISACA IT Auditing Guideline G21 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Systems 
Review [5] or from the ISACA Switzerland Chapter’s Guide to Auditing IT Applications [6]. 
The United States Government Accounting Office’s Inventory Systems Checklist provides 
guidance for assessing the inventory management capabilities of an inventory system and its 
compliance with the applicable United States statutory requirements. [7] 
Possible bases for IPSAS requirements analysis
International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) are conceptually derived from 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the earlier International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), respectively. A future goal of the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (IPSASB) is the convergence of IAS/IFRS and IPSAS. [8] [9] Guidance 
on the IFRS requirements for private sector inventory systems could therefore in principle 
form mutatis mutandis the basis for IPSAS requirements of public sector (including military) 
logistics systems.
While an Exposure Draft is foreseen for September 2013 [10], to date there is no IPSAS 
on the first–time adoption of IPSAS. In addition IFRS 1 First–Time Adoption of IFRS [11] 
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does not discuss any practical implementation issues related to the first–time adoption of 
IFRS or, by extension, IPSAS. Likewise, the IPSASB Recommended Practice Guidelines 
[12] [13], and the official SIC–Interpretations (for IAS) [14], and IFRIC–Interpretations (for 
IFRS) [15] all focus exclusively on accounting issues in the narrower sense.
While noticeably more practically oriented than the above authoritative guidance, the 
IPSASB Study 14 Transition to the Accrual Basis of Accounting: Guidance for Governments 
and Government Entities [16] includes nonetheless only a rather limited discussion of the 
role logistics systems play in the implementation of IPSAS, despite the fact that traditional 
governmental accounting standards, such as cash–based accounting usually do not mandate 
that all assets – including in particular items of inventory and items of property, plant and 
equipment have to be reported in the annual financial statements, as Bergmann emphasizes 
in his criticism of cash–based accounting. [17]
Although there is already substantial literature on the major issues typically encountered 
in IAS/IFRS implementations, only very few authors, such as e.g. Bastos [18], or Brown [19] 
give at least some high–level indications of the areas, where financial information systems 
have to be reviewed in concreto in order to ascertain that they are capable of providing the fi-
nancial information necessary for the preparation of IAS/IFRS compliant financial statements. 
The comparative study of Christiaens and Reyniers [20] on the impact of IPSAS on re-
forming governmental financial information systems concentrates on conceptual issues at the 
central government or local government level rather than on requirements for systems to be 
used in real–world implementations of IPSAS.
The compliance of information systems with laws, rules, regulations or standards is only 
implicitly discussed in the existing literature. One possible explanation could be that com-
pliance of information systems are seen largely as one of many requirements an existing or 
planned system has to fulfill. Additionally, for most systems the documentation made avail-
able by the software vendors will be limited to user documentation and to a certain extent of 
technical documentation, leaving systems essentially as black boxes with limited possibili-
ties to actually test them for compliance. This is particularly problematic with regard to most 
ERP systems, where as a consequence of the numerous configuration possibilities through 
parametrisations two real–world ERP implementations can almost never be considered iden-
tical. The example of the compliance certification of the Oracle 12 E–Business Suite for 
compliance, German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (Grundsätze ordnungsmäs-
siger Buchführung), shows that a statement of compliance is directly linked to a certain, well 
defined set of parameters used for the configuration of the ERP–System. [21]
From the above overview of the existing literature it can therefore be seen that there is 
indeed a need to determine the requirements for both existing and planned military logistics 
systems that need to comply with IPSAS 12 Inventories. 
The concept of systems requirements analysis
Grady defines a requirement as “an essential attribute or characteristic for a system or an 
element of a system” [22] and the analysis of system requirements is, as Boehm notes in his 
discussion of the historical development of software engineering in the 20th and 21st century, 
always an early, if not the first, activity in the various software development life cycle models 
that emerged in the recent decades. [23] 
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The challenge in requirements analysis is to determine and document the system require-
ments in such a way that they are unambiguous and can be objectively validated and verified 
(V&V) or – in short – that they are testable. [24]
For developing requirement documents for large–scale systems Grady [22] recommends 
following the guidance from United States Military Standards (MIL–STD) 961D/E [25] and 
the successor standards of MIL–STD–490A, which define inter alia the structure, language 
style, and format of such requirements documents. MIL–STD–961E specifies that “(…) 
‘shall’ (...) shall be used (...) whenever a requirement is intended to express a provision that 
is binding.”, which – together with the expression “in accordance with” for citing references 
is considered to be a straightforward approach for documenting IPSAS requirements. [25]
Exemplary IPSAS 12 requirements for military logistics systems
While all items typically managed with a military logistics systems can be classified through 
a NATO Supply Classification Code, not all items will necessarily be items of inventories in 
accordance with IPSAS 12 Inventories, since some items may require reporting according to 
IPSAS 17 Property, Plant and Equipment or — in the case of Group 87 Agricultural Supplies 
and Group 88 Live Animals — in accordance with IPSAS 27. Agriculture is outside the scope 
of this paper, since it should be reported in accordance with IPSAS 27 Agriculture. [1]
Recapitulating that IPSAS does not consider system capabilities — as pointed out by 
Chan [2] — a real–world implementation of IPSAS inevitably encounters the question, 
which actual capabilities of a system used – alone, or together with other systems – are need-
ed in order to support the preparation of IPSAS compliant financial statements. Depending 
on the nature of the entity, the system concerned will need to comply with a larger or smaller 
number of other IPSAS standards in addition to IPSAS 12. 
For deriving the requirements from the IPSAS 12 standard the following approach has 
been used: The text of the standard has been analysed and the intended result of an individual 
provision of the standard has to be worded in such a way that the result is a requirements 
statement that is unambiguous and can be verified and validated, but is at the same time 
neutrally worded, so that the requirements can be used to both analyse a broad range of com-
parable systems, such as e.g. paper–based logistics systems, Government–Off–The–Shelf 
(GOTS) logistics systems as well as Commercial–Off–The–Shelf (COTS) logistics systems 
and to provide, at the same time, requirements for the development and implementation of 
new systems. 
Based on the above discussion the following exemplary requirements are proposed as 
basic requirements for compliance of a military inventory logistics system with IPSAS 12:
1. Minimum item properties in accordance with IPSAS 12
a. The system shall for each item that meets the definition of IPSAS 12 and can be classified with 
a NATO Supply Classification Code (except Groups 87 and 88) provide at least the following 
item properties (different methods for realisation of the requirement are possible, the property 
names and property values are provided below for illustration of the concepts only) [26]:
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 Property Name Proposed Property Values
 ItemType Inventory, PPE
ItemTransactionType ExchangeTransaction, NonExchangeTransaction















ItemQuantity  nteger number (0, 1, ...N)
ItemDescription Text in accordance with nomenclature
ItemFairValueLessCostsToSell Yes, No
ItemTransactionHistory List of transactions related to the item
ItemNATOStocknumber 4–digit number (Group/Class)
ItemBudgetAccount Integer number or string
ItemAssetAccount Integer number or string
ItemExpenseAccount Integer number or string
2. Item categories in accordance with IPSAS 12,2–9 and 11, and IPSAS 17
a. The system shall be capable of grouping items of inventory in accordance with IPSAS 12 (IPSAS 
12,2–9 and 11) on the one hand and items of property, plant and equipment in accordance with 
IPSAS 17 on the other hand. [27] 
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to select the 
appropriate item category in accordance with IPSAS 12 and IPSAS 17 and shall record the 
selected item category by setting the ItemType to Inventory in the case of an item of inventory 
and to PPE in the case of an item of property, plant and equipment. [27] 
c. In the case the ItemType is set to PPE the system shall process the item in accordance with 
IPSAS 17 Property, Plant and Equipment, which is described in a separate requirements 
document. [27]
3. Exchange Transactions and Non–Exchange Transactions in accordance with IPSAS 
12.9 and 17 and IPSAS 9
a. The system shall be capable of grouping items of inventory that have been obtained by the 
entity as the result of an exchange transaction on the one hand and items of inventory that have 
been obtained by the entity as the result of a non–exchange transaction on the other hand. [28] 
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to select the appropriate 
item property and shall record the selected item category by setting ItemTransactionType to 
ExchangeTransaction in the case of an item of inventory obtained by the entity as the result of 
an exchange transaction and to NonExchangeTransaction in the case of an item of inventory 
obtained by the entity as the result of a non–exchange transaction. [28] 
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4. Ordinarily interchangeable items and non–ordinarily interchangeable items in ac-
cordance with IPSAS 12.9
a. The system shall be capable of grouping items of inventory that are ordinarily interchangeable 
on the one hand and items of inventory that are non–ordinarily interchangeable on the other 
hand. [29]
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to select the appropriate 
item property and shall record the selected item property by setting ItemInterchangeable to 
OrdinarilyInterchangeable in the case of an item of inventory that is ordinarily interchangeable 
and to NotOrdinarilyInterchangeable in the case of an item of inventory that is not ordinarily 
interchangeable. [29] 
5. Measurement of inventory items resulting from exchange transactions in accor-
dance with IPSAS 12.18–27
a. The system shall query the user to enter the monetary amount for the item of inventory’s cost 
of purchase and any other applicable costs. [30] 
b. The system shall set the value of the item of inventory’s ItemCost property to the sum of the 
monetary amount for the cost of purchase and of all other costs entered by the user. [30]
c. The system shall set the initial value of ItemCarryingAmount to the value of the ItemCost 
calculated in the preceding step. [30]
6. Measurement of inventory items purchased on deferred settlement terms in accor-
dance with IPSAS 12.27
a. The system shall be capable of grouping items of inventory that have been purchased on 
deferred settlement terms on the one hand and items of inventory that have not been purchased 
on deferred settlement terms on the other hand. [31] 
b. The system shall query the user at the time the purchased item of inventory is recorded in 
the system to select the appropriate item property and shall record the selected item property 
by setting ItemDeferredSettlement to Yes in the case of an item of inventory that has been 
purchased on deferred settlement terms and to No in the case of an item of inventory that has 
not been purchased on deferred settlement terms. [31]
c. If ItemDeferredSettlement has the value Yes, the system shall query the user to enter the financing 
element of the purchase of the inventory item and shall record the amount of the financing 
element in ItemFinancingElement. Then the system shall query the user for the apportioning 
of the financing element over the period of the financing and shall record the apportioning in 
ItemFinancingElementApportioning. [31]
7. Measurement of inventory items resulting from non–exchange transactions in ac-
cordance with IPSAS 12.18–27
a. The system shall query the user to enter the monetary amount for the item of inventory’s fair 
value cost and shall record this amount in ItemFairValue. [30] 
b. The system shall set the value of ItemCarryingAmount to the value of the ItemFairValue entered 
in the preceding step. [30]
8. Items of inventory held for distribution at no charge or for a nominal charge in ac-
cordance with IPSAS 12.18–27
a. The system shall be capable of grouping items of inventory held for distribution at no charge 
or for a nominal charge on the one hand and items of inventory not held for distribution at no 
charge or for a nominal charge on the other hand. [30] 
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to select the 
appropriate item category and shall record the selected item category by setting ItemDistribution 
to Yes in the case of an item of inventory held for distribution at no charge or for a nominal 
charge and to No in the case of an item of inventory not held for distribution at no charge or for 
a nominal charge. [30]
c. The system shall allow the user to change the value of ItemDistribution at a later point in time 
after the item has been created in the system. [30] 
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9. Measurement of inventory items held for distribution at no charge or for a nominal 
charge in accordance with IPSAS 12.18–27
a. In the case that ItemDistribution has the value Yes, the system shall query the user to enter 
the monetary amount for the item of inventory’s current replacement cost and shall set 
ItemCurrentReplacementCost to the monetary amount entered in the preceding step from the 
amounts entered by the user. [30]
b. Then the system shall set ItemCarryingAmount to the lower of ItemCost and 
ItemCurrentReplacementCost of the item of inventory. [30]
10. Measurement of non–ordinarily interchangeable inventories resulting from ex-
change transactions in accordance with IPSAS 12.32–37
a. If ItemInterchangeable has the value OrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall apply the 
procedure listed below under 11. [32]
b. If ItemInterchangeable has the value NotOrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall query the 
user to enter the monetary amount for the cost of purchase and any other applicable costs. [32]
c. The system shall set the value of the item of inventory’s ItemCost property to the sum of 
monetary amount for the cost of purchase and of all other costs entered by the user. [32]
d. The system shall set the initial value of ItemCarryingAmount to the value of the ItemCost 
calculated in the preceding step. [32]
11. Cost formulas for ordinarily interchangeable items of inventory in accordance with 
IPSAS 12.35–37
a. The system shall be capable of grouping items of inventory for which the first–in–first–out cost 
formula is used on the one hand and items of inventory for which the weighted average cost 
formula is used on the other hand. [32]
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to select the 
cost formula for an item of inventory and shall record the selected item property by setting 
ItemCostFormula to FirstInFirstOut in the case of an item of inventory for which the first–in–
first–out cost formula is used and to WeightedAverageCost in the case of an item of inventory 
for which the weighted average cost formula is used. [32]
c. The system shall allow the user to change the value of ItemCostFormula at a later point in time 
after the item has been created in the system. [32]
12. Measurement of ordinarily interchangeable inventories resulting from exchange 
transactions in accordance with IPSAS 12.32–37
a. If ItemInterchangeable has the value NotOrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall apply the 
procedure listed above under 10. [32]
b. If ItemInterchangeable has the value OrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall query the 
user to enter the monetary amount for the cost of purchase and any other applicable costs. [32]
c. If ItemCostFormula has the value of FirstInFirstOut the system shall recalculate 
ItemCarryingAmount in accordance with the first–in–first–out cost formula with the monetary 
amounts entered by the user in above step b. [32]
d. If ItemCostFormula has the value of WeightedAverageCost the system shall recalculate 
ItemWeightedAverageCost in accordance with the weighted average cost formula and shall then 
recalculate ItemCarryingAmount in accordance with the weighted average cost formula with 
the monetary amounts entered by the user in above step b. [33]
13. Wrtiting down inventory items to net realisable value in accordance with IPSAS 
12.38–42
a. The system shall query the user if an item of inventory has become wholly or partially obsolete 
and let the user select this item from the items of inventory stored in the system. [33]
b. Then the system shall query the user for the monetary value equivalent to the full or partial 
obsolescence of the inventory item in accordance and shall set ItemWriteDownAmount to this 
monetary amount. [33]
c. Then the system shall reduce the item of inventory’s ItemCarryingAmount by ItemWriteDownAmout. 
[33]
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14. Reversing the previous write down of inventory items to net realisable value in ac-
cordance with IPSAS 12.38–42
a. The system shall query the user for which inventory item the reason for the prior period write–
down no longer exists and let the user select this item from items of inventory stored in the 
system. [33]
b. Then the system shall query the user for the monetary amount equivalent to the degree to 
which the full or partial obsolescence no longer exists and shall set the item of inventory’s 
ItemReversedWriteDownAmount to this monetary amount. [33]
c. Then the system shall add the value of ItemReversedWriteDownAmount to the item of 
inventory’s ItemCarryingAmount. [33]
15. Recording the asset account of an item of inventory
a. The system shall be capable of recording the asset account to be used for an item of inventory. [26]
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to enter the 
asset account to be used for the item and shall record the selected asset account by setting 
ItemAssetAccount to the selected asset account. [26]
c. The system shall allow the user to change the value of ItemAssetAccount at a later point in time 
after the item has been created in the system. [26]
16. Recording the expense account of an item of inventory
a. The system shall be capable of recording the expense account to be used for an item of 
inventory. [26]
b. The system shall query the user at the time an item is created in the system to enter the expense 
account to be used for the item and shall record the selected expense account by setting 
ItemExpenseAccount to the selected expense account. [26]
c. The system shall allow the user to change the value of ItemExpenseAccount at a later point in 
time after the item has been created in the system. [26]
17. Recognising the sale, exchange or distribution of non–ordinarily interchangeable 
inventory items as an expense, when there is related revenue in accordance with 
IPSAS 12.44–46
a. The system shall query the user which inventory item is being sold, exchanged, or distributed. 
[34]
b. If the value of ItemInterchangeable is NonOrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall record 
the value of ItemCarryingAmount in the expense account specified in ItemExpenseAccount 
and in the asset account specified in ItemAssetAccount together with the date when the related 
revenue is realised. [34] 
c. Then the system shall set the value of the ItemCarryingAmount property of the inventory item 
to zero. [34]
18. Recognising the sale, exchange or distribution of an ordinarily interchangeable in-
ventory item as an expense, when there is related revenue in accordance with IPSAS 
12.44–46
a. The system shall query the user which inventory item is being sold, exchanged, or distributed. [34]
b. If the value of ItemInterchangeable is OrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall query the 
user for the quantity of items to be sold, exchanged or distributed. [34]
c. If the quantity of items to be sold, exchanged or distributed is less or equal than ItemQuantity, 
the system shall calculate the expense amount in accordance with the first–in–first–out formula 
in the case ItemCostFormula has the value FirstInFirstOut or with the weighted–average–cost–
formula in the case ItemCostFormula has the value WeightedAverageCost. [34]
d. Then the system shall record the expense amount calculated in the preceding step c in the 
expense account specified in ItemExpenseAccount and in the asset account specified in 
ItemAssetAccount together with the date when the related revenue is realised. [34]
e. Then the system shall reduce ItemQuantity by the quantity entered and reduce the value of the 
ItemCarryingAmount property by the expense amount calculated in the preceding step c. [83]
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19. Recognising the sale, exchange or distribution of non–ordinarily interchangeable 
inventory item as an expense, when there is no related revenue in accordance with 
IPSAS 12.44–46
a. If the value of ItemInterchangeable is NonOrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall record 
the value of ItemCarryingAmount in the expense account specified in ItemExpenseAccount 
and in the asset account specified in ItemAssetAccount together with the date when the related 
revenue is realised. [34] 
b. Then the system shall set the value of the ItemCarryingAmount property of the inventory item 
to zero. [34]
20. Recognising the sale, exchange or distribution of an ordinarily interchangeable in-
ventory item as an expense, when there is no related revenue in accordance with 
IPSAS 12.44–46
a. The system shall query the user which inventory item is being sold, exchanged, or distributed. [34]
b. If the value of ItemInterchangeable is OrdinarilyInterchangeable the system shall query the 
user for the quantity of items to be sold, exchanged or distributed. [34]
c. If the quantity of item to be sold, exchanged or distributed is less or equal than ItemQuantity, 
the system shall calculate the expense amount in accordance with the first–in–first–out formula 
in the case ItemCostFormula has the value FirstInFirstOut or with the weighted–average–cost–
formula in the case ItemCostFormula has the value WeightedAverageCost. [34]
d. Then the system shall record the expense amount calculated in the preceding step c in the 
expense account specified in ItemExpenseAccount and in the asset account specified in 
ItemAssetAccount together with the date when the related revenue is realised. [34] 
e. Then the system shall reduce ItemQuantity by the quantity entered and reduce the value of the 
ItemCarryingAmount property by the expense amount calculated in the preceding step c. [34]
21. Calculation of the total carrying amount of all inventory items in accordance with 
IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall calculate the total carrying amount of all items of inventory as the sum of the 
ItemCarryingAmount properties of the individual inventory items. [35]
b. The system shall output the total carrying amount of all item of inventory. [35]
22. Calculation of the carrying amount of inventory items in classifications in accor-
dance with IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall be capable of reporting the carrying amounts of inventory items by the 
common classifications of inventories, merchandise, production supplies, materials, work in 
progress, finished goods or by user–defined classifications. [35]
b. The system shall calculate and output for each classification of inventories the sum of the 
respective inventory items. [35]
23. Calculation and output of the carrying amount of inventory items carried at fair 
value less costs to sell in accordance with IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall query the user which inventory items are carried at fair value less costs to sell 
(i.e. at residual value). [35]
b. The system shall calculate and output the sum of those inventory items carried at fair value less 
costs to sell. [35]
24. Calculation and output of the amount of inventories recognised as an expense during 
the accounting period in accordance with IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall calculate and output for each expense account the amount of inventories 
recognised as an expense during the accounting period. [35]
25. Calculation and output of the amount of write–downs of inventories recognised as 
an expense during the accounting period in accordance with IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall calculate and output for each classification of inventories the sum of the 
respective inventory items. [35]
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26. Calculation and output of the amount of reversals of write–downs of inventories 
recognised as an expense during this accounting period or prior accounting periods 
in accordance with IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall calculate and output for each classification of inventories the sum of the 
ItemReversedWriteDownAmounts. [35]
27. Calculation of the carrying amount of inventories pledged as security in accordance 
with IPSAS 12.47–50
a. The system shall query the user which items of inventory have been pledged as security. [35]
b. The system shall calculate and output the sum of the ItemCarryingAmounts of all items of 
inventory items that have been pledged as security. [35]
Conclusion and outlook
The above discussion has shown that — in principle — exemplary requirements for the com-
pliance of military logistics systems can be derived from IPSAS 12–Inventories.
However, several of the found requirements such as e.g. requirement 16 Recording the 
expense account of an item of inventory directly confirm the opinion of Chan that IPSAS 
implicitly take for granted that an “accounting system with sophisticated features” has al-
ready been implemented and that such an accounting system is based both on double–entry 
book–keeping and on the IPSAS accounting equation and has inter alia a sufficiently detailed 
chart of accounts [2]. The wide–ranging requirements that hide behind these “sophisticated 
features” can be seen e.g. in the Generally Accepted Principles for IT–based Accounting 
Systems (Grundsätze ordnungsmäßiger DV–gestützter Buchführungssysteme) issued by the 
German Federal Ministry of Finance [36].
Following Grady the process of requirements integration ensures that all requirements of 
a system taken together, i.e. “the complete set of requirements” [22: 395] are reduced to the 
minimum number of requirements, complete and balanced, and are mutually consistent. [22: 
395] IPSAS 12 requirements therefore would need to be integrated with regard to require-
ments derived from other IPSASs and with requirements related to the link of the military lo-
gistics system with the accounting system used to prepare IPSAS annual financial statements. 
More likely than not the exemplary IPSAS 12 requirements proposed above need to be 
noticeably changed and/or augmented depending on the characteristics of the accounting 
system used and other factors external to the military logistics system.
From the text of IPSAS 12 it is not a straightforward move to derive concrete require-
ments for the historical data that have to be stored for an item, such as transaction history, 
which is of high relevance, e.g. for writing down the carrying amount of an item and possi-
bly reversing fully or partially this write down in later accounting periods. Additionally, the 
practical effort for storing large amounts of historical data for items with a high turnover but 
small individual carrying amount can be expected to be considerable
Another issue in which further research would be desirable would be to explore, if oth-
er ways of documenting requirements, such as using models, graphics or tables are better 
suitable for documenting IPSAS requirements than the written (narrative) requirements pro-
posed in this paper. [22: 395] 
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(Specialized) Technical and medical reconnaissance of 
disaster–affected areas 
HORNYACSEK Júlia1, ANTAL Örs
Following a disaster in the affected area secondary impacts also prevail besides 
primary ones. It is important to know these impacts because rescue operations 
should be based on them. The implementation of the activities with the aim of man-
aging the consequences is commanded and controlled by the onsite commander 
in all cases. As a leader, he makes decisions based on assessment. This method is 
appropriate if it is built on the reconnaissance information and data of the affected 
zone. Depending on the features of disasters, the most frequent reconnaissance 
methods of the disaster area are the technical and medical reconnaissance. In this 
article, the authors review the purposes, functions and correlations of these scopes 
of tasks with the decisions of the onsite commander. On the other hand, they sys-
tematize the types of technical reconnaissance and the applicable reconnaissance 
methods and tools. Furthermore, they examine the main tasks, requirements and 
elements of medical reconnaissance.
Keywords: disaster area, specialized reconnaissance, building diagnostics, cable 
search, public utilities, specialized medical reconnaissance 
Introduction
In natural and man–made disasters, it is crucial to identify the appropriate rescue tasks from 
the aspect of intervention and rescue activities, and the outcome of disasters.
The adequate reconnaissance of the disaster–affected area is essential for the thorough 
and safe response and efficient damage control. 
The former requires special expertise and tools and relates to the entire territory of the 
affected area. Following the occurrence of a disaster, response and recovery units need abun-
dant information on the needs of the disaster response forces. [13: 1] 
The primary and secondary assessment of the situation is based on the data provided by 
the reconnaissance of the disaster area; thus, it is a fundamental element of rescue operations. 
Following a widespread catastrophic incident, onsite commanders must make decisions 
based on the incoming data and information. The consequences of “hasty” or improvised 
decisions, regardless of the information collected, may be the use of an inefficient and undu-
ly expensive technique, thus causing unprecedented damages in human lives and property. 
Therefore, we may say that reconnaissance and its special type called specialized reconnais-
sance is essential in the course of recovery following a disaster. 
Due to the unexpected occurrence of disasters and the urgency of intervention, it is neces-
sary to get prepared for the reconnaissance of the areas potentially prone to disasters already 
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in the prevention period. The question arises as to how we can define disaster assessment 
(reconnaissance); which are its special forms; what the differences between technical and 
medical reconnaissance are; and how they can be related to the decisions made during the 
response activities. Hence, the functions, types, possible tools or instruments and the tech-
niques of reconnaissance procedures must be defined. In this article, the authors answer these 
questions and systematize the theoretical and practical issues of the two main forms of re-
connaissance.
1. Definition and types of reconnaissance of disaster–affected areas
The meaning of reconnaissance of areas damaged by natural or human–related disasters is 
collecting information, which delivers data on the features of the disaster area, the possible 
ways of protection, the probable consequences of the phenomenon and the possibilities of 
preventing the disaster’s escalation. The evaluation of data gained in the course of reconnais-
sance takes place according to the following:
• the evaluation of the general conditions of the disaster areas,
• the viability of the terrain and roads, assessment of the level of damages,
• the assessment of the location, the condition of shelters and the number and vulnera-
bility of persons located outdoors,
• the assessment of the condition of public utilities, and the potential consequences of 
damages occurring in the systems,
• the exploration of the sectors of the terrain contaminated by radioactive, biological or 
chemical substances,
• the determination and definition of the location of the facilities and buildings, which 
are needed to accomplish the rescue, decontamination and supply tasks,
• the assessment and forecast of the present and the expected changes in the weather 
conditions. [1]
Following the assessment and verification of the information collected, the data is sys-
tematized and prioritized by its features and importance in order to ensure the immediate pro-
visions. In the past, reconnaissance had to fulfill the requirements of continuity, up–to–date-
ness, being purposeful, timeliness, credibility flexibility and adequate detailedness. These 
requirements are valid nowadays as well, although they are supplemented by the rule of 
complexity and systems approach. 
As we can see, the efficient assessment process is an indispensable element of thorough 
planning and response. Its main functions are to help the government and defense forces 
in treating the effects of disasters. On the other hand information originated from disaster 
assessment facilitates the interoperability of the response teams. Overall, therefore results 
are intended to measure the extent and the impacts of the disaster, and the government can 
make a decision about the necessary level and requirements of response and about the needs 
of international assistance, as humanitarian intervention with urban search and rescue teams 
(USAR teams) or humanitarian aid. Internationally, the efficiency of disaster assessment of-
ten based on the combination of two components; observation and semi–structured inter-
views taking into account that representative data or information can be useful as well. There 
is a close connection between observation and visual reconnaissance, since both of them 
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are based on visual impressions besides smells and sounds. This type of disaster assessment 
often starts with a walk around the affected zone. Semi–structured interviews — held with 
local inhabitants, survivors, casualties, representatives of survivors or key officials — have 
no rigorous framework and specific protocol or order. Questions are not decided preliminary, 
thus interviewers have freedom to vary their questions to the interview context and to the 
people they are interviewing. [2]
In international interventions onsite reconnaissance inspectors usually use assessment 
checklists which help them in planning and implementing the assessment. These checklists 
include the major sectors of humanitarian activity consisting of questions that need to be ob-
served and answered in the course of reconnaissance activity. In many cases, some of the ques-
tions require specialized reconnaissance. Checklists provide data in the following fields: [2]
• nature of disaster (Table 1),
• urban search and rescue (USAR),
• shelter and personal/household items,
• health,
• water and sanitation,
• food and nutrition,
• and logistics.
Subject Indicative information
Main event. Date and time (local and UTC).
Duration.
Strength.





Flooding expected to rise/recede. 
Affected area. Name of region, province, and/or district (be aware of 
conflicting local names).
Provide GPS or other map coordinates.
Major cities/urban centres/villages.
Approximate size of affected area in square km.
Topography.
Population. Estimate total population in affected area.
Estimate percentage of affected population.
Socio–economic characteristics (rural, urban agricul-
tural, industrial, nomadic, low–income).
Table 1. Assessment checklist of nature of disaster 
(Edited by the authors) [2] 
The reconnaissance of disaster–affected areas can be grouped by its types and methods 
(Figure 1). By type we can distinguish general, specialized and particular reconnaissance. 
According to the methods of reconnaissance there are terrestrial and particular reconnais-
sance. The latter includes aquatic and aerial reconnaissance.
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General reconnaissance Specialized reconnaissance 
 
 Particular reconnaissance 
Meteorological Medical Technical  Fire safety 
Types of reconnaissance of disaster areas 
Figure 1. Types of reconnaissance of disaster areas 
Edited by the authors [3: 82] 
  Groups of reconnaissance of disaster areas 
Terrestrial reconnaissance  Particular reconnaissance 
Aquatic Aerial 
 Other particular reconnaissance 
Figure 2. Grouping of reconnaissance of disaster areas 
Edited by the authors [3: 82] 
The type of assessment of disaster areas highly influences the method of reconnaissance. 
With regard to the methods, we distinguish terrestrial, aquatic, aerial and other reconnaissance 
(Figure 2). Aquatic and aerial reconnaissance are often called particular reconnaissance. In 
the following, let us examine the features of general and specialized reconnaissance.
General reconnaissance
During general reconnaissance the main objective is to collect basic information and data on 
the stricken area. Before this, the selection of the reconnaissance area and forces as well as 
the determination of safety regulations are necessary. The information gathered (i.e. recon-
naissance data) is evaluated, reconnaissance inspectors make conclusions and forward it to 
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the so–called head of protection and the response control persons, who can make their deci-
sions on the further steps and actions necessary based on these raw data and results.
During the process of collecting information, the objective is to search for a source of 
information (a person, a facility or an object) irrelevant of the incident area. [3]
General reconnaissance is the first phase of situation assessment. In justified cases, search 
continues with the help of specialized reconnaissance. 
Specialized reconnaissance
Specialized reconnaissance becomes necessary when the results of the general reconnais-
sance are not sufficient for the performance of tasks related to mitigation and recovery of 
damages. As obtaining important information is necessary, it requires the use of special forc-
es and devices. Furthermore, specialized reconnaissance has to cover the entire territory of 
the disaster–affected area; for example, in case of damage to a chemical plant, the measure-
ment of the concentration of poisonous substances is not only carried out in the immediate 
vicinity but also extended to the vulnerable area surrounding the plant.
The special monitoring of mission areas is carried out by specialized forces using special 
vehicles and devices. [4] The authors would like to call the attention to the fact that these 
actions or interventions are system–based activities and not independent ones.
The types of specialized reconnaissance are as follows:  
• radiological, biological, chemical, 
• meteorological,
• medical,
• animal welfare and phytosanitary,
• technical, 
• and fire safety reconnaissance.
In many cases, the activities listed above are implemented simultaneously, since, de-
pending on the characteristics of a given mission area, several specialized reconnaissance 
processes may become necessary in order to be able to make right decisions later. In case of 
terrestrial reconnaissance, gathering information and the reconnaissance of the danger source 
can be performed from a fix point, by vehicle, in form of patrolling or scouting. Aquatic 
reconnaissance is usually performed by reconnaissance platoons with tools and devices ca-
pable of working under and on water. Generally speaking, their activities are as follows: 
examination of the hydrological parameters and the identification of the phenomena and 
objects that endanger the operation of facilities. In case of aerial reconnaissance, the main 
objective is to determine the extent and the expected directions of the spread of the disaster 
with the help of aircraft.
The use of this technique is significantly effective in non–approachable or hardly ap-
proachable areas and during the escalation of disasters; the information on the escalation is 
immediately needed in order to prevent secondary impacts and to protect human lives. Ex-
amining the specialized forms of reconnaissance, besides aquatic and aerial reconnaissance, 
we may also mention some other special reconnaissance techniques needed to adapt to the 
special environmental conditions of the danger source. Such activities are, for instance, cave, 
mountain or satellite reconnaissance. They can be coordinated by specially trained and pre-
pared specialists. [5]
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After the presentation of the general features, types and methods of reconnaissance of 
disaster areas, let us examine what kind of tasks have to be done during the process of re-
connaissance.
2. The scope of tasks of reconnaissance of disaster areas
The efficient and productive process of reconnaissance of disaster–affected areas consists 
of strongly correlated activities. Regarding chronology, reconnaissance operations have the 
following elements:
1.  planning, identification of the affected areas;
2.  designation of the reconnaissance observers/patrols/squads/groups;
3.  the reconnaissance itself, collecting information, measuring and recording data;
4.  the evaluation, aggregation and — if needed — verification of the information and 
data gathered. [3]
Regarding the sudden occurrence of disasters, usually there is not enough time for plan-
ning of the reconnaissance activities immediately before the response, thus these activities 
must be performed during the preparatory period. Recon forces and commanders can best 
rely on reconnaissance maps of the disaster area, because they provide extensive informa-
tion on the location of recce squads, rescue forces and significant buildings or facilities, the 
allocation of the necessary technical equipment and the possible routes of relocation in order 
to be able to determine the reconnaissance directions and routes in the most precise and ef-
fective way. [3]
To gather information — which is considered the main target of reconnaissance — spe-
cialists apply the methods and techniques of identification, observation, assessment and 
search. The implementation of these tasks can be done through target spotting or patrolling 
with the use of equipment suitable for the given circumstances. The objective of this pro-
cess is to map and ensure the requirements of the effective, successful and safe activity of 
the response teams besides protecting human lives and property. Furthermore, an absolutely 
relevant role of reconnaissance is to be able to detect the changes in the movement of the re-
sponse forces in time in order to be prepared for rapid decisions. In case of changes suddenly 
occurring, an escalation or a new hazard, the former conditions are basic requirements for a 
fast and adequate realignment of implementation. [5]
Assessing the areas damaged by disasters, it is obvious that all involve damages of med-
ical or technical nature. We can state that it is not possible to make reasonable decisions 
without collecting information on them. Therefore, in the following chapter we will analyze 
specialized technical and medical reconnaissance tasks and activities.
3. Specialized technical reconnaissance
The objectives of specialized technical reconnaissance are to provide analyzable data on the 
status, the conditions and the extent of sustained damages of buildings, infrastructural ele-
ments and the public utility system, the required number of forces to be involved, rescue and 
reconstruction efforts and the equipment needed during the response. Furthermore, during 
the process of specialized technical reconnaissance, experts analyze the ways in which build-
ings become ruined and the possibility of rescuing civilians from under the ruins, on the 
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other hand, they also estimate the possible number of people trapped under the debris and the 
chance of being alive. Prior to technical rescue and intervention, by evaluating assessment in-
formation, it is important to find out if life–threatening conditions exist, the dimensions of the 
disaster zone and the features of hazards. Furthermore, it is necessary to prioritize response 
tasks, and — if it is reasonable — to carry out simultaneous activities.
Additionally, the experts must determine the method of supporting the response forces 
and ensuring the required equipment, and they also have to confine the incident sites by des-
ignating safety boundaries and prepare for a possible evacuation. 
According to the above mentioned and based on disaster descriptions or reports, we may 
say that the two main elements of specialized technical reconnaissance are the assessment of 
the condition of buildings (generally called building diagnostics) and the localization of dam-
ages to the public utility system and the identification of the probable future consequences. 
The following chapter discusses the suitable methods.
3.1 Processes and methods of building diagnostics
Basically, the purpose of the diagnostic processes is to estimate the level of ruin of buildings 
and other structures. The aim of building diagnostics (implemented after the onsite assess-
ment), is to determine the extent of damages. During damage assessment, the correlations 
and the priority of damage phenomena can be identified. During the specialized examination 
of the building conditions, it is highly important to scrutinize the load–bearing structures and 
support beams of buildings, as these elements strongly influence the extent of damages, the 
vulnerability of human lives and the possibility of collapse. Depending on the circumstances 
and the extent of damages, the examination of structures consists of the following activities:
• visual inspection,
• detection of structural faults (damage–free or non–damaged environment),
• examination of edges and joints,
• thermo–dynamical calculations and onsite measurements in case of the shift of support 
structures, 
• examination of ceiling and roof structures. [6]
Following disaster incidents (e.g., earthquakes, gas explosions, terrorist acts, etc.), build-
ing structures are frequently distorted due to strain, sinking, cracking, heat convection and 
tear and wear of materials. To measure these changes inspectors use calipers, plumb lines, 
straight laths, and water level meters or bullets in order to determine the slope conditions. In 
case of minor mechanical damages, it is sufficient to use a wire brush, a chisel or a knife to 
diagnose damages. In case of covered structure elements, exploration procedures involving 
building demolition are carried out or thermal cameras are used.
In the following, we examine how the assessment of the conditions of the individual 
structural elements (foundations, subtractions, load–bearing structures, ceilings, etc.) can be 
carried out. [6]
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Foundation assessment
During building diagnostics, foundation assessment basically includes the creation of a crack 
image and the examination of sinking. Speaking of damages resulting from disasters, the 
above–mentioned two cases are closely related to each other, since, as we can see in the 
drawing below [Figure 3], cracks increasing the vulnerability of the building are created as 
a result of sinking. The position and the rate of sinking can be assessed by visual inspection. 
Plumb lines (in case of vertical shifts), or a strung cord, a lath, a bullet or a water level meter 
can be used for the measurements of deformations. [7: 45]
Figure 3. Rate of sinking depending on cracks [6]
If the rate of sinking and the damages of the foundation can only be determined by ground 
exploration, creating a maximum one–meter wide search pit up to the foundation plain might 
be required.
Examination of the insulation of the subtraction
The examination of the insulation of the subtraction can be implemented by the access to the 
insulation’s endings or by opening them on a short segment. Therefore, inspectors can ascer-
tain the materials and the layers of the insulation and they can make conclusions on the leak 
spots and the expected harmful impacts of the moisture on the building’s structure. In case of 
mortar plasters or cladding, the separated cover surface can be explored with a rubber mallet 
or by hand. The damage to the water insulation rarely causes direct danger to life, though 
in medium or long term they can directly contribute to the decreasing of the load–carrying 
capacity of the wall structures and to the collapse of the buildings.
The examination of the vertical load–carrying and outer wall structures 
During specialized technical reconnaissance the most important element of building diag-
nostics is the examination of the damages to the load–carrying and other wall structures that 
directly threaten the stability of the building’s structure and can cause a direct danger to life. 
In case of the compression of the wall–parts, the reduction in size is relevant, on the other 
hand, during the examination of cracks, their lengths, directions, depths and spaciousness 
are relevant. These parameters have to be determined by measuring instruments. Based on 
crack–spaciousness categories, spaciousness exceeding 15 mm can cause the slanting and 
deformation of the walls or the distortion of the structure of the ceiling. The examination of 
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vertical wall structures can be carried out using the following methods: 
• examination of deformation, whereby the changes of the wall structures are measured 
using the earlier mentioned tools: plumb lines, straight laths, strings or measuring 
tapes. The danger of collapse of the building prevails if the projection of the wall’s 
center of gravity approaches the contour of the baseline,
• examination of the damages caused by moisture, whereby the dampening of the walls 
can be measured (e.g. by tapping),
• through thermal examination, heat bridges and condensation damage caused by pre-
cipitation can be measured,
• using thermal cameras the heat radiation of surfaces can be examined by thermal maps.
The examination of ceilings
During the first phase of examination of ceilings, by virtue of visual inspection it is necessary 
to determine if the damages on the structure of the ceiling are superficial or spread over the 
load–bearing structures as well. During the examination it is absolutely important to take into 
consideration that the cracks in the monolithic reinforced concrete ceilings must not move 
deeper than the reinforcing bars. In case of structures made from wood, steel or reinforced 
concrete, small damage is enough to cause fatal damage.
The examination of ceilings can be performed the following ways:
• examination of cracks, during which it is necessary to ascertain if the direction of the 
cracks corresponds to the direction of the bridging, or is it perpendicular to it. The 
latter incurs a real danger, especially with wooden and steel beam supports, since it 
exponentially increases the risk of fractures and collapse. In reinforced concrete struc-
tures, when the thickness of cracks exceeds 0.6 mm, further examination is needed.
• examination of stability, which primarily means the checking of the joints of the sup-
port structures,
• examination of rigidness, whereby the permanent stoops of the structural elements are 
measured with respect to the limit values provided by standards,
• examination of damage caused by moisture, whereby primarily the surface damages 
caused by dampening can be measured,
• thermal examination, during which the insulation of ceilings can be tested.
Examination of facade balconies and hanging corridors
Collapse of facade balconies and hanging corridors is extremely dangerous to people who 
are located inside or next to the buildings, besides the rescue forces. Subsequently, in the 
course of building diagnostics, these structural elements must be approached with extreme 
precautions. Primarily, we have to examine the method and the level of how the walls and the 
ceilings are joined, afterwards, the examination of damage, corrosion, cracks, moisture and 
stability (which ensures the verification of the joints of support structures) can be completed 
in the way already mentioned above. In order to check the fixation of the bars and putlogs, it 
is necessary to examine the fastener elements.
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Examination of flat roofs
It is necessary to examine the flat roofs to avoid accidents. It should be done by uncovering 
the ceiling layers. This process implicates:
• checking the condition of moisture insulation, 
• examination of deflection in the case of the deformation of insulation layers, 
• measurement of slopes, 
• examination of cavities formed during the loosening of the connections of support 
structures and surface layers. 
The visual inspection of flat roofs should be extended to the lower plain of the ceiling, 
since obvious signs indicate leaks, (which highly influences stability); it can be discovered 
using this method.
After the examination of building structures, we should focus on the methods and pro-
tocols of the examination of public utility systems, which is another important activity of 
technical reconnaissance.
3.2 Augmented Situational Visualization
In many cases damage occurring in the structure of facilities can be evaluated by observing 
key differences between the augmented baseline image and the real view of the building. 
This modern way of assessment is based on Interstory Drift Ratio (IDR), which is a global 
measure that can be calculated from external building dimensions and conveniently used 
to quantify the sustained damages. Generally speaking IDR is the relative horizontal dis-
placement of two adjacent floors which can be measured by using special equipment called 
Augmented Reality (AR) see–through displays (glasses) (Figure 4) connected to a portable 
computer device. [8]
Figure 4. Augmented Reality (AR)  
see–through displays [15]
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3.3 The special technical reconnaissance of public utility systems
Before mentioning the examination of reconnaissance procedures related to public utilities, 
we have to explain the elements of public utility systems. Public utilities are the collective 
concepts of pipe and lead systems that satisfy certain service providing demands of the pop-
ulation, industry, the economy or law enforcement, etc. Amongst public utility systems we 




• sewage and rainwater drainage,
• gas supply,
• distant heating supply,
• and crude oil transport. [9]
The work aiming at the mitigation of damages to the public utility systems can be classi-
fied as a top priority response pre–task, since these can directly inhibit rescue activities and 
can create further harmful incidents. In the course of specialized reconnaissance, the evalu-
ation of the location and conditions of public utilities takes place along with the assessment 
of the consequences of damages. Furthermore, the secondary impacts, damages and charac-
teristics or the spread of the emergency can also be calculated. Following reconnaissance, the 
reconstruction of the public utility system is performed by technical rescue and special utility 
recovery units. Maps, data and site maps collected from the official registration of public 
utilities provide relevant assistance to the search activities. In order to assess and identify the 
damages to the utility system, localization and exploration of the pipelines are necessary with 
the help of instrumental observation and by opening research pits. [10]
In the following, we review the tools and equipment needed to perform the instrumental 
positioning of the underground pipeline system. [10] 
Instrumental search of underground utility systems
The materials of cables and pipelines (which have been damaged or are needed to be ex-
amined), basically determine the applied protocol used during the instrumental search. The 
ultrasonic, electromagnetic or thermal camera technology can be either used in case of me-
tallic or non–metallic pipelines. In practice, the most frequently used method is the induction 
pipeline search, whereby non–metallic pipeline need to be converted into an electrical con-
ductor, (since the very basic requirement of this method is that electricity have to flow along 
the pipelines). The method for inducting pipelines is to fix a kind of metallic wire or string 
onto the body of pipeline in order to make it a conductor.
In the following, we discuss what technical devices are needed to perform the search, 
mapping and damage localization of the pipeline system. [10]
The radio frequency wire locators are suitable to perform both localization and depth 
measurement activities. Besides identifying the location of pipeline, they can also be used for 
examining the insulation, the condition of the pipelines and the damage to the cladding. We 
distinguish active sweep devices (which are in direct contact with the metallic pipelines) and 
passive sweep devices (which can be used in case of long pipelines with high performance 
signal emitters).
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Magnetic wire locators are suitable for searching facilities containing metallic compo-
nents, since these tools sense the magnetic field of ferromagnetic substances. Magnetic loca-
tors are generally lightweight, tractable instruments equipped with LCD monitors, on which 
the signal intensity can be permanently monitored. The maximum sweep depth of a device 
depends on the type and performance, but this value is generally approximately 8 to10 meters.
Ground Penetrating Radars (GPR) consist of the following three components: a sensor, a 
built–in hard disc and an antenna suitable for the reception of the signals and for the transmis-
sion of the received signals on a specific frequency into the ground following amplification. 
Regarding the functionality of GPR, they transmit short impulses to the tested facilities and 
detect the frequency and the run–time of the reflected signals.
During reconnaissance by probe, search is carried out by moving the transmitter cable on 
the ground surface. Both the receiver and the transmitter have to be calibrated to the same 
frequency. Before searching with digital probe, the presence of interfering signals (emitted 
by nearby computers, electric devices or other electric cables, etc.) has to be checked. This 
method is also suitable for the identification of the pipelines’ location and their accurate 
depth, besides localizing the damages.
In case of non–metallic pipelines, searching is more difficult, as these public utility units 
do not conduct electrical signals used in the search process. Thus, a kind of an emitter must 
be transferred into the pipeline. The solution is a 50–meter–long search cable made of glass 
fiber (Figure 5), which is led into the pipelines by the searchers. After generating radio fre-
quency into it, the pipelines can be located with the help of suitable receivers.
 
Figure 5. Glass fiber research cable suitable  
for searching non–metallic cables [16]
Based on the above, we can say that the range of devices used for searching pipelines 
is very wide. During the design of these devices, manufacturers focus on multifunctionality 
and multiple applicability. Instrumental reconnaissance can be accomplished successfully in 
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a very short period of time by using site plans or utility system maps. Therefore, the damages 
occurring as a result of disasters can be assessed, besides locating the endangered pipelines. 
Generally, some tools and portable measuring devices are sufficient to carry out onsite inspec-
tions during the survey of buildings and public utility systems. Nevertheless, the use of many 
large and special instruments is reasonable in many cases to perform the targeted inspection.
4. Specialized medical reconnaissance
The unfortunate impact of disasters are damage, deaths, and human health impairment. The 
identification of tasks in these mission areas cannot be implemented without thorough assess-
ment. In the following, we examine the definition, purpose, types, functions and the methods 
of implementation of specialized medical reconnaissance.
4.1 The definition, purpose and function of specialized medical 
reconnaissance
Specialized medical reconnaissance is an activity that has the function to complement data 
and information (collected from the damage areas caused by disasters or other emergencies) 
with additional special and medico–epidemiological information and details.
Its function is to support the head of rescue in the identification and implementation 
of tasks related to the disaster zones. Specialized medical reconnaissance is different from 
general disaster assessment, since it is more comprehensive and complex. Therefore, due to 
its feature, this activity can only be performed by experts and groups having basic medical 
qualification. Regarding the implementation of specialized medical reconnaissance, we dis-
tinguish two basic types of activities:
• specialized medical reconnaissance performed during medico–epidemiological disas-
ters,
• specialized medical reconnaissance performed during non–medico–epidemiological 
disasters.
Assessment should give answers to the following questions:
• What is the root cause and what are the consequences and the primary and secondary 
impacts?
• What is the number of casualties and the diseased, what are the features of their inju-
ries and the expected tendencies?
• What spontaneous or organized actions have already been taken? What kind of further 
medical consequences can be predicted?
• What kind of medical supply system is operating during normal conditions in the area 
and how can it be transformed into a disaster management medical organization?
• To what an extent did the disaster affect the given system, and how can the reserves 
be activated? Furthermore, what other forces can be involved in the implementation 
of rescue activities?
The subsidiary objective of specialized medical reconnaissance is that the head of res-
cue operations must identify the range, boundaries, zones and dimensions of response ac-
tivities with a high level of professionalism and prudence, based on the incoming data and 
information. Another important role is to provide detailed information on the damage to the 
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infrastructure in order to identify how they obstruct the implementation of the medical tasks 
(damages to roads or houses, etc.).
4.2 Phases and implementation of specialized medical reconnaissance
Specialized medical reconnaissance is performed by observers, scouts, patrols or recon 
squads. They perform their tasks by observing, patrolling, searching, sampling etc. 
The main phases of the activities are:
• planning reconnaissance,
• implementing reconnaissance (collecting data and information),
• evaluating, aggregating and systemizing data,
• continuously rechecking data and processes.
The most important elements of disaster–medical specialized reconnaissance are:
• the estimated number and location of casualties,
• the identification of the types of injuries according to the following:
• by root cause (mechanical, thermal, radiation, chemical, etc.),
• by their complexity (mono–complex, poly–complex or combined),
• in case of complex injuries, the identification of the main injury,
• distribution of the severity of casualties, the proportion of children and the elderly who 
suffered injuries,
• circumstances that refer to further dangers of damage to health (e.g. the lack of hy-
giene, food and water shortage, climatic circumstances, epidemics, the condition and 
losses of local health care),
• the existence and condition of medical resources, pharmacies, storage, etc.,
• the direction of the mass flow of casualties, the possibilities of triage and collection of 
casualties,
• the possible ways of evacuation, the number of refugees, the direction of their movement,
• the condition of communal systems, the perspective hazard of undernourishment due 
to the lack of calories or protein. [11: Slide 23]
4.3 The relationship between medical reconnaissance, protection and  
rescue in the affected area
Protection and rescue are based on medical reconnaissance, as the fundamental goals of 
protection are saving human lives and property. Rescue activities are based on a series of 
decisions made by the head of rescue operations. These decisions cover the following:
• What has to be done in order to avoid the escalation of the situation?
• Which are the basic and important actions and which are the less important tasks that 
can be postponed for a short time, and finally, which are the tasks that can be delayed.
• What is the size of the affected area, where are the work sites situated and what kind 
of workplaces have to be established for the recovery of damage.
• How can the undisturbed conditions for rescue be ensured and what are the technical– 
medical and civil protection tasks that are needed to be carried out?
• What will be the direction of rescue and which are the forces and equipment that are 
needed to be put in action, furthermore, what is their location? 
• How often should the shifts take place?
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The answers to these questions are based on the data, information, evaluations and partial 
assessments provided and carried out by the assessment teams. On the other hand, according 
to this information, an overall view can be obtained of the tasks, the necessary forces and 
equipment, and other units that can be deployed. Considering these facts, the responsible 
persons can make decisions on the form, extent and elements that are needed to be activated 
and involved in medical disaster issues respecting the valid laws and hierarchy. 
The main objective of specialized medical reconnaissance is to deliver information for 
risk analysis of the affected territory before a temporary medical relief camp can be built 
on the mission area. These assessment processes require professional skills in medical and 
humanitarian affairs including international humanitarian methodologies and laws, epidemi-
ology, public health infrastructures, diseases, logistical needs etc. Furthermore, during inter-
national interventions, especially in developing countries, understanding of psychosocial and 
cross–cultural issues are absolutely relevant. Besides risk analysis, resource matrix — con-
taining human resource assignments for the medical activities — and effective cooperation 
with the local forces are important elements of medical reconnaissance. [12]
Summary
The essential conditions for efficient response in the disaster–affected areas following di-
sasters are obtaining information and collecting data, which can be performed by general or 
specialized reconnaissance units. In the latter case, the use of special recon units, equipment, 
and procedures become reasonable and have to be extended to the entire disaster area. One 
of the specific versions of specialized reconnaissance is specialized technical reconnaissance, 
whereby the survey of the condition of buildings and the survey of damage to public utility 
systems take place. Regarding civilians and rescue forces situated in the disaster–affected 
zone, the examination of the essential building structures is very important. It can be per-
formed by visual inspection or building diagnostics carried out by measuring devices.
In the course of the former method, a general status assessment can be implemented for 
a rapid situation awareness. This method does not require the detailed examination of root 
causes. To accurately identify building diagnostic data, meticulous instrumental analysis is 
needed. In this article, we have systematized these tools.
One of the most frequently occurring secondary impacts of disaster are the losses resulting 
from the damage to public utility systems. Therefore, prevention is very important, besides 
the timely localization of damage occurring to the pipelines, which can also be provided for 
in the course of specialized technical reconnaissance. It can be concluded that without spe-
cialized technical reconnaissance, the vulnerability of the rescue forces is significant, besides 
civilians, since it is indispensable that the response forces must have adequate knowledge of 
the condition of the buildings and public utilities situated in the given area.
In the mission areas (occurring as a result of disasters and other hazards), technical dam-
ages must also be taken into account besides injuries, diseases or epidemics.
As a result of medical disasters, the features of the disaster zone are identified by the 
diseases, epidemics, injuries etc. Therefore, the necessary equipment, devices, forces and 
measures can only be identified by knowing these issues. Also based on the above, it is 
obvious that nowadays and even in the future, heads of rescue operations cannot avoid spe-
cialized medical reconnaissance in order to be able to make the right decisions. In the orga-
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nizations responsible for protection, the number and the alert capability of experts, who are 
able to carry out this type of specialized reconnaissance highly influences the outcome of 
the disaster and the success or failure of the intervention. In this way, the importance of the 
reconnaissance of losses — especially medical and specialized reconnaissance — should be 
taken into account more seriously as one of the most significant tasks to be performed in the 
disaster areas.
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Introduction
Since the end of the 20th Century the role and ultimate power of states have been diminishing. 
Once, states were considered untouchable no matter what happened within their borders and 
no matter who ruled them, but nowadays, international intervention into intra–state affairs 
has become quite common. Ungoverned, undergoverned, misgoverned and contested areas 
offer fertile ground for insurgents, extremists, organized crime and warlords to flourish and 
consequently endanger not only local civilian populations but also the political, security, eco-
nomic or ideological interests of western powers. Consequently, two separate approaches to 
intra–state interventions have been developed: backing the government in their fight against 
the insurgency, such as in Afghanistan, and backing the insurgents in their fight against the 
government such as in Libya. 
First, this article will analyze the changed role of the states in the New World Order and 
define parameters that guide international interventions into the intra–state affairs. Secondly, 
it will analyze western approaches to insurgency and counter insurgency operations through 
a case study of NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya.  
     
Role and status of states in the new world order
Until two decades ago, intervention in intra–state questions and crisis would have been un-
imaginable. This was established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which upheld the right 
of sovereign states to act freely within their own borders. Additionally, it was backed up by 
1945 Charter of the United Nations article 2/7: “Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to set-
tlement under the present Charter.”[1] Despite this, and in the light of the bloody and brutal 
conflicts of the 1990s, tension rose between principles of sovereignty and intervention. This 
article will answer what has changed that gives evermore authority to the international com-
munity to intervene and support one of the opposing sides in intra–state conflicts.
The end of the Cold War and the bipolar division of the world ended the support of the 
powerful allies to the weaker African and Asian states, many of these plummeted into civil 
wars for power, justice, human rights or for resources, both deficient and abundant ones. 
1 This article is the written form of the presentation that was shown on the Central European Forum on Higher 
Military Education (CEFME) International Young Scientists Conference on December 2013, NUPS, Budapest
2 major, PhD, vzekulic@morh.hr
3 cadet
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Nathan Lauri states that intra–state crises most often rose from four structural reasons: au-
thoritarian rule, the marginalization of minorities, relative socio–economic deprivation or 
weak states. [2]
The changes that led to these circumstances did not occur overnight. They resulted from 
the versatile political and apolitical factors that happened not only in the states themselves, 
but also in their surroundings. Most analyses indicate that instability springs from the weak 
dynamics of the political processes in which expectations from state and citizens are not in 
balance. When states cannot fulfill their societies’ demands, it leads to peoples’ dissatisfac-
tion and lowering of the states’ legitimacy. The fact that the state has been dragged into crisis, 
war or a conflict means that the crucial institutions of pre–conflict power failed in the state 
management, monopoly of the use of force, sustained stable social relations, protection of 
its citizens and, in most cases, in the protection of a functional market. In order to maintain a 
stable state capable of dealing with constant changes, governments need to conduct constant 
adjustments and alignments in: [3: 6–10]  
1. Political settlements. They are used to emphasize centralization of state management 
and persuade political, industrial and military elites of the benefits of coexisting. 
Hobbes critically observed that “unity among people is not natural; it comes out of a 
contract that is artificial.”[4: 122] Political settlements fulfill needs and interests of 
individuals and groups, but the ability to form and focus them towards the greater good 
is of crucial importance for sustainability and stability of the states.
2. Survival functions. States must develop capacity in relation to: security (ability to con-
trol, if not monopolize, the use of violence); revenue (the ability to raise funds sus-
tainably, particularly through taxation) and law (the capability to rule through laws).
3. Expected functions. They are used to prove and verify legitimacy of state structures. 
They represent the minimum capacity needed for the state to exert its power over peo-
ple by satisfying their basic needs. 
Being involved in conflict or war additionally impedes the functioning of the states and 
in many cases gives room for development of new organizational forms on a sub-state level, 
new economies and new relations, loyalties and spheres of interests. According to Claire 
McIoughlin the relationship between conflict and fragility is circular: conflict is both cause 
and consequence of weak authority and state legitimacy. [5]
In attempts to deal with crisis, most states lose institutional capacity to fulfill their duties 
within executive, parliamentary or judiciary spheres. They become fragile and unresponsive. 
Fragility is not something that can be clearly defined; it varies in its content, intensity and 
capacity. Fragility has many causes — chronic and acute ones, and it leads to many conse-
quences such as poverty, vulnerability to inter and intra state conflicts, inability to deal with 
humanitarian disasters and a high risk of states’ political collapse. Governments that lack 
resources and expertise to resolve disputes and grievances and to protect their legitimacy 
to manage competition and protect the rights of citizens, enable individuals and groups to 
disrupt their governance even more and seize power by all means available and deemed 
necessary. [2]
Bloody and ruthless clashes stemming from the aforementioned fragility raise multiple 
concerns: those for human security, state and regional stability and development and eco-
nomic growth as well as a strong belief that instability and underdevelopment are mutually 
interlinked and supported. Nathan stated that “Large–scale domestic violence prevents the 
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attainment of security communities because it renders people and states insecure, generates 
uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, and creates the risk of cross–border vio-
lence.” [6] In other words, weak and fragile states can no longer “keep” their insecurity with-
in their borders, uncontrolled terrain becomes the training ground for terrorists, extremists 
and criminal groups as weapons, drugs, people and other contraband flow through the regions 
unchecked and enters rich countries of the West. This raises alarm within the international 
community and it rises to arms and gets involved in the fight. 
Insurgency vs Counterinsurgency
As stated in the previous chapter, main threats, insecurities and instabilities for the western 
powers come from weak, fragile and dysfunctional states. They are most often involved in 
some type of inner struggle, crisis or conflict. Before we can explain foreign involvement in 
the support of insurgents or the governments fighting against them, this article will define 
main principles of insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
Insurgency
NATO defines insurgency as “the actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, 
group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority 
within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence 
and subversion.” [8: 1–2] Insurgents attempt to achieve their goals through the use of various 
political and military means, applying tactics such as violence, subversion and propaganda. 
Insurgencies normally seek to achieve one of three objectives: 
1. to overthrow the existing government in order to reallocate power, 
2. to expel whom they perceive to be “outsiders” or “occupiers” or, 
3. to seek to create or maintain a region where there is little or no governmental control 
that they can exploit. [8: 2–7]
Need, will, and motivation to rebel come out of core grievances stated previously in the 
text: feelings of suppressed socio–cultural identity that is conflicting (such as the black ma-
jority against apartheid in South Africa in 1980s); religion (as was the cause of 30–years of 
rebellion of Christian blacks in the south Sudan against the ruling Arab Muslims of the north 
Sudan ending in 2010); economy; corruption and lack of essential services (such as in Egypt 
during the Arab spring movements of 2010); repression (such was in Libya under Gaddafi’s 
rule); foreign exploitation and occupation (as was the case in Vietnam during 1960–70s) etc. 
Both NATO and US counterinsurgency doctrines recognize that for both insurgents and 
governments they fight, population vulnerability is a key prize. Under the right leadership 
and ideological cloak, the population may bring prevailing victory to one side or the other. 
Thus, one of the main steps for insurgents is to convince and prove to the population that the 
ruling government is incapable of providing and securing them. In order to do this, insurgent 
organizations must create good “management” structure that is most often made up of five 
elements: leaders, guerrillas, underground, auxiliaries and mass base. [8: 3–12, 13]
Leaders provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination and organization for an insur-
gent movement. They have force of personality, the power of revolutionary ideas and person-
al charisma. There are generally three categories of leadership: single person, single group 
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or party and group of groups. One person leadership structure has one person who provides 
cohesion, motivation and direction for the insurgency. Such was Osama Bin Laden for Al–
Qaida. The insurgency may be headed by a ruling council that makes and executes policy. 
The lead group contains many leaders with different concepts of how the movement should 
be conducted or lead.  
A guerrilla does the actual fighting for the insurgency. The RAND study on trends in out-
side support for insurgency concludes that “In ideological, religious and nationalist insur-
gencies, militants risk their lives, and possibly those of their friends and families, to further 
the set of beliefs. Thus self-reliance, dedication to the struggle and self–denial are extremely 
useful qualities in rebel groups.”[9: 83] They are usually the faceless masses that execute the 
leader’s visions and ideas. 
The support can be external, internal or an underground one. It gathers active supporters 
who usually must operate secretly, especially during the preparation of the insurgency. The 
underground may spread propaganda, support sabotage, assassination and subversion, sup-
port intelligence and counterintelligence operations, run safe houses, provide transportation 
and manufacture and maintain arms and explosives. [8: 2–4] In its’ study of outside support 
for insurgent movements RAND diversified three main forms of support to rebels: critical 
ones (such as providing safe haven, transit, finances, political support and propaganda, and 
sometimes even direct military support); valuable ones (such as training, weapons and ma-
teriel); and minor forms of support (such as fighters, intelligence, organizational aid and 
inspiration). [9: 84–102] 
An auxiliary is the support element of the insurgency (usually they are children and wom-
en). They provide important logistical services safer than the underground does, and they do 
not directly participate in operations. Examples of support that auxiliaries provide include: 
storing weapons and supplies, performing courier operations, providing passive intelligence 
collection, giving early warnings of counterinsurgent movements, acquiring funds from lawful 
and unlawful sources, providing forged or stolen documents, promoting and facilitating deser-
tion of security forces, recruiting and screening new members, creating and spreading propa-
ganda, providing medical support and manufacturing and maintaining equipment. [8: 3–16]  
The mass base consists of the population of the true silent supporters of the insurgent 
movement. Leaders often recruit members of the mass base, who are actively oriented, to 
serve as auxiliaries, underground or guerrillas. 
NATO COIN doctrine identified main insurgents’ vulnerabilities that become exposed 
during their fight. [7] First among these is security. As the insurgency expands, it becomes 
harder to keep their activities, locations and key personnel a secret, which exposes their 
“flanks” to government COIN ops. There is an inherent tension between the need to grow 
popular support and the need to maintain organizational security. It directly influences where 
they wish to establish their bases of operations – further away from center would be safer but 
harder to act; however, placing them close by would increase the risk of getting discovered. 
If insurgents decide to decentralize their organization to increase safety, they face another 
set of challenges: the flow of information, resources, encouragement or directions become 
much harder. Having longer and more exposed lines of supply make them more vulnerable 
and fragile. But decreasing support could make their members feel secluded and isolated, 
which could lead to development of their own narrative, path or direction that can indicate a 
split in the insurgents’ unity of effort, leading to factionalism within the leadership.    
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NATO experts conclude that “nothing is more demoralizing for insurgents than to real-
ize that people inside their movement or trusted supporters are deserting the insurgency or 
providing information to government authorities” [8: 3–17] and this is the moment when 
counterinsurgency starts its major operations.  
Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency (COIN) encompasses all “those military, paramilitary, economic, psy-
chological and civil actions which government takes for defeating an insurgency.” [8: 3–1] 
It can be conducted by the very government facing insurgency alone or in union with the 
international community and foreign assistance. Because it needs to disrupt the operational 
tempo of the insurgents, the government needs to develop a strategic–political, operational 
and tactical dimension. Since political considerations are of much greater importance than 
military considerations in a struggle for the consent of the population, every COIN action 
should support a political resolution to the problem.
While insurgents aim to expose government’s inadequacies and falsehoods, ruling gov-
ernments need to recognize and understand the full range of insurgent actors, their motiva-
tions, aspirations, interests and relationships. As stated before, both sides fight for the incli-
nation of the population. Insurgents most often hide among the civilians: they do not carry 
visible insignia or uniforms, and can often be taken for the innocent and impartial bystanders, 
so NATO COIN doctrine stresses “it is a struggle for the population, not against the popu-
lation” even when the population turns against ruling elites. [8: 3–20] If this principle is not 
obeyed, the situation may lead to the one similar to Afghanistan where “Afghan people hate 
the Taliban, but they equally despise the government.” [10: 11] 
Additionally, NATO defines some other attributes of COIN, such as: political primacy 
(need to have a clearly–defined political objective) and relevancy of the full legitimacy of 
government as well as the need to provide security under the rule of law. It also warns that 
insurgencies are often long lasting. Some reports state that the average duration of successful 
insurgencies was 14 and unsuccessful ones 11 years, and this could not be possible without 
the ability to learn and adapt to new techniques, tactics and procedures. In order to do this, 
all operations need to be intelligence driven with a clear unity of effort, goals, visions and 
strategies. In the military spectrum of operations the first and crucial goal is to neutralize the 
insurgency by isolating them from their support. As their backing system breaks, so will the 
ability to wage operations. 
Another important military factor in COIN is the terrain. [10: 2] The nature and size 
of urban population increasingly hamper a counterinsurgent’s ability to detect and identify 
insurgents. In urban centers insurgents easily hide in masses and have increased freedom of 
movement in observing and approaching their targets. This is the reason why the two most 
deadly and violent attacks in Afghanistan during 2012–2013 were in fact in Kabul, its capital 
city, despite the extensive net of police, military and intelligence agencies available. In fact, 
the attacks were at the intelligence base and main city traffic police headquarters, the very 
institutions meant to protect the people. 5 COIN forces may have to emphasize intelligence 
and police operations to counter covert organizational, intelligence, logistic and terrorist ac-
5 From personal experience of Maj. Zekulić, serving in Afghanistan, Kabul as the member of NATO forces at 
the time of attacks. 
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tivities, and carefully plan and coordinate all operations, particularly those involving use of 
deadly force, as there is a high risk of collateral damages.
Militaries sometimes call COIN a “clear–hold–built” operation. In its full spectrum they 
combine offense operations (“Clear” meaning finding and eliminating the insurgent), de-
fense (“Hold” meaning establishing the presence and protecting the local populace) and 
stability operations (“Build” meaning rebuilding the infrastructure, increasing the legitimacy 
of the local government and bringing the rule of law to the area). [8: 3–17]
When foreign states step in the intra–state crisis they consequently became legitimate tar-
gets as well. According to the Law of armed conflict, theatre of war is any space where mili-
tary operations are prepared and executed, making the confrontation much more comparable 
to full spectrum war, then civil conflict. We saw examples of this when Islamist extremist 
conducted attacks on Madrid, London and attempted to do them in Germany and Denmark, 
as a response to their engagement in Afghanistan. On the other side, the US justified their 
raids in Pakistan by claiming that the Pakistan government was shielding and protecting the 
Taliban insurgents and Al–Qaida operatives.   
International responses to insurgency and counterinsurgency
Whether the western powers get involved in intra–state conflicts to support insurgents, or 
to support governments in their struggle against insurgency, depends on multiple factors. 
Countries that are ruled in opposition to democratic principles, who brutally suppress human 
and minority rights or who prevent fair access to natural and mineral resources, could be a 
potential target for international intervention. According to Nathan, following causes may 
trigger international intervention into intra state matters6: [11]
• Proximity, the risk of cross border violence and instability is greatest among adjacent 
countries. In case of Africa and Europe, the Mediterranean Sea is considered not as a 
buffer zone of separation, but as the mitigating and hard to control medium through 
which insecurity factors and actors may easily enter. This was one of the reasons for 
French led EU intervention in Mali in 2013.  
• Military balance of power, as the likelihood of military intervention would be smaller 
if the opposing party had significant military might that could significantly jeopar-
dize lives of NATO/EU troops. Such was the case of operation “Allied Force” against 
Serbia in 1999, when the decision was made to conduct operations only through air 
strikes, estimating that putting troops on the ground would be too risky. 
• Regional organization and norms that guide foreign policies towards protection of 
their national or international interests. In support of this aspect, we can observe ex-
tensive EU interest in security situations in Africa and the Near East, whilst NATO is 
more oriented towards controlling security and stability in Asian and Caucasus region. 
Depending on whether the preferred security status is provided by the governments in 
power (such as in Afghanistan) or by the insurgents (such as in Syria) foreign interven-
tion may occur in support of one party or the other.    
• Structural instability is the precondition for the worsening of the favorable industrial 
and economic culture in the region of interest. Intervention by EU and NATO into 
6 Other factors include: strategic culture, defensive versus offensive motivations.  [11]
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Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to fight Somali pirates was predominantly guided by 
the need to protect merchant and cargo ships, thus enabling continuation of trade and 
business.         
US National Defense Strategy, published in June 2008 clearly states that “violent extrem-
ist ideology adherents reject state sovereignty, ignore borders, and attempt to deny self–de-
termination and human dignity wherever they gain power… Combating these violent groups 
will require long–term, innovative approaches.” [12: 2]  
That is why the attention of the international community returned to Somalia after it was 
left to plummet into civil war in 1993. Although it has not had a stable central government 
since 1991, the situation in 2005 became so dire due to an increase of piracy and increase 
of terrorist attacks planned and prepared in an Al–Qaida base stationed on the Somali island 
of Eas Komoboni, that something had to be done. US, NATO and EU troops sailed the seas, 
while AU sent 1,700 Sudanese and Ugandan troops to protect the regime’s limited presence 
at Baidoa and Johwar and assisted them in fighting the Islamic extremists’ and warlords’ 
rebellions. [13: 24]   
On the other hand there are many instances when states provide direct military support 
to the insurgents, sometimes even using their own armies to fight alongside them. Without 
them, they would remain marginalized and struggle merely to survive. Such was the case in 
Congo during the first and second Congo War, or the “Great African war”. Before Laurent 
Kabila obtained the support of Rwanda and Uganda, he was a murky guerrilla leader who 
posed little danger to the regime. With their political and military support, he eventually over-
threw it and became the president. As his “friendship” with Rwanda and Uganda cooled, they 
attempted to overthrow him, and would probably have succeeded if it were not for assistance 
from seven other states: Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, Sudan and Namibia. [14]            
We discussed earlier general concepts behind the term insurgency and counterinsurgen-
cy, but different nations and organizations use different terms to explain and justify their 
engagement in intra–state conflicts. For example, the US military doctrines use the term For-
eign Internal Defense (FID) and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). Both concepts 
encompass actions by “civilian and military agencies of one government in programs taken 
by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and in-
surgency.” [15] FID can also be defined as an effort that involves numerous US Government 
agencies where they are all working together to eliminate the root causes of an insurgency 
in certain areas. The US Special Forces’ doctrine also states that “FID also supports stability 
operations designed to promote and protect US national interests by influencing adversarial, 
political, and information operational variables in a region or country…” [16]
Nevertheless, international intervention will most likely occur where there is a case of 
grave violation of human rights or threat of massive violence overflow in the region. In such 
circumstances, western powers might initiate humanitarian intervention operations. 
Humanitarian intervention
UN Charter and Law of War emphasize the principle of nonintervention and forbid aggres-
sion, in case of crises and conflicts that can occur within a State. But the 1990s brought the 
so-called, “CNN effect” that forced people to face humanitarian catastrophes and killing of 
civilians from the comforts of their own homes. These images activated the collective con-
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science of the population that pressed their political leaders to react. On the eve of the NATO 
campaign in Kosovo in 1999, Tony Blair became one of the first world leaders to assert a 
moral right to “get actively involved in other people’s conflicts” even without the mandating 
resolution of the UN Security Council. He stated the need to wage a “just war, based not on 
territorial ambitions, but on values.” [17] 
Slowly, a concept was forming that it is a moral duty of the international community to 
intervene and protect civilians from governments that cannot or will not do it themselves, 
implying that saving human lives could in some circumstances override sovereignty of the 
states. That is why humanitarian intervention at its core carries the UN principle of “The 
responsibility to protect – R2P.”7 By 2005, the UN World Summit confirmed the final “Out-
come Document” that legalized the possibility to conduct humanitarian intervention in cases 
of proven genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity.
Some politicians believe that to “Accept the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would 
mean the endangerment of the concept of independence and nonintervention in a world that 
reached no agreement on which moral postulates should actually guide humanitarian inter-
vention.” [18: 21] Any intervention, even the humanitarian one, contains in its nature forceful 
interaction in the affairs placed within the authority of another state. They claim that each 
state has a right to their own political independence, organization, traditional and cultural 
principles that can be different from American or West European, and that there are small 
chances for success of such operations when meddling into inner relations they know little 
or nothing about. Reasons against also include: questionable motives for intervention, resis-
tance of different groups including the leading one in the area of intervention and also the 
simple fact that foreign actors cannot secure long term stability for any state unless there is 
motivation for change within. [19] 
The positive side to this concept is that interference is focused on protection and well-be-
ing of the civilians. Supporters of the humanitarian intervention often emphasize the moral 
need to protect interests of all people, the right to fight for universal human good, for basic 
freedoms in each country and obligation to respect the interests and needs of civilians. If 
governments refuse or are incapable of doing this, then the foreign actors (international com-
munity) are forced to act. 
Humanitarian intervention bases its legitimacy on the obligation to protect basic human 
rights, but it can only be validated if this action in not unilateral but authorized by a multilat-
eral, internationally validated body and that action, as such, should be transparent, controlled 
and clearly focused on the main aim of the intervention. 
Case studies
Crises most often arise when states lack popular legitimacy, either because they are wholly 
authoritarian (case of Libya in 2010), are under minority rule (case of Rwanda in 1994) or 
because they exclude ethnic minorities from full participation in a democratic political sys-
7 In 2001 Canada had set up an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, under 
the chairmanship of Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister, and Mohamed Sahnoun, a 
former Algerian diplomat. In their report, published in 2001, it was they who first suggested changing the 
discretionary “right to intervene” into a more muscular “responsibility to protect”. Available at http://www.
economist.com/node/11376531
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tem (case of Mali in 2011). Similarly, Nathan says: “Put differently, the absence of justice is 
frequently the principal reason for the absence of peace.” [2] Oppressed and marginalized 
communities may seek to resolve the crisis through armed rebellion. Hostilities are likely to 
be intense and sustained because the stakes are so high.
Insurgents may prize freedom and justice more than peace. They may consequently be 
prepared to provoke and endure prolonged physical and political violence in order to achieve 
their goals. Quick peace settlements predominantly serve the interests of the ruling elite and 
its foreign sponsors, who wish to prove that they can maintain control over the country and 
that they possess the ability to suppress any violence or upheaval. In these circumstances, 
the cessation of hostilities is not in the interests of rebels as they need time to prove their 
strength, ability to challenge and disrupt ruling governance. 
This article analyzes reasons and two different approaches of the international commu-
nity to intra–state conflicts: support for the Afghan Government in its struggle against the 
Taliban insurgency, and on the opposite spectrum, support for Libyan insurgents in their fight 
against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi.  
Support for counterinsurgency: Case study Afghanistan 
To be able to fully understand the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, it is vital to be 
acquainted with the history of insurgency itself in this particular area. After the “Saur rev-
olution” in 1978, a communist party named the “People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
— PDPA” formed a new government with Nur Muhammad Taraki as the Head of the State. 
However, the deeply conservative and religious population did not respond favorably to the 
implementing of the socialist agenda by the PDPA, and by the spring of 1979 large parts of 
the country started an open rebellion against the government. After a year, it became clear 
that the government was not able to regain control and territorial integrity. Therefore, after 
he assassinated president Taraki, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin requested Soviet 
military assistance. Although the USSR at first declined military intervention, it could not 
allow such an insecure environment at its border, and on Christmas Eve the Soviets launched 
the invasion, seizing key airfields and key government and communications sites in Kabul, 
occupying main cities and installing a puppet regime.8 
The Soviets expected the resistance and war to end here but it was only the beginning. 
The Soviet army was not prepared for this kind of warfare as they were trained to wage wars 
on European plains, not in the mountains. They were forced to employ new techniques and 
strategies for fighting the Mujahedeen, the Afghan freedom fighters who came from a tra-
ditional warrior society and proved highly resourceful in fighting the Soviets. Although the 
Soviets were winning the battles, they were losing the war because the Mujahedeen were not 
willing to confront them on the open battlefield. They would simply come back and reestab-
lish control over the area when the Soviet forces left. It was a stalemate where insurgents 
controlled the countryside and the Soviets controlled the cities. 
Mujahedeen morale was higher, and with the help of foreign aid in weaponry, estimated 
to be worth $66 billion from 1978–1992 [20: 238], they had significant efficiency. Another 
8 New president was Babrak Kamal, former diplomat in exile, as the President. In the process they killed 
Hafizullah Amin, accusing him of being a brutal power–hungry leader who betrayed the Saur revolution and 
accusing him of being an American sympathizer or even a CIA agent.
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advantage was the support of Afghan Islamists by Pakistan, where the Mujahedeen could 
find new recruits and shelter. The new “Gorbachev foreign policy”,9 along with the inability 
to control the Afghan countryside, was one of the many reasons for the Soviets’ withdrawal. 
The plan was to prepare the Afghan army to fight without Soviet help and the withdrawal was 
finished by the beginning of 1989. 
The Soviet withdrawal left Afghanistan in a collapsed state, which resulted in civil war. 
In 1992 major Afghan political parties agreed on power–sharing and establishing an interim 
government for a transitional period until the general elections. However, a significant group 
made of mostly ethnic Pashtu was regrouping in Kandahar. They were calling themselves 
the Taliban, which meant “students” or “seekers”. They started to attract fresh recruits from 
religious seminaries with excessive funding by Pakistan’s Inter–Services Intelligence in Fed-
erally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan – FATA and Waziristan, which was an effort to 
expand Pakistan’s sphere of influence into Afghanistan with the help of the so–called proxy 
warriors.10 After a few years of sporadic fighting, the Taliban entered Kabul in 1996, and 
established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. [21] By the end of 2000, the Taliban seized 
control of 90% of the country, imposing a strict interpretation of Sharia law. The only opposi-
tion, named Northern Alliance, was formed in the north of the country under the leadership of 
later assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud. The assassination was conducted by the Al–Qaida 
operatives in return for allowing Afghanistan to become safe haven for shelter and training 
camps of Al–Qaida operations.  
On 11th September 2001, Al–Qaida members attacked the United States on their own 
territory killing more than 5,000 people. This was a turning point in NATO strategy toward 
insurgents and global terrorism, for the first time in history Article 5 of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty was activated and Operation Enduring Freedom was launched. A wartime–like 
coalition was put together with over thirty countries which provided logistical, financial, 
diplomatic and political support. Military operations began on October 7, 2001 and within 
75 days American coalition and anti–Taliban Afghan forces defeated and chased the Taliban, 
Al–Qaida and Pakistani insurgents into Pakistan. US officials claimed that “The Taliban is 
out of business, permanently”11 but they were deceived. 
Again, the same scenario as with the Soviets happened. The coalition had achieved a mil-
itary victory but an effective long term policy was not present. Taliban found sanctuaries in 
Pakistan and in the vast lands of their hometown, Kandahar, where they could retrain new re-
cruits and prepare for a new phase of war. The Pakistani government could also wage another 
proxy war, this time against Coalition troops and president Karzai, who was in a way installed 
by the US. 12 [22: 288] On the other side, Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA) was facing 
the task of rebuilding the country from ashes and almost no security forces at all to rely on.
9 Easing of Cold War tensions
10 proxy war n. — a war instigated by a major power which does not itself become involved — Oxford dictionary
11 Taliban destroyed, says Cheney (18.11.2013) accessed at http://hindu.com/2002/03/14/
stories/2002031406201400.htm
12 Fight against the Taliban could not be waged in Pakistan. Exceptions are isolated and covert operations that 
target individuals, like the assassination of Osama bin Laden, which crippled the Al–Qaida leadership, but 
also in a way embarrassed the Pakistani Government, weakened the Coalition capacity for negotiation, which 
is an extremely important issue, simply because Pakistan still sees the Taliban as a valuable asset in bringing 
Afghanistan into its sphere of influence, and the US–led Coalition’s primary goal in this matter should be to 
cut all links between the Taliban and Pakistani army. Estimates are that between 1994 and 1999, 80,000 to 
100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan. [22]
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To assist them with this challenge and assure that the Taliban regime did not return to 
power, the international community stepped in, and at the beginning of 2002, in accordance 
with UN Security Council Resolution 1386 established the International Security Assistant 
Force — ISAF. While troops assigned to operation “Enduring Freedom” were still fighting 
the pockets of Taliban resistance, ISAF’s main role was securing Kabul and the surrounding 
areas, acting as military support for the Government and the creation of Afghan National 
Security Forces. 
By 2006, it became obvious that the NATO strategy for securing and stabilizing Afghan-
istan was not working. As the attacks on NATO and Afghan Security Forces (AFS) troops 
drastically increased, it became obvious that the Taliban were not defeated, they had re-
grouped, rearmed and were ready to fight for power and territory once again.13 This time they 
were backed up by allies from Hezb–i–Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters from 
Pakistan, local tribes that had rejected the Karzai rule and criminal organizations involved in 
opium production and trade. Counterinsurgency operations had to be initiated. 
As the local Security Forces and Government were still too weak, US forces assumed the 
leading role in COIN. 
The first COIN strategy was not as effective as the international community hoped it 
to be. One of the main reasons was that the majority of the Afghan population live in the 
countryside, where central governance from Kabul has a weak and almost invisible reach. 
The occasional flood of foreign soldiers, concentrated in small Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs), into neighboring villages, just to pull back behind walls hours or days later, 
triggered additional dissatisfaction, frustration and unrest among the population. Any aid 
or help brought to them in attempts to “win hearts and minds” just triggered the insurgents’ 
rage, and they would reappear as soon as foreign troops left. These troops and efforts were 
seen as occupying, exploiting and hostile. Thus, the number of Alliance casualties constantly 
increased and by 2009 doubled in numbers. COIN strategy had to be changed. 
Based on the analysis of 90 insurgencies since 1945, Seth Jones wrote in his study “Coun-
terinsurgency in Afghanistan” that there are “three variables correlated with the success (and 
failure) of counterinsurgency efforts: capability of indigenous security forces (especially po-
lice), local governance and external support for insurgents including sanctuary.” [23] This 
and the arrival of former US Special Forces General Stanley A. McChrystal and Iraq Veteran 
General David H. Petraeus, as consecutive ISAF commanders, changed the operational design 
and dynamics of the second Afghanistan COIN. Foreign military troops pulled back and local 
Security Forces and Government officials pushed front, still backed and supported by ISAF.   
Their plan was to activate COIN in two separate directions. The first, “population–
centric” strategy emphasized the need to satisfy economic, social and political grievances 
through three COIN “lines of operations” — security project, governance, and development. 
Security and governance could be improved by short–term projects, even without any long–
term policy. The idea assumes that development aid will promote local stability and win 
political support. 
The second strategy was to continue training and equipping ASF, but now through a con-
cept called “embedded partnership”. In its core was the idea to rapidly bring ASF to a phase 
where they would conduct their tasks, missions and operations independently, but according 
13 http://icasualties.org/oef/ accessed on 15 November 2013
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to western standards. This was to be done by embedding NATO troops into Afghan Security 
Forces. They were not just training together, but also living, sleeping, eating and fighting 
together. Slowly, NATO troops pulled out leaving COIN with a fully “Afghan face” and full 
local ownership. 
However, 4 years into second COIN, billions of dollars invested in the country have done 
little to increase the population’s support for the Afghan Government or support against the 
Taliban, and the fact is that the most stable areas are the ones that have not received any aid 
or received a small share of it. The main reason is the flourishing corruption in the Afghan 
Government in certain areas, combined with opium production and involvement in local 
power struggles, which is a sign of inefficient Government apparatus.   
On the military end, two problems occurred: The ASF troops started acting and fighting as 
the NATO troops, they were no longer deemed local, but seen as an extended hand of the “oc-
cupying force”. Constant home searches were viewed as attacks on family honor, and some 
incidents by Coalition soldiers have damaged the relations between the domicile population 
and Coalition forces and/or Afghan officials. Another gap opened as the exit strategy of Co-
alition forces was developed. After the 2014 transition, Afghan military and police, although 
well trained and impressively equipped may have problems effectively fighting the Taliban, 
and even more sustaining and maintaining the complex bases, facilities and equipment they 
were given. In these circumstances, the withdrawal of Western forces could lead to a collapse 
of the entire security sector. 
As an answer to that, president Karzai attempted reconciliation with the Taliban, and ne-
gotiations are still in progress. The Taliban are not fighting to be accommodated but to bring 
the State down or at least gain their own autonomy in the south and east of the country. [24] 
The coalition has started its military withdrawal, but without any doubt, for the past 11 years 
it has actively supported and backed the Afghan Government in its fight against insurgency.  
Support for insurgency: Case study Libya
When, on 15 February 2011, Muammar Gaddafi’s security forces opened fire on protesters 
inspired by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, a seed, which would eventually end Colonel’s 
forty year long career as an autocrat in Libya, was planted. Protests began in the eastern city 
of Benghazi, controlled by the Gaddafi opposition and some defected military units, and 
slowly spread across the country. In the area where the fighting was intense, reports claimed 
that the Government was using firearms and even heavy artillery and cluster bombs against 
protesters in civilian areas. The international community condemned that kind of action and 
responded accordingly. 
The first international measure came on 26 February 2011, when the UN Security Council 
adopted resolution no. 1970 that imposed an arms embargo, travel ban for members of the 
Gaddafi regime and an asset freeze. It also referred the actions of the Government to the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation. However, Gaddafi ignored the measures 
and launched a counterattack pushing the rebels back and approached Benghazi and Misrata, 
which, on 17th March 2011, triggered the second UN resolution no. 1973 imposing a no–fly 
zone over Libya and authorizing “to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including 
Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
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territory.” [25] Immediately, the Libyan Government announced a ceasefire, but neverthe-
less continued with the shelling of rebel–controlled cities and regime soldiers continued ap-
proaching Benghazi. 
Because of that, some of the European members of NATO, backed by partner countries of 
the Arab League,14 decided to launch operations in support of UN SC resolutions. The United 
Kingdom initiated operation “Ellamy”, France operation “Harmattan” and the US launched 
the military operation “Odyssey Dawn”. At the same time, NATO was preparing for its mis-
sion, and on 23rd March 2011, operation “Unified Protector” absorbed all other international 
operations in Libya. After the command transfer, three tasks were initiated:  
Policing the arms embargo. Even before the uprisings, Gaddafi feared a military coup so 
he kept regular military units poorly armed, with just four brigades of highly equipped and 
trained soldiers. Therefore, NATO ships performed a maritime blockade with the mission to 
monitor, report and interdict vessels suspected of carrying arms or mercenaries, however, 
NATO ships did not enter Libyan territorial waters. 
Patrolling the no fly–zone. It was successfully conducted after initial strikes had destroyed 
all Government air defense capabilities. The few Ally losses were mainly due to mechanical 
malfunctions. 
Protecting the civilians. The only way to protect civilians was through air strikes on 
Gaddafi’s ground forces, but the problem was the proximity of the regime’s forces and other 
assets to civilian infrastructures with reported use of human shields by forces loyal to the 
regime.15 Similarly, insurgents also used civilians for refuge, resupply and shield.   
By August 2011 rebels rallied under the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) 
became internationally recognized as the legitimate governing authority in Libya. The ICC 
issued an arrest warrant for Gaddafi and his closest associates for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. After a certain stalemate, with the help of NATO–led aerial intervention, 
opposition launched attacks on Tripoli and Gaddafi’s hometown Sirt, and eventually over-
powered forces loyal to the regime and captured these cities. Two months later, NTC secured 
control over the whole of Libya and Operation Unified Protector ended on October 31, 222 
days after it had begun. 
It can be concluded that NATO’s involvement in the conflict was in fact in support of 
the rebels as it played a crucial role in the rebels’ campaign to overthrow the regime.16 The 
fact that the rebels were recognized as the legitimate representative of Libya and the fact the 
NATO bombed Gaddafi’s residence only corroborated that NATO and the West would settle 
for a regime change. Because of that, some claim NATO went beyond its limits, as provision 
of military assets to the rebels was not part of adopted UN resolutions. Nevertheless, NATO 
stayed within the limits of the mandate, as the mission was solely airborne and many civilian 
lives were saved.17
14 Qatar, Jordan, Morocco and UAE
15 Mission aborted on orders of SAS: RAF attack is halted after troops spot human shields (20 11 2013) from  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1368626/Libya-RAF-abort-attack-SAS-spot-Gaddafi-using-human-
shields.html
16 NATO has “played a decisive role” in Libya (20 11 2013) from http://www.dw.de/nato-has-played-a-decisive-
role-in-libya/a-15346089-1
17 French Air Force itself launched over 4,500 flying missions and hit around 2 500 military targets. The French 
airmen continue their mission in Tripoli (20 11 2013) from http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/
les-aviateurs-francais-poursuivent-leurs-missions-sur-tripoli-22-08-2011-1365090_53.php 
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Conclusion
Internal conflicts, whether instigated by the government or the insurgents, generate tension 
and mistrust between states and in the region, in ways that prevent them from attaining mutu-
al confidence, stability and security needed to create and maintain a healthy, functioning and 
prospering community. Cross–border violence, hostilities, rebel attacks from neighboring 
countries, military action by governments against rebel movements, or collective enforce-
ment action intended to restore domestic order are just some of the consequences of uncon-
tained conflicts. 
Weak and fragile states are incapable of restraining instabilities and crisis within, thus 
forcing the international community to “step in” and take charge in separating opposing 
sides, negotiating peace settlements and reestablishing a stable environment. Whether this is 
done with or without support of the ruling elites is far less important than the international 
security, safety of the local population and regional political and economic stability.  
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Military symbology and schemes of battalion task 
force in selected tactical activities  
(Learning tool)1
Marek PANÁK2, Jiří ČERNÝ3
This paper deals with the use of military symbology in accordance with the current 
standard of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) APP–6C from 2012. It 
analyses the current state of the topic, especially the available resources dedicated to 
military symbology and schemes of tactical activities of units. The paper defines the 
procedures and principles in creating tactical symbols and principles for their use in 
tactical situations. One of the annexes of is an overview of the most common tactical 
symbols, which provides a standardized, structured set of graphic symbols identify-
ing the most common units, equipment, lines, areas and maneuvers with respect to 
the current state of the Army of the Czech Republic. This examination also provides 
the user, through the presentation of MS Office, a comprehensive overview of tactical 
symbols, as well as short instructions for their use. These symbols can also be re-
moved from the presentation and can be used by the user as the necessary basis for 
creating one’s own diagrams of tactical situations. The next part of this thesis deals 
with the design of new variants of schemes selected for use in tactical operations of a 
battalion task force. This schema set is available to the user as well in a presentation 
of MS Office. Individual schemes are drawn to ensure the required clarity and so this 
presentation can be used for teaching and by students. This work is a learning tool 
which can be used by students of The University of Defense especially in subjects 
like Tactics of Units and Tactics of Formations and, other fields of study as well as in 
military practices of the units of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR).
Keywords: Military symbology, schemes, battalion task force, schema set, princi-
ples in creating tactical symbols, use of tactical symbols, NATO joint symbology, 
APP–6C, learning tool.
Introduction
The basic purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of the knowledge of creation 
and use of military symbology in the current operating environment. 
It is not intended to provide an exhaustive treatise on the issue of military symbology. The 
aim is primarily to acquaint the reader with the issue of military symbology under a general 
framework and with available documents dealing with military symbology.
1 This article is the written form of the presentation that was shown on the Central European Forum on Higher 
Military Education (CEFME) International Young Scientists Conference on December 2013, NUPS, Budapest
2 Sergeant BSc
3 Lieutenant Colonel, engineer, Ph.D.
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The most important part of this work is to create a file of the most common site of mili-
tary symbols, which will serve both for teaching, as well as a database usable when creating 
custom schemas of tactical situations. The other part is an album of schemas of battalion task 
forces in selected tactical activities.
The work itself and its annexes should serve students and teachers as support for teaching 
at the University of Defense and also as an aid for the improvement of individual training in 
the ACR.
Definition of basic terminology
Interoperability is the ability to act in a coordinated way, to effectively and efficiently achieve 
Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives. [3] 
Unit is a military element whose structure provides for the responsibility of the parent 
folder. [1] 
Maneuver is the evolution of the troops on the battlefield with the use of movement in 
conjunction with fire or firepower to achieve the advantages over the enemy in order to meet 
the stated purpose. [1] 
Maneuver defense is a way of keeping the defense consisting of a combination of ac-
tive offensive operations for troops with a temporary obstruction prepared status (favorable 
lines). [1] 
Multinational operation is an operation carried out by the forces of two or more cooper-
ating States. [1]
The defense is a basic, but not the decisive nature of the struggle led, in order to repel or 
thwart the attack of the enemy in a specified area and time, inflicting losses, maintain im-
portant premises, preserve strength and resources, and thus create the conditions for its own 
activity. [1] 
Operation represents the military activity or the implementation of the military strategic, 
tactical, training, administrative task or the provision of assistance, the process of warfare, 
including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuver, which are necessary for the 
achievement of the objectives of any battle or campaign. [1] 
Operating procedures are detailed methods, with the help of which the headquarters and 
units perform their operational tasks. [3] 
Operating environment consists of a summary of the conditions, circumstances and influ-
ences that have an impact on the use of skills and decision–making. [4]
Positional defense is the kind of defense that most defense forces deploy in a selected 
policy area where there will be a decisive battle. It relies mainly on the ability of the forces in 
the defensive area to keep biased position and checks the terrain between them. Backups are 
used to increase the depth, to block, or for the renewal of fighting position to counterattack. [1] 
Graphical symbol is a graphical shape that is used to display the operational and tactical 
situations, the stationing of troops, equipment, weapons, and objects on a map, the schema 
(sketch), screen or projection devices, and is complemented by numerical and text descrip-
tion. [5] 
Task force is a temporary grouping of units under the command of the designated Com-
mander, created for the purpose of carrying out certain operations or to meet a specific task. [1]
Marek PANÁK, Jiří ČERNÝ: Military symbology and schemes of battalion task force…
AARMS (13) 1 (2014) 201
Attack is a kind of battle, which is crucial in order to achieve victory. The attack consists 
in the destruction of the enemy, in his report, the breakdown of the procedure in their own 
troops into its depth with the use of fire and maneuver. [1]
Attack from direct contact normally starts after the rearrangement or replacement of units 
in contact with the enemy. Usually requires the implementation of realignment and rotation, 
including ensuring confidentiality of the activities before the enemy. [1] 
Attack after moving from a depth usually takes place from the default, or other area, gen-
erally outside the range of the artillery of the enemy. The default space for an attack battalion 
occupies in the report of the Brigade (the parent). [1]
Analysis of current situation
The first chapter is devoted to the definition of the basic concepts contained in this work, and 
describes the current state of the solved problems in the environment of the ACR. In particu-
lar, it deals with the analysis of the available literature and its timeliness in comparison with 
the latest NATO standard APP-6c (Joint Symbology). In addition, this section deals with the 
analysis of the specific graphical symbols and principles for their use. The last part of the first 
chapter is an analytical description of the use and nature of graphical symbols.
Analysis of the available literature
As has already been mentioned above, this section deals with the analysis of the available 
NATO and national military documents, especially the literature dedicated to the issue of 
graphical symbols. The basic and fundamental document for the design issue is the Alliance 
document APP–6 published in May 2011. This publication provides the user with all the mil-
itary vital information about graphical symbols. In the introduction it describes the dividing 
of graphical symbols on land, air, maritime (surface, beneath the surface) and the space units. 
Furthermore, there is a defined division of the graphical symbols that are used to display 
weapons, material, vehicles and equipment. Graphical symbols show friendly units, units of 
the enemy, neutral and unknown forces.
After this initial division into individual categories, this Alliance publication also deals 
with their creation and use, in particular the principle of locating and describing each of the 
symbols with the appropriate default defined fields. This publication is not trying to create a 
database of all graphical symbols, as in the case of the previous document APP–6A (1999). 
There are more displayed individual icons forming the symbol and it is always shown as an 
example, the description of their location.
The following figure shows an example: Here is the icon depicting the mortar, it also 
shows the fields in the frame of its own symbol, where you can place this icon, and last but 
not least there is a specific example of use, in this case the unit towed mortars.
Figure 1. Example of icon and default fields (APP–6C)
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A custom document is very easy to understand, thanks to this structure, and at the same 
time very versatile and usable. The user does not have to pick a symbol from a prebuilt data-
base, it presents individual icons from which the symbol consists and introduces the princi-
ples of their placement to the user.
The publication also describes the symbols for the coordination of the activities of the 
units, such as: lines and interfaces, maneuvers, command and control, fires ... etc. The last 
part the document also contains meteorological symbols. The document is currently not 
available in Czech translation.
Literature, dedicated to the military symbology in the ACR is mainly the publication 
Pub–53–01–4 Štábní práce v operacích – 3. část of the year 2009, which is based on docu-
ment APP–6B, from 2008. This publication also provides instructions on how to form graph-
ical symbols and how to work with them. Symbols are represented, rather, in the form of a 
database, and as already mentioned, the publication is based on an old document APP–6B, 
and therefore some of the symbols are no longer valid.
The last comprehensive document, which deals with the principles of military symbol-
ogy, is a handbook Situační značky (2005) and is based on the original document APP–6A. 
This handbook offers a very brief form on the principles of making and use of the symbols. 
Again, these are rather a small database of specific symbols and a description of the basic 
principles. As has been already mentioned, the publication is based on the original standard 
APP–6A, and thus most symbols do not agree with the current guidelines for creating them.
In the environment of the ACR, there are also other documents devoted to military sym-
bology but these do not address the complex issues, but rather deal with them only marginally 
depending on the specialization of the publication. These are for example the three publica-
tions: Tactics of the Squad (Platoon, Company).
Use and creation of military symbology
In the current multinational operational environment, the emphasis is placed primarily on the 
interoperability in the area of command and control. This means accurate and unambiguous 
representation of an operational (tactical) situation, which is an important decisive factor in 
the process of command and control in the operation. In the common operating environment 
it is then absolutely necessary to find a common language that will be easy to understand 
by all actors in an operating environment. An essential part of this language is a graphical 
representation of the markup and symbols, which can transmit information faster and more 
efficiently than a lengthy verbal description. In this, the analysis confirmed opinion is the 
nature of military symbology existence. As mentioned above, the present document, which 
deals with the issue of military symbology, is APP–6C. This document is currently used by 
all members of NATO.
Graphical symbols represent the units, equipment, vehicles and other elements related 
to activities in the operating environment. The symbol is formed from the frame, the main 
character (icon), color fill, and other ancillary data and symbols are placed in the appropriate 
fields.
Using the frame, we define the identification of a unit, or an object that is represented by 
the symbol. Using the shape of the frame we also divide units on land, air, maritime (surface, 
beneath the surface) and the space units, equipment, facilities, and activities. The main icon 
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is placed in the middle of the brand and represents the image of the unit, equipment, facility, 
or activity. Some of the icons, for example, technique, or weapons may be used without the 
frame, these are further defined in the APP–6C. Sectorial icons 1 and 2 are located above and 
below the main icon in the area, its Octagon, which is used for the layout of the individual 
icons within frame signs.4
Full–frame icons are a special kind of main icon, which go beyond the boundary of the 
octagon and occupy the entire frame of the symbol. For example, the symbol for recogni-
sance unit. (Figure 2)
Figure 2.  
Recognisance unit (own source)
Additional information is located outside the frame in the appropriate fields. (Figure 3)
Figure 3. The label field of the symbol (APP-6c)
The symbols indicating the points, lines, areas, and tactical activities is governed by its 
own rules for label placement and display fields that vary according to the type and purpose 
of the symbol. As regards the displaying, you can draw the following symbols in either black 
or white (depending on the background), or color. Color can be used for own forces – blue, 
red for enemy, green for the obstacles, and yellow for the chemically contaminated areas.
The following illustration shows the fill and border colors that are used for creating 
graphical symbols. The use of color varies according to the method of view. The 3 number 
sequence shows the designation of the appropriate color in the RGB–model. (Figure 4)
4 A detailed description of the purpose of each of the icons, including the so–called, Full–frame icons are part 
of the annex to this work — presentation Tactical symbols. The use of color, display options, and also the 
detailed description of all label fields is also clarified.
204 AARMS (13) 1 (2014)
Marek PANÁK, Jiří ČERNÝ: Military symbology and schemes of battalion task force…
Figure 4. RGB model (APP–6C)
Partial conclusion
In the part of analysis, dedicated to the available resources on the field of military symbology, 
this work came to the conclusion that at the present time in the environment of the ACR there 
is only one current document — APP–6C, which, however, is still not available in Czech 
translation.
The objectives
Analyze the current situation of the use of military symbology in the environment of ACR, in 
regards to the available documents, evaluate the importance of the use of military symbology 
in the current operating environment, create the database of most used graphical symbols, 
which will also be a description of the principles for their use, 
Create an album of schemes for the battalion task force in the selected tactical activities.
Restrictions
In this work I restrict, on the basis of interviews with educators from the Faculty of Eco-
nomics and Management (FEM) (K–110 K–108 and K–107), to the development of the most 
frequented graphical symbols at the University of Defense.
Used methods of examination 
In this work the following methods have been used to explore:
• Analysis — the basic method that was used in the analysis of available materials in 
ACR and Alliance materials dedicated to military symbology.
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• Synthesis — through the combination of individual knowledge, which has been ob-
tained by analyzing the available resources in a coherent framework, comes the idea 
of the content of the work. 
• Comparison — this method was used, especially in the parts of the description of the 
differences between the documents dedicated to the subject. 
• Induction — induction was achieved by the transfer of knowledge within the general 
framework. 
• Deduction — method, which helped in the application of general knowledge.
Introduction to military symbology
As mentioned in the introduction to this work, we can characterize the direction of contem-
porary operations. We talk about joint multinational operations carried out within the frame-
work of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and in the framework of the European 
Union Battle–groups (EUBG). For the successful conduct of such operations, it is essential 
to establish a common operational language, as a means of communication, which is used 
by all interested nations. It is necessary to the established uniform standards for all NATO 
joint actions. In contemporary operations interoperability plays an important role — that is 
the required knowledge of common operating procedures and symbolism. This symbolism, 
also known as military symbology, provides us a universal tool for description of tactical 
situations and operating tasks without the need for lengthy verbal description. Also there are 
no more language barriers. Knowledge of tactical symbols is in a contemporary operating 
environment is absolutely necessary. Consequently, it is necessary to reflect these claims into 
the preparation of the individual in the ACR, and also into the preparation of students in the 
University of Defense.
The key objective of this work is creation of the study material that will provide the user 
an overview of the most commonly used symbols, with regard to the current state of the 
Army of the Czech Republic. In the next section is an album of schemes of selected tactical 
activities for battalion task force.
Selected tactical symbols
As mentioned above, this file provides the user with a form of presentation of MS Office a 
comprehensive overview of most commonly used symbols, as well as a brief guide to using 
them. These symbols can be removed from the presentation and can be used by the user as 
needed, for example for creating custom schemas of tactical situations. Symbols are placed 
in MS PowerPoint presentation and are also supplemented by the description of fields and 
represented by a variant of use of the individual symbols. 
Album of schemes for battalion task force in selected tactical activities
Another objective of this work was to create a scheme for battalion task force in the selected 
tactical activities. This objective constitutes of creation of a PowerPoint presentation, which 
represents this album of schemes. One of the main requirements, which the author set by the 
creation of these schemes was their lucidity and clearness. It ensures the fact that the individ-
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ual schemas are drawn according to the steps. In some schemes it was appropriate to split the 
layers, where each layer represents the terrain, units, maneuvers and obstacles. These layers 
then, when displayed in a single image, create the schema of tactical activity. (Figure 5 and 6)
Figure 5. Defense of water obstacle (own source)
The album contains the schemas for the following activities:
• The structure of battalion task force 
• Battalion task force in the first echelon of brigade 
• The defense of battalion task force 
• Fires of battalion task force in defense 
• Defense of water obstacle 
• Positional defense 
• Maneuver defense 
• Attack of battalion task force 
• Battalion task force in encirclement 
• Relieving battalion task force in defense 
• Variants of attack of battalion task force 
• Attack of battalion task force from the direct contact 
• Attack of battalion task force after moving from the depth
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Figure 6. Attack of battalion task force after moving from a depth (own source)
The conclusion 
The analysis found:
In contemporary operations it is necessary to introduce common standards for all joint 
activities. Knowledge of tactical symbols in a contemporary operating environment is abso-
lutely necessary. 
In the contemporary environment of ACR there is only one current document — APP–6C, 
which, however, is still not available in Czech translation. 
On this basis, one can argue that:
It is necessary to incorporate the demands of knowledge of tactical symbols into indi-
vidual training in ACR, and also in the preparation of students at the University of Defense. 
It is necessary to create a handbook dedicated to the issue of military symbology. 
This work can be used in military practice as a basis for improvement of training in the 
area of military symbology. It may also be used by students of the University of Defense 
for the study of military symbology. This work may also be a teaching tool, available to the 
teachers of University of Defense, in subjects like tactics of the units and formations.
The final conclusion
The purpose of this work was to point out the importance of knowledge of military symbol-
ogy in a contemporary operating environment. The work concludes that in contemporary 
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operations it is necessary to introduce common standards for all joint activities. Knowledge 
of military symbology is absolutely necessary in a contemporary operating environment. In 
the current ACR environment there is only one document dedicated to military symbology — 
APP-6c, which, however, is still not available in Czech translation, therefore it is necessary 
to create the handbook dedicated to the issue of military symbology in the Czech language.
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Military Captcha1
Jiří SZTUKA2, Ladislav HAGARA3 
Captcha description
Captcha is a tool that protects websites from internet bot attacks. A detailed description of 
Captcha will be mentioned below.  
What is Captcha
Captcha is an acronym based on the word “capture” and standing for “Completely Automat-
ed Public Turning test to tell Computers and Humans Apart”. Captchas are mostly developed 
for systems which are vulnerable to e–mail spambots, for example Yahoo! Mail or Gmail. 
They are also developed for systems that provide posting, such as most blogs, forums, chats, 
etc. Captcha can be designed and made in various ways. Many companies make their Capt-
chas in .Net, PHP or JavaScript. We had chosen JavaScript for our Captcha development.
Purpose of Captcha
The main purpose of Captcha is to distinguish whether you are human being or “bot”. It 
simply asks you a question that is easy for a human to answer, but impossible for computer 
to solve. The first Captcha was used on Yahoo! webpages. 
Picture 1. Example of Captcha
It was a picture of a curved text where one had to type in some kind of label underneath 
the Captcha picture. If one succeeded, the webpage sent you on to the desired content, or 
allowed the completion of the new account.
Development of Captcha
Impossible Captcha
At first people started to make Captchas that were really hard or nearly impossible for com-
puters to solve, but they were almost impossible to solve even by humans.
1 This article is the written form of the presentation that was shown on the Central European Forum on Higher 
Military Education (CEFME) International Young Scientists Conference on December 2013, NUPS, Budapest
2 Sergeant, B. Sc., jiri.sztuka@unob.cz
3 Lieutenant Colonel, M. Sc., Ph.D., ladislav.hagara@unob.cz
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Picture 2. Impossible Captcha 
The illustration above displays an impossible Captcha, one where the main intent is not 
to make the question that hard. Although there is one kind of Captcha that is specialized at 
making the task impossible to solve. It is called Crapcha (Completely Ridiculous and Phony 
Captcha that Hassles for Amusement).
Picture 3. Example of Crapcha
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Picture 4. Math Captcha
Pix Captcha
Many different kinds of Captcha were invented. The main goal is to make the easiest question 
for a human, but that a computer cannot solve. That was when picture Captcha were created, 
it is called Pix–Captcha. It is short form for Picture Captcha.
Picture 5. Picatcha—Pix—Captcha
This Captcha asks you to mark a specific picture, or specific group of pictures. Pictures 
are generated randomly and do not look the same. For example you have to mark all clocks, 
pix–captcha generated 8 pictures two of them are clocks one is digital and the second is an-
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alog, the rest of the pictures can be anything. The computer does not know how these clocks 
that you have to mark should look like, but you can easily mark the two pictures that display 
clocks.
More accessible Captcha
There were many attempts for more accessible Captchas. First people tried to do some kind 
of Captcha for people with disabilities, mostly visual. More accessible Captcha involved 
questions like: “How much is 1+2”, or “What color is the sky?”. Questions that are impossi-
ble for computers to solve. But these kinds of Captcha may worsen accessibility for people 
with intellectual and mental disabilities, for instance dyscalculia. The biggest effort is on 
making a central server which is shared with many sites. 
Picture 6. Sound Captcha(left), Original Captcha(right)
This server provides Captchas on websites, all of them generated randomly, and not only 
the text–based Captchas, but also visual, motor, cognitive and hearing kinds of Captcha. 
This could eliminate problems for people with mental, intellectual, visual, etc. disorders. The 
picture above displays the sound and the original, mostly used Captcha. The displayed text 
could be unreadable for some, and impossible to type correctly. 
Picture 7. 3D Captcha before test and after test
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Picture 8. Rezistor Captcha and Game Captcha
Kinds of attacks
Attackers usually try to get attention somehow. And there are various ways to accomplish 
that. There are various forms of getting attention done by attackers such as:
• Seeing something that has not been seen yet,
• Showing funny and interesting or even shocking content,
• Possibility of getting something for free,
• Declaring the reader a winner of some kind of competition,
• Showing any kind of nudity.
People are easily manipulated and usually do not recognize this kind of thread. The main 
groups of interest for attackers are elderly people or young people. Groups that are not edu-
cated enough in Information Technologies. 
“Bots”
But there are also other forms of attacks that can cause server overload. This can be caused by 
robots. A robot is a computer program that does some cycling processes over and over again, 
till the goal is reached. It usually collects data or fulfills requirements until accomplished and 
it is necessary to continue. And even within this branch there are many variations of these 





Spambots: this bot will send unwanted emails to your email address. Spambots can sim-
ply get your email address anywhere you type it, they register a string with a “@”, and after 
“harvesting” your email they just save your address and send spam to you.
Gatherers: they come through web pages and collect links of new web pages. These col-
lected links can be used for consecutive exploration.
Chatterbot: It is a kind of spambot, the difference is that this bot sends you unwanted 
messages, not emails. This bot spams users in chat applications.
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Botnet: It is a network of interconnected bots on virus–infected computers. Bots are wait-
ing for commands from owners who own this kind of virus–infected computer. They simply 
do what the owner tells them to do.
Characteristics of the solution
Military Pix–Captcha — Military means that this kind of Captcha is primarily designed for 
people who work in military branches. But it can also be used by users who are not educated 
in knowledge of military ranks. Military Pix–Captcha has many utilizations. For example at 
forums, specifically in situations when you want to create, edit or delete new posts. Whenev-
er you want to do such actions, Captcha will occur and wait for its solution. In another way 
you will be unable to proceed with such action. It can be also used at a contact form, where 
it appears right before successfully sending your contact information.
For whom is Military Captcha intended
Although Pix–Captcha is modern and an easily solved kind of Captcha it is not commonly 
used. Problems appear in situations when blind people would want to access pages that use 
this kind of Captcha. It is designed for military personnel and even for people that are not 
familiar with military ranks, but not for handicapped or injured people, or who have visual 
disorders or disabilities. 
Military Captcha development
Randomly generated pictures
Simple image array is used in which are inserted all pictures of military ranks concerning one 
national type of ranks. One image array means only one image is generated randomly. We 
have chosen three randomly generated pictures so we have three arrays. Pictures containing 
military ranks are saved in a specific folder. This must be mentioned, because functions that 
generate these pictures randomly need the exact paths of these pictures. The path is saved 
into a variable called “imlocation”. So there are three functions which generate pictures ran-
domly, each for one array. Functions are refreshed every time you refresh your web page, so 
each time you refresh your web page, you will get three different pictures. Before pictures are 
shown to the user, there is an “If else” statement that oversees this problem. It simply says: 
“Generate pictures as long as all of them are different from each other and until that, do not 
show me the pictures”. 
Picture 9. Condition for different picture appearance
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Randomly generated text
We used simple labels in which there is shown which one you have to mark for passing 
Captcha. We solved this similarly to the problem with the pictures. I have chosen a function 
that involves array of text. In this case military ranks are in the form of a text. Again, titles 
are randomly generated.
Mutual comparison
We decided on mutual comparison. This means that it is necessary to have a simple algorithm 
that compares text and name of the picture, to see whether one’s indication is correct. All of 
the pictures have their own names based on ranks that they show. We made a function that cut 
out a specific part of the file name. This specific part involves the whole title of the rank, but 
does not involve filename extension, but how to ensure cutting out the filename dynamically? 
It can be easily made by saving the length of text that has been randomly generated into a 
variable, followed by putting this variable as a number into a function that cut out a wanted 
string. Now the function knows in what range it has to cut.
Picture 10. Function for finding proper length of picture title
Now we know the exact length of string that we are looking for. 
Picture marking
Picture 11. Military Captcha
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At first we wanted to make the indication animated. But it would only complicate the 
structure of source code and worsen the functionality of Captcha. Also, there are various 
problems with different appearances of the same code in different browsers. So we decided 
to solve this problem by showing a border around the picture that one has to click on. We 
solved this exact part by involving jQuery in the source code. The picture is shown in div of 
dedicated scale, position, color and name. After clicking on the picture the border is shown 
around the div, not the picture. This action made the picture move. From a visual side, there 
was no problem, but it did not have a good aesthetic appearance. We wanted to make all the 
divs immobile and not influenced by changing scale after marking them with a border. We 
changed markings by border, by marking the picture with shadows after a click. That is the 
way to make div immobile after marking it. We chose a scale of fifteen pixels for the shadow. 
The color of the shadow is red, so it is easy to recognize which picture is the one marked. A 
few problems were solved, but many others showed up.
After marking a picture one can change one’s mind and want to mark another one. It 
does not sound like a big deal, but after marking a new picture one needs to unmark the old 
one. The solution we have described above made the pictures marked, not unmarked when 
one selected another picture. We had to upgrade click function with variables which indicate 
whether the other div is selected or not.
Help button
Military Captcha is supposed to be accessible even for people that are not familiar with mil-
itary ranks. Due to this problem it was necessary to add a help button that shows all ranks of 
the chosen nationality. The button is situated underneath the national flags. The new window 
displaying military ranks will open after clicking on this button.  
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Picture 12. Military ranks — Czech Republic
Picture13. Military ranks — United States
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Picture14. Military ranks — Slovak Republic
Picture15. Military ranks — Hungary
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Web implementation
As you can see, there are flag icons representing each state individually. It is there only for 
testing purposes and it is not going to be in the web version. The implemented version is 
supposed to appear right after one wants to send post or information where one has filled in 
a contact form. These are two main but not exclusive domains where Captcha could be used. 
Unlike the testing version, the implemented version will not let you change nationality while 
answering a question. There will be an option that will let you choose from the list of nation-
alities. Nationality selection will be presented by a selection file containing all nationalities.
Posting
One of many domains where Captcha could be implemented is at forums, mainly due to 
a higher possibility of bot attacks. Problems occur right before the successful posting of a 
contribution. That is the weakest part in forum security, and Captcha helps strengthen this 
weakness by implementing itself. 
The program should be used in situations such as sending your post to a forum, just after 
clocking the submit button. Your post is held right after clicking and Captcha pops up, the rest 
of the screen is blacked out and the only accessible part of the screen is Captcha. The content 
of the webpage is accessible and you or the robot has to answer the question that Captcha 
wants solved. The only thing that allows continuation is solving the question.
Sending
Sending has similar principles as posting has, but with the difference that sending is not 
viewed on the webpage. This applies to contact forms that allow admins and also robots to 
get personal information. As mentioned before, sending has a principle which is similar to 
posting. It includes a button, but its main purpose is calling, the function that shows Captcha 
and hides the website content.
Web browser and nationality support
Captcha was developed and tested on Google Chrome, on which it is fully functional. Also it 
is working properly in other browsers like Mozilla and Firefox. The only problematic brows-
er is Internet Explorer, which does not support a svg file format. In the current situation Mil-
itary Captcha supports three nationalities: Czech, American, Slovak and Hungarian. These 
involve ranks and Captchas in the native language for each state individually.
Implementation possibilities
Military Captcha could be used on websites of the Czech army: http://www.army.cz/. Imple-
mentation at school intranet is also possible.
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Other possible ways of Captcha usage
On the other hand, despite security purposes there is an option to use Captcha as educating 
material.
Security elements
Right–clicking is not allowed after Captcha appearance. This represents a simple prevention 
against potential abuse. The main reason is to limit a robot’s options of abuse to the maxi-
mum. After wrong indication, followed by unsuccessful checking, the Captcha will reload 
itself. 
Possibilities of future development 
Expansion
Due to multinational influence, national expansion is necessary. The number of French sol-
diers in our institution has risen, due to this French Captcha is needed. 
Education
Captcha could be also used for educating. The program should be accessible for every stu-
dent at university webpages. Upgraded by an option menu where you can select difficulty and 
number of questions, plus nationality selection.
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The analysis examines the governmental decisions that tried to provide alternatives and offer 
a realistic response to the current U.S. debt crisis, severely undermining those defense budget 
provisions that had previously been planned. First, the impact of the 2011 Budget Control 
Act and the ‘sequestration’ process will be examined within the context of U.S. defense plan-
ning, giving a comprehensive overview of the U.S. budget debate with regard to U.S defense 
policy. Then the analysis compares and contrasts the current 2013 financial year data to the 
2014 financial plan proposal based on President Obama’s statement in the White House on 
April 10, 2013, in which he presented the key points of the 2014 financial year budget. There 
the President put an emphasis on his sustained effort to improve the situation of American 
people through social benefit programs. These will have a determining effect to the United 
States armed forces in the future, which operate under heavy pressure and at times financial 
austerity. Expenses of social welfare and medical care are important for our analysis, as these 
belong to more steady mandatory items of the federal budget, while the defense budget relies 
mostly on discretionary funding, and is subject to major fluctuations. Finally the assessment 
will reflect on the Obama administration’s FY 2014 proposals with regard to the US defense 
policy review process in order to highlight the practical effects of sequestration.
Keywords: United States, strategy, defense policy, sequestration, financing
1. The essence of the Budget Control Act and the sequestration 
process
President Barack Obama approved the Budget Control Act (BCA) [1] on August 2 2011. In 
several aspects this was a milestone in the history of the United States, as one of the worst 
budget crises ever was postponed by the Act. Enacting the BCA was the only way for the 
United States to maintain financial liquidity in the short term. Even though it has never hap-
pened in U.S. history that the financial year has closed with a budget surplus, but this partic-
ular situation was extremely hard: enduring fiscal deficit and the continuously high stock of 
government debt was to continue increasing the debt accumulation in the U.S., paralyzing fi-
nancial policy. Therefore, significant fiscal spending cuts were enacted to regulate the growth 
of debt and maintain financial viability.
1 This article is the written form of the presentation that was shown on the Central European Forum on Higher 
Military Education (CEFME) International Young Scientists Conference on December 2013, NUPS, Budapest
2  monakoi.albert@gmail.com
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The BCA created the so called Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, publicly 
referred to as the Super Committee, whose primary task was finding a suitable solution to 
reduce the estimated $ 1.2 trillion deficit over the next ten years. However, in the selected 
ten–year period, the BCA will be followed much more by rebalancing the rate of debt ac-
cumulation, raising again long–disputed questions within U.S. politics, like how these cuts 
would be distributed among the different departments and functional fields.
As the next step, the budget sequestration process was initiated as an inevitable measure, 
unless a negotiated solution to executing budget reductions was found. The budget sequestra-
tion in 2013 referred to the automatic spending cuts of U.S. federal government spending in 
different categories of outlays that were initially set to go into effect on January 1, 2013. Both 
parties in Congress, the President, and the secretary of defense insisted that sequestration 
would not be allowed to go into effect, and no contingency plans were developed to mitigate 
the effects. Despite being under serious pressure, sequestration was also postponed by a fur-
ther two months by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, until March 1st 2013 to create 
further opportunity for a bipartisan negotiated solution. However, still lacking consensus the 
sequestration finally went into effect. The sequestration became a major topic of the fiscal 
cliff debate. The debate’s resolution, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA), [2] 
eliminated much of the taxation issues of the dispute but only delayed budget sequestrations 
for two months, thus reducing the original $110 billion to be saved per fiscal year to $85 bil-
lion in 2013. [3] The reductions in spending authority are approximately $85.4 billion during 
fiscal year 2013, with similar cuts for years 2014 through 2021. [4] However, the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated that the total federal outlays will continue to increase even 
with the sequester by an average of $238.6 billion per year during the next decade, although 
at a somewhat lesser rate.
2. Historical perspectives
Putting the uneasy situation of the U.S federal budget crisis into historical perspective and 
contrasting the Department of Defense (DoD) budget within, we can observe unprecedented 
levels of DoD expenditure in real terms, explaining a lot about the current crisis. On February 
1st 2011, the Obama administration released its FY 2011 budget. That fiscal year was seeking 
549 billion dollars for the Department of Defense base budget, which also included war costs. 
This represents a nominal increase of 2.8 percent in real terms, or 1.4 percent over the FY 
2010 request.
Since 2001, the base budget has grown by an average of four percent per year above in-
flation. Overall funding for overseas contingency operations (OCO) has declined by just over 
50 percent since 2008 when the war in Iraq ended. [5]
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Chart 1. Pentagon Budget Since 1948 [6] 
(in constant FY 2011 dollars – includes war costs)
As Chart 1 shows, defense spending since World War II has risen and fallen in cycles. In 
inflation–adjusted dollars and including war costs, the FY 2011 Pentagon budget request was 
13 percent higher than the Korea War peak, summing up to 624 billion dollars; and it was 
33 percent higher than the Vietnam War peak (534 billion dollars), 23 percent higher than 
the Reagan–era 1980s peak (574 billion dollars), and 64 percent higher than the Cold War 
average (432 billion dollars), and also 15 percent higher than the post–9/11 average which 
was 618 billion dollars. The latter symbolized the historic DoD budget record in the United 
States.
3. Effects on the FY 2014 defense budget
Our intention is to compare the FY 2013 defense budget to the FY 2014 defense budget re-
quest and to examine the main fracture points which influence U.S defense policy planning. 
The Obama Administration requested $525.4 billion in discretionary funding and $6.3 billion 
in mandatory funding in the base Department of Defense budget for FY 2013. Initially the 
budget did not include a request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding and 
instead used a placeholder of $88.5 billion, which was similar to the level of war funding in 
FY 2012. In May, the DoD released its FY 2014 OCO budget request, which totaled $88.5 
billion. With this change, the total DoD request for FY 2013 — including the base budget and 
OCO — was set to $620.2 billion USD.
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Chart 2. Summary of defense–related funding in the FY 2013  
Budget Request [7]
Chart 2 presents the total defense–related budget that includes more than the DoD bud-
get alone. The budget request also includes $19.4 billion for defense–related atomic energy 
programs, $7.7 billion for defense–related activities in other agencies, and $137.7 billion for 
veterans’ benefits and services. The treasury must also make an annual payment of $67.2 bil-
lion to the Military Retirement Trust Fund which was $15.2 billion. Together these expenses 
total $852.2 billion, or 23 percent of the total federal budget.
The FY 2014 budget request was released by the Obama administration on April 10 and 
this request — similarly to the FY 2013 defense request — does not comply with the Budget 
Control Act budget caps currently in effect for FY 2014, exceeding the caps by $52 billion. 
The FY 2014 budget requests a total of $612.5 billion for the Department of Defense (DoD). 
The base budget for the Department includes $526.6 billion in discretionary funding and $6.5 
billion in mandatory funding. An additional $79.4 billion is requested for ongoing military 
operations, primarily in Afghanistan.
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Chart 3. Summary of Defense–related Funding in the FY 2013  
Budget Request [8]
The total defense–related budget request also includes $19.3 billion for defense–related 
atomic energy programs; $7.7 billion for defense–related activities in other agencies; $137.7 
billion for veterans’ benefits and services; $70.3 billion to the Military Retirement Trust Fund 
to cover unfunded obligations from prior years, as well as tax exemptions for military per-
sonnel that resulted in $15.2 billion in lost revenue. Altogether these expenses total $875.2 
billion, which is nearly a quarter of the total federal budget.
Nonetheless, when comparing the total FY 2014 department of defense base budget re-
quest with the previous year we find that it had been reduced by $7.7 billion on the one hand, 
but on the other the total defense related spending had been increased by 23 billion dollars. 
The reason for this increase in spending is veterans’ benefits and services, plus the costs of 
the military retirement trust fund. If we add up all these extra costs the result is $ 235.4 billion 
which is nearly half of the base DoD budget, or ‘it could cover the costs of three Afghanistan 
wars’.
The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance [9] calls for rebalancing to the Pacific region and 
the Middle East. The U.S. military is not likely to emerge from this drawdown with the ca-
pacity or capability to both increase its presence in the Asia–Pacific region and maintain its 
current level of presence in the Middle East. As the FY 2014 budget request also shows, U.S. 
forces can be redeployed from one theater to another as needed in the event of a conflict, 
but the military may not be able to address successfully two major overlapping conflicts in 
different theaters.
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Conclusion
Basically, the fiscal uncertainty that began in 2011 with the federal statute of the BCA has 
only grown worse over time with the throw–back of the Super Committee, sequestration 
going into effect, and the government shutdown. Now that sequestration has indeed begun 
and the sharpest decrease from FY 2012 to FY 2013 has already taken place, the BCA budget 
caps may be more of a ceiling than floor in the coming years. Moreover, a significant reduc-
tion in the defense budget means that the United States will have to make a number of critical 
strategic choices in defense planning and management for the future. [8] The sequestration 
process or the BCA do not relieve defense planners from making these difficult choices 
because future funding levels are never certain—Congress only appropriates one year at a 
time. [10] 
Finally, the current budget impasse may not be resolved until the Afghanistan drawdown 
is effectively over, at which point many of the critical decisions will have already been made 
for the Defense Department by incremental reductions that chip away at programs year–
by–year or, worse, by the blunt and indiscriminant mechanism of sequestration. The 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the FY 2015 budget request will provide an op-
portunity for the Defense Department to address the rapidly evolving budgetary pressure. If 
the Department plans for the reduced budget caps in its FY 2015 request and uses the QDR 
as an opportunity to alter its strategic guidance according to these more realistic budget con-
straints, it will give DoD greater say in how cuts are implemented in the future but on the 
other hand this approach is not without risks. [11] The Department now has an opportunity 
to revise its budget and strategic guidance to fit within more realistic resource constraints.
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Thoughts on the Book Nuclear Reactor Safety
CSURGAI József1, SOLYMOSI Máté2
In 2013 December, the SOMOS Environmental Protection Ltd. and the ELTE Eöt-
vös Publishing Company published a new book dedicated to the safety of nuclear 
reactors and having analogous title (“Nuclear reactor safety”). For the readers 
of Academic and Applied Research in Military Science we want to present some 
considerations for reviewing the book.
Keywords: nuclear reactor safety, operation and construction of nuclear reactors, 
safe operation, safety assessment, legal regulation of the reactor safety
Introduction
Nuclear weapons, defense against them and the non-proliferation issues have priorities in 
military science and the science of military engineering. Military tasks of nuclear emergency 
response and the research with contemporary scientific tools are especially important to meet 
the challenge of the renaissance of CBRN weapons. 
The book on Safety of Nuclear Reactors is closely connected to the previously mentioned 
military and defensive tasks. It provides complete theoretical and practical knowledge of nu-
clear safety, one of the most essential parts of military engineering, i.e. the safety of nuclear 
reactors and nuclear power plants, including response tasks of a nuclear emergency.
The book Nuclear Reactor Safety covers the issues of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
and of the safe construction and operation of nuclear power plants. [1] The following goals of 
the book were declared by the editors: to complement missing basic knowledge, knowledge 
transfer, to awaken interest and support experts.
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Volume I. of Nuclear Reactor Safety
The Book has 750 pages in two volumes. The 378 pages of the first volume are separated into 
Chapters I-III. The contents of the chapters are shortly summarized below. 
Picture 1. The cover of Volume I.
Chapter I. The most important processes of nuclear reactors
The first chapter reviews the basic nuclear processes facilitating the understanding of the fol-
lowing chapters: fission, chain-reaction, neutron physics, critical systems, research reactors, 
nuclear power plants, the basic physics of the pressurized water reactors, and the basics of 
thermo hydraulics, fuel cycle, the behaviour of fuel elements, activity transport and environ-
mental effects. 
Chapter II. The construction of nuclear power plants
This chapter reviews the basic operation of a nuclear power plant, the function of a nuclear 
power plant, the features of the power plant cycle, the main characteristics of systems and 
equipment.
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Chapter III. The basics of reactor design safety
The subjects of the chapter are the normal and emergency operational conditions, and the 
design basis of them; incidents, accidents, safety functions and systems; design basis and 
deterministic design principles, risks and characteristics and criteria of risk. 
Volume II. of Nuclear Reactor Safety
The 372 pages of the second volume are separated into Chapters IV-VI.
Picture 2. The cover of Volume II.
Chapter IV. The operational safety of the reactors
Beside the technical requirements, the safety culture and the operational norms, for the con-
sistency and coherence for the construction and the safe operation of a nuclear reactor there 
must be established instructions and procedures described in the actual chapter. The chapter 
shows how these norms, instructions and procedures must be complied with in any circum-
stances during normal and emergency operation. The aging treatments, maintenance, moni-
toring and testing listed in the chapter are also important elements of safe operation as long 
as possible.  
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Chapter V. The basics of safety assessments 
The chapter depicts how safety assessment demonstrates the acceptability of safety level re-
sulting from control measurements and tests directed at serious accident assessments, Level 1 
and Level 2 PSA, assessments of external hazards and the evaluation of source term, activity 
transport and health effects. 
Chapter VI. The legislation for the safety of nuclear reactors
The acceptance of the use of nuclear reactors in society is - as usual - based on legal regula-
tions.  
The relevant legislation is mostly based on international standards and other norms ac-
cepted by international organizations. Among these are the safety standards of the IAEA3 [3] 
and the European Union regulations, directives and recommendations. Safety is guaranteed 
by the international organizations and a system of international conventions. 
The chapter describes the legislative background, the responsibilities, safety reports, and 
the activity of international organizations (IAEA, OECD4 NEA5, ENSREG6, WENRA7) and 
the system of international conventions.
Final conclusions
The Hungarian authors of the book have published such a complex work on the topic, a first 
in the world. Besides the theoretical questions the book provides an overview of the process 
how the issues of nuclear reactors’ safety are handled by professionals in practice. It can be 
stated that the book is a new and bright lighthouse in the sea of domestic nuclear safety. It 
directs and guides the reader through the safety issues of the electricity-producing nuclear 
power plants, which make up the dominant part of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Besides the importance, the actuality of the book is also acknowledged, because the 
MVM8 Paks Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) has a leading position in energy production in Hun-
gary, generating more than 40% of the domestic electric energy. However, the increase in 
energy production has become a necessity recently, and one of the important and environ-
mentally friendly ways is the extension of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant with a new block or 
blocks. Young specialists, as well as students, teachers and workers in their field of work can 
find knowledge and experience in the book necessary for the NPP’s extension. A well of ex-
perience and several decades of practical knowledge from the writers were also incorporated 
into this masterpiece.
Holló Előd, one of the editors of the book mentioned the possibility of a shorter English 
edition of the book. 
The book has 24 authors, who are not teachers, but experts in their own fields, acknowl-
edged both at a domestic and international level. The diversity results in the occasional struc-
3 International Atomic Energy Agency
4 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
5 Nuclear Energy Agency
6 European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group
7 Western European Nuclear Regulators Association
8 MVM — Magyar Villamos Művek (Hungarian Electric Energy Corporation) 
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tural problems of the book. It is not a lack of teaching approach, rather the missing unified 
approach and style that might be objected to.
The editors sought homogeneity with the main objectives, that the principles must be 
reviewed generally and the practical implementations with examples from the Paks NPP 
should also be referred to. The four-member editorial board had a difficult task to ensure a 
homogeneity of visions of 24 individual authors. It is appreciated that their effort was mostly 
successful, but not in every case, unfortunately.
We hope that these imperfections of the Hungarian edition will be eliminated in the 
planned English edition and the readers will receive a great handbook.
Based on all these, we highly recommend this book for the specialists of both the civil 
and the defense sectors.
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